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As our nation strives to develop effective policies to respond to climate change, it is critical to have the latest and best 
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It is the first report in almost a decade to provide an extensive evaluation of climate change impacts on the United States 
at the regional level. 
An expert team of scientists operating under the authority of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, assisted by 
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and the public in accordance with the Information Quality Act guidelines issued by the Department of Commerce and 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
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report as we make policies and decisions about the future, and we recommend others do the same.
   Sincerely,
      
Dr. John Holdren     Dr. Jane Lubchenco
Director,       Administrator,
Office of Science and Technology Policy   National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
C
O
N
T
EN
T
S About this Report ........................................................................................ 7 
Executive Summary ................................................................................... 9 
Global Climate Change ...................................................................... 13 
National Climate Change .................................................................. 27  
Climate Change Impacts by Sector
 Water Resources ....................................................................................... 41 
Energy Supply and Use .............................................................................53 
 Transportation ............................................................................................ 61 
 Agriculture ................................................................................................... 71 
Ecosystems ..................................................................................................79 
Human Health .............................................................................................89 
 Society ..........................................................................................................99
Regional Climate Change Impacts 
 Northeast .................................................................................................107 
 Southeast ...................................................................................................111 
 Midwest ..................................................................................................... 117  
  Great Plains ..............................................................................................123 
 Southwest .................................................................................................129 
 Northwest ................................................................................................135 
 Alaska ........................................................................................................139 
 Islands ........................................................................................................145 
 Coasts .......................................................................................................149 
An Agenda for Climate Impacts Science .............................153
Concluding Thoughts ............................................................................157 
Author Team Biographies ..........................................................................159 
Primary Sources of Information ............................................................. 161
Acronyms and Abbreviations ...................................................................164 
References ..........................................................................................................165
Photo and Figure Credits ............................................................................188 
C
O
N
T
EN
T
S

About this Report
PB 7
Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States About this Report
What is this report?
This report summarizes the science of climate change 
and the impacts of climate change on the United States, 
now and in the future. It is largely based on results of 
the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP),a 
and integrates those results with related research from 
around the world. This report discusses climate-related 
impacts for various societal and environmental sec-
tors and regions across the nation. It is an authoritative 
scientific report written in plain language, with the goal 
of better informing public and private decision making 
at all levels.
Who called for it, who wrote it, and who 
approved it?
The USGCRP called for this report. An expert team of 
scientists operating under the authority of the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act, assisted by communication 
specialists, wrote the document. The report was exten-
sively reviewed and revised based on comments from 
experts and the public. The report was approved by its 
lead USGCRP Agency, the National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration, the other USGCRP agencies, 
and the Committee on the Environment and Natural Re-
sources on behalf of the National Science and Technol-
ogy Council.b This report meets all Federal requirements 
associated with the Information Quality Act, including 
those pertaining to public comment and transparency. 
What are its sources?
The report draws from a large body of scientific in-
formation. The foundation of this report is a set of 21 
Synthesis and Assessment Products (SAPs), which were 
designed to address key policy-relevant issues in climate 
science (see page 161); several of these were also sum-
marized in the Scientific Assessment of the Effects of 
Climate Change on the United States published in 2008. 
In addition, other peer-reviewed scientific assessments 
were used, including those of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, the U.S. National Assessment 
of the Consequences of Climate Variability and Change, 
the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, the National 
Research Council’s Transportation Research Board 
report on the Potential Impacts of Climate Change on 
U.S. Transportation, and a variety of regional climate 
impact assessments. These assessments were augmented 
with government statistics as necessary (such as popula-
tion census and energy usage) as well as publicly avail-
able observations and peer-reviewed research published 
through the end of 2008. This new work was carefully 
selected by the author team with advice from expert re-
viewers to update key aspects of climate change science 
relevant to this report. The icons on the bottom of this 
page represent some of the major sources drawn upon 
for this synthesis report.  
On the first page of each major section, the sources 
primarily drawn upon for that section are shown using 
these icons. Endnotes, indicated by superscript numbers 
and compiled at the end of the book, are used for specific 
references throughout the report.
a. The U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP), which was established in 1990 by the Global Change Research Act, encompasses the Climate Change 
Science Program (CCSP).
b. A description of the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) can be found at www.ostp.gov/cs/nstc.
See page 161 for descriptions of these sources.
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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Does this report deal with options for 
responding to climate change?
While the primary focus of this report is on the 
impacts of climate change in the United States, 
it also deals with some of the actions society is 
already taking or can take to respond to the climate 
challenge. Responses to climate change fall into two 
broad categories. The first involves “mitigation” 
measures to reduce climate change by, for example, 
reducing emissions of heat-trapping gases and par-
ticles, or increasing removal of heat-trapping gases 
from the atmosphere. The second involves “adapta-
tion” measures to improve our ability to cope with 
or avoid harmful impacts and take advantage of 
beneficial ones, now and in the future. Both of these 
are necessary elements of an effective response 
strategy. These two types of responses are linked in 
that more effective mitigation measures reduce the 
amount of climate change, and therefore the need 
for adaptation. 
This report underscores the importance of mitiga-
tion by comparing impacts resulting from higher 
versus lower emissions scenarios. The report shows 
that choices made about emissions in the next few 
decades will have far-reaching consequences for 
climate change impacts. Over the long term, lower 
emissions will lessen both the magnitude of climate 
change impacts and the rate at which they appear. 
While the report underscores the importance of 
mitigation as an essential part of the nation’s climate 
change strategy, it does not evaluate mitigation 
technologies or undertake an analysis of the ef-
fectiveness of various approaches. These issues are 
the subject of ongoing studies by the U.S. Govern-
ment’s Climate Change Technology Program and 
several federal agencies including the Department 
of Energy, Environmental Protection Agency, 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 
Department of Transportation, and Department of 
Agriculture. The range of mitigation responses be-
ing studied includes more efficient production and 
use of energy, increased use of non-carbon-emitting 
energy sources, and carbon capture and storage.
Adaptation options also have the potential to moder-
ate harmful impacts of current and future climate 
variability and change. While this report does ad-
dress adaptation, it does not do so comprehensively. 
Rather, in the context of impacts, this report identi-
fies examples of actions currently being pursued 
in various sectors and regions to address climate 
change, as well as other environmental problems 
that could be exacerbated by climate change such as 
urban air pollution and heat waves. In most cases, 
there is currently insufficient peer-reviewed infor-
mation to evaluate the practicality, effectiveness, 
costs, or benefits of these measures, highlighting a 
need for research in this area. Thus, the discussion 
of various public and private adaptation examples 
should not be viewed as an endorsement of any 
particular option, but rather as illustrative examples 
of approaches being tried. 
How is the likelihood of various 
outcomes expressed given that the 
future is not certain? 
When it is considered necessary to express a range 
of possible outcomes and identify the likelihood 
of particular impacts, this report takes a plain-
language approach to expressing the expert judg-
ment of the author team based on the best available 
evidence. For example, an outcome termed “likely” 
has at least a two-thirds chance of occurring; an 
outcome termed “very likely,” at least a 90 percent 
chance.1 In using these terms, the Federal Advisory 
Committee has taken into consideration a wide 
range of information, including the strength and 
consistency of the observed evidence, the range and 
consistency of model projections, the reliability of 
particular models as tested by various methods, and 
most importantly, the body of work addressed in 
earlier synthesis and assessment reports. Key sourc-
es of information used to develop these character-
izations of uncertainty are referenced in endnotes. 
How does this report address 
incomplete scientific understanding?
This assessment identifies areas in which scientific 
uncertainty limits our ability to estimate future 
climate change and its impacts. The section on An 
Agenda for Climate Impacts Science at the end of 
this report highlights some of these areas.
Executive Summary
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Observations show that warming of the climate is unequivocal. The global 
warming observed over the past 50 years is due primarily to human-induced 
emissions of heat-trapping gases. These emissions come mainly from the 
burning of fossil fuels (coal, oil, and gas), with important contributions from 
the clearing of forests, agricultural practices, and other activities.
Warming over this century is projected to be considerably greater than 
over the last century. The global average temperature since 1900 has risen 
by about 1.5ºF. By 2100, it is projected to rise another 2 to 11.5ºF. The U.S. 
average temperature has risen by a comparable amount and is very likely 
to rise more than the global average over this century, with some variation 
from place to place. Several factors will determine future temperature 
increases. Increases at the lower end of this range are more likely if global 
heat-trapping gas emissions are cut substantially. If emissions continue to 
rise at or near current rates, temperature increases are more likely to be near 
the upper end of the range. Volcanic eruptions or other natural variations 
could temporarily counteract some of the human-induced warming, slowing the rise in global 
temperature, but these effects would only last a few years.
Reducing emissions of carbon dioxide would lessen warming over this century and beyond. Siz-
able early cuts in emissions would significantly reduce the pace and the overall amount of climate 
change. Earlier cuts in emissions would have a greater effect in reducing climate change than com-
parable reductions made later. In addition, reducing emissions of some shorter-lived heat-trapping 
gases, such as methane, and some types of particles, such as soot, would begin to reduce warming 
within weeks to decades. 
Climate-related changes have already been observed globally and in the United States. These 
include increases in air and water temperatures, reduced frost days, increased frequency and inten-
sity of heavy downpours, a rise in sea level, and reduced snow cover, glaciers, permafrost, and sea 
ice. A longer ice-free period on lakes and rivers, lengthening of the growing season, and increased 
water vapor in the atmosphere have also been observed. Over the past 30 years, temperatures have 
risen faster in winter than in any other season, with average winter temperatures in the Midwest 
and northern Great Plains increasing more than 7ºF. Some of the changes have been faster than 
previous assessments had suggested.
These climate-related changes are expected to continue while new ones develop. Likely future 
changes for the United States and surrounding coastal waters include more intense hurricanes with 
related increases in wind, rain, and storm surges (but not necessarily an increase in the number of 
these storms that make landfall), as well as drier conditions in the Southwest and Caribbean. These 
changes will affect human health, water supply, agriculture, coastal areas, and many other aspects 
of society and the natural environment.
This report synthesizes information from a wide variety of scientific assessments (see page 7) and 
recently published research to summarize what is known about the observed and projected conse-
quences of climate change on the United States. It combines analysis of impacts on various sectors 
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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such as energy, water, and transportation at the 
national level with an assessment of key impacts on 
specific regions of the United States. For example, 
sea-level rise will increase risks of erosion, storm 
surge damage, and flooding for coastal communi-
ties, especially in the Southeast and parts of Alaska. 
Reduced snowpack and earlier snow melt will alter 
the timing and amount of water supplies, posing 
significant challenges for water resource manage-
ment in the West.
Society and ecosystems can adjust to some climatic 
changes, but this takes time. The projected rapid 
rate and large amount of climate change over this 
century will challenge the ability of society and 
natural systems to adapt. For example, it is difficult 
and expensive to alter or replace infrastructure 
designed to last for decades (such as buildings, 
bridges, roads, airports, reservoirs, and ports) in re-
sponse to continuous and/or abrupt climate change. 
Impacts are expected to become increasingly severe 
for more people and places as the amount of warm-
ing increases. Rapid rates of warming would lead 
to particularly large impacts on natural ecosystems 
and the benefits they provide to humanity. Some of 
the impacts of climate change will be irreversible, 
such as species extinctions and coastal land lost to 
rising seas. 
Unanticipated impacts of increasing carbon dioxide 
and climate change have already occurred and 
more are possible in the future. For example, it has 
recently been observed that the increase in atmo-
spheric carbon dioxide concentration is causing an 
increase in ocean acidity. This reduces the ability of 
corals and other sea life to build shells and skeletons 
out of calcium carbonate. Additional impacts in the 
future might stem from unforeseen changes in the 
climate system, such as major alterations in oceans, 
ice, or storms; and unexpected consequences of 
ecological changes, such as massive dislocations 
of species or pest outbreaks. Unexpected social or 
economic changes, including major shifts in wealth, 
technology, or societal priorities would also affect 
our ability to respond to climate change. Both 
anticipated and unanticipated impacts become more 
challenging with increased warming.
Projections of future climate change come from 
careful analyses of outputs from global climate 
models run on the world’s most advanced comput-
ers. The model simulations analyzed in this report 
used plausible scenarios of human activity that 
generally lead to further increases in heat-trapping 
emissions. None of the scenarios used in this report 
assumes adoption of policies explicitly designed to 
address climate change. However, the level of emis-
sions varies among scenarios because of differences 
in assumptions about population, economic activity, 
choice of energy technologies, and other factors. 
Scenarios cover a range of emissions of heat-trap-
ping gases, and the associated climate projections 
illustrate that lower emissions result in less climate 
change and thus reduced impacts over this century 
and beyond. Under all scenarios considered in 
this report, however, relatively large and sustained 
changes in many aspects of climate are projected by 
the middle of this century, with even larger changes 
by the end of this century, especially under higher 
emissions scenarios. 
In projecting future conditions, there is always 
some level of uncertainty. For example, there is a 
high degree of confidence in projections that future 
temperature increases will be greatest in the Arctic 
and in the middle of continents. For precipitation, 
there is high confidence in projections of continued 
increases in the Arctic and sub-Arctic (including 
Alaska) and decreases in the regions just outside 
the tropics, but the precise location of the transition 
between these is less certain. At local to regional 
scales and on time frames up to a few years, natural 
climate variations can be relatively large and can 
temporarily mask the progressive nature of global 
climate change. However, the science of making 
skillful projections at these scales has progressed 
considerably, allowing useful information to be 
drawn from regional climate studies such as those 
highlighted in this report. 
This report focuses on observed and projected 
climate change and its impacts on the United States. 
However, a discussion of these issues would be 
incomplete without mentioning some of the actions 
society can take to respond to the climate chal-
lenge. The two major categories are “mitigation” 
and “adaptation.” Mitigation refers to options for 
limiting climate change by, for example, reducing 
10 11
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heat-trapping emissions such as carbon dioxide, 
methane, nitrous oxide, and halocarbons, or re-
moving some of the heat-trapping gases from the 
atmosphere. Adaptation refers to changes made 
to better respond to present or future climatic and 
other environmental conditions, thereby reducing 
harm or taking advantage of opportunity. Effective 
mitigation measures reduce the need for adaptation. 
Mitigation and adaptation are both essential parts of 
a comprehensive climate change response strategy. 
Carbon dioxide emissions are a primary focus of 
mitigation strategies. These include improving 
energy efficiency, using energy sources that do not 
produce carbon dioxide or produce less of it, captur-
ing and storing carbon dioxide from fossil fuel use, 
and so on. Choices made about emissions reductions 
now and over the next few decades will have far-
reaching consequences for climate-change impacts. 
The importance of mitigation is clear in compari-
sons of impacts resulting from higher versus lower 
emissions scenarios considered in this report. Over 
the long term, lower emissions will lessen both the 
magnitude of climate-change impacts and the rate 
at which they appear. Smaller climate changes that 
come more slowly make the adaptation challenge 
more tractable.
However, no matter how aggressively heat-trapping 
emissions are reduced, some amount of climate 
change and resulting impacts will continue due to 
the effects of gases that have already been released. 
This is true for several reasons. First, some of these 
gases are very long-lived and the levels of atmo-
spheric heat-trapping gases will remain elevated for 
hundreds of years or more. Second, the Earth’s vast 
oceans have absorbed much of the heat added to the 
climate system due to the increase in heat-trapping 
gases, and will retain that heat for many decades. 
In addition, the factors that determine emissions, 
such as energy-supply systems, cannot be changed 
overnight. Consequently, there is also a need  
for adaptation. 
Adaptation can include a wide range of activities. 
Examples include a farmer switching to growing 
a different crop variety better suited to warmer or 
drier conditions; a company relocating key busi-
ness centers away from coastal areas vulnerable 
to sea-level rise and hurricanes; and a community 
altering its zoning and building codes to place fewer 
structures in harm’s way and making buildings 
less vulnerable to damage from floods, fires, and 
other extreme events. Some adaptation options that 
are currently being pursued in various regions and 
sectors to deal with climate change and/or other 
environmental issues are identified in this report. 
However, it is clear that there are limits to how 
much adaptation can achieve.
Humans have adapted to changing climatic condi-
tions in the past, but in the future, adaptations will 
be particularly challenging because society won’t be 
adapting to a new steady state but rather to a rapidly 
moving target. Climate will be continually chang-
ing, moving at a relatively rapid rate, outside the 
range to which society has adapted in the past. The 
precise amounts and timing of these changes will 
not be known with certainty. 
In an increasingly interdependent world, U.S. 
vulnerability to climate change is linked to the fates 
of other nations. For example, conflicts or mass 
migrations of people resulting from food scarcity 
and other resource limits, health impacts, or envi-
ronmental stresses in other parts of the world could 
threaten U.S. national security. It is thus difficult to 
fully evaluate the impacts of climate change on the 
United States without considering the consequences 
of climate change elsewhere. However, such analy-
sis is beyond the scope of this report.
Finally, this report identifies a number of areas in 
which inadequate information or understanding 
hampers our ability to estimate future climate 
change and its impacts. For example, our knowl-
edge of changes in tornadoes, hail, and ice storms 
is quite limited, making it difficult to know if 
and how such events have changed as climate has 
warmed, and how they might change in the future. 
Research on ecological responses to climate change 
is also limited, as is our understanding of social 
responses. The section titled An Agenda for Climate 
Impacts Science at the end of this report offers some 
thoughts on the most important ways to improve our 
knowledge. Results from such efforts would inform 
future assessments that continue building our 
understanding of humanity’s impacts on climate, 
and climate’s impacts on us.
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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1. Global warming is unequivocal and primarily human-induced.
Global temperature has increased over the past 50 years. This observed increase is due primarily to human-
induced emissions of heat-trapping gases. (p. 13)
2. Climate changes are underway in the United States and are projected to grow.
Climate-related changes are already observed in the United States and its coastal waters. These include increases 
in heavy downpours, rising temperature and sea level, rapidly retreating glaciers, thawing permafrost, lengthening 
growing seasons, lengthening ice-free seasons in the ocean and on lakes and rivers, earlier snowmelt, and  
alterations in river flows. These changes are projected to grow. (p. 27)
3. Widespread climate-related impacts are occurring now and are expected to increase.
Climate changes are already affecting water, energy, transportation, agriculture, ecosystems, and health. These 
impacts are different from region to region and will grow under projected climate change. (p. 41-106, 107-152)
4. Climate change will stress water resources.
Water is an issue in every region, but the nature of the potential impacts varies. Drought, related to reduced 
precipitation, increased evaporation, and increased water loss from plants, is an important issue in many regions, 
especially in the West. Floods and water quality problems are likely to be amplified by climate change in most 
regions. Declines in mountain snowpack are important in the West and Alaska where snowpack provides vital 
natural water storage. (p. 41, 129, 135, 139)
5. Crop and livestock production will be increasingly challenged.
Many crops show positive responses to elevated carbon dioxide and low levels of warming, but higher levels of 
warming often negatively affect growth and yields. Increased pests, water stress, diseases, and weather extremes 
will pose adaptation challenges for crop and livestock production. (p. 71)
6. Coastal areas are at increasing risk from sea-level rise and storm surge.
Sea-level rise and storm surge place many U.S. coastal areas at increasing risk of erosion and flooding, especially 
along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, Pacific Islands, and parts of Alaska. Energy and transportation infrastructure 
and other property in coastal areas are very likely to be adversely affected. (p. 111, 139, 145, 149)
7. Risks to human health will increase.
Harmful health impacts of climate change are related to increasing heat stress, waterborne diseases, poor air qual-
ity, extreme weather events, and diseases transmitted by insects and rodents. Reduced cold stress provides some 
benefits. Robust public health infrastructure can reduce the potential for negative impacts. (p. 89)
8. Climate change will interact with many social and environmental stresses.
Climate change will combine with pollution, population growth, overuse of resources, urbanization, and other 
social, economic, and environmental stresses to create larger impacts than from any of these factors alone. (p. 99)
9. Thresholds will be crossed, leading to large changes in climate and ecosystems.
There are a variety of thresholds in the climate system and ecosystems. These thresholds determine, for example, 
the presence of sea ice and permafrost, and the survival of species, from fish to insect pests, with implications for 
society. With further climate change, the crossing of additional thresholds is expected. (p. 76, 82, 115, 137, 142) 
10. Future climate change and its impacts depend on choices made today.
The amount and rate of future climate change depend primarily on current and future human-caused emissions 
of heat-trapping gases and airborne particles. Responses involve reducing emissions to limit future warming, and 
adapting to the changes that are unavoidable. (p. 25, 29) 
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Key Messages:
Human activities have led to large increases in heat-trapping gases over the • 
past century.
Global average temperature and sea level have increased, and precipitation • 
patterns have changed.
The global warming of the past 50 years is due primarily to human-induced • 
increases in heat-trapping gases. Human “fingerprints” also have been 
identified in many other aspects of the climate system, including changes in 
ocean heat content, precipitation, atmospheric moisture, and Arctic sea ice.  
Global temperatures are projected to continue to rise over this century; by • 
how much and for how long depends on a number of factors, including the 
amount of heat-trapping gas emissions and how sensitive the climate is to 
those emissions.
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This introduction to global climate 
change explains very briefly what has 
been happening to the world’s climate 
and why, and what is projected to 
happen in the future. While this report 
focuses on climate change impacts in 
the United States, understanding these 
changes and their impacts requires  
an understanding of the global  
climate system. 
Many changes have been observed in 
global climate over the past century. 
The nature and causes of these changes 
have been comprehensively chronicled 
in a variety of recent reports, such as 
those by the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) and the 
U.S. Climate Change Science Program 
(CCSP). This section does not intend to 
duplicate these comprehensive efforts, 
but rather to provide a brief synthesis, 
and to integrate more recent work with 
the assessments of the IPCC, CCSP, 
and others. 
Key Sources
800,000 Year Record of Carbon Dioxide Concentration
Lüthi et al.; Tans; IIASA2
Analysis of air bubbles trapped in an Antarctic ice core extending back 800,000 years 
documents the Earth’s changing carbon dioxide concentration. Over this long period, 
natural factors have caused the atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration to vary 
within a range of about 170 to 300 parts per million (ppm). Temperature-related data 
make clear that these variations have played a central role in determining the global 
climate. As a result of human activities, the present carbon dioxide concentration of 
about 385 ppm is about 30 percent above its highest level over at least the last 800,000 
years. In the absence of strong control measures, emissions projected for this century 
would result in the carbon dioxide concentration increasing to a level that is roughly 
2 to 3 times the highest level occurring over the glacial-interglacial era that spans the 
last 800,000 or more years.
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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Human activities have led to large 
increases in heat-trapping gases over 
the past century. 
The Earth’s climate depends on the functioning of a 
natural “greenhouse effect.” This effect is the result 
of heat-trapping gases (also known as greenhouse 
gases) like water vapor, carbon dioxide, ozone, 
methane, and nitrous oxide, which absorb heat radi-
ated from the Earth’s surface and lower atmosphere 
and then radiate much of the energy back toward 
the surface. Without this natural greenhouse effect, 
the average surface temperature of the Earth would 
be about 60°F colder. However, human activities 
have been releasing additional heat-trapping gases, 
intensifying the natural greenhouse effect, thereby 
changing the Earth’s climate.
Climate is influenced by a variety of factors, both 
human-induced and natural. The increase in the 
carbon dioxide concentration has been the principal 
factor causing warming over the past 50 years. Its 
concentration has been building up in the Earth’s 
atmosphere since the beginning of the industrial 
era in the mid-1700s, primarily due to the burn-
ing of fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas) and 
the clearing of forests. Human activities have also 
increased the emissions of other greenhouse gases, 
such as methane, nitrous oxide, and halocarbons.3 
These emissions are thickening the blanket of 
heat-trapping gases in Earth’s atmosphere, causing 
surface temperatures to rise.
Heat-trapping gases
Carbon dioxide concentration has increased due 
to the use of fossil fuels in electricity generation, 
transportation, and industrial and household uses. 
It is also produced as a by-product during the 
manufacturing of cement. Deforestation provides a 
source of carbon dioxide and reduces its uptake by 
trees and other plants. Globally, over the past sev-
eral decades, about 80 percent of human-induced 
carbon dioxide emissions came from the burning 
of fossil fuels, while about 20 percent resulted from 
deforestation and associated agricultural practices. 
The concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmo-
sphere has increased by roughly 35 percent since 
the start of the industrial revolution.3
Methane concentration has increased mainly as 
a result of agriculture; raising livestock (which 
produce methane in their digestive tracts); mining, 
transportation, and use of certain fossil fuels; sew-
age; and decomposing garbage in landfills. About 
70 percent of the emissions of atmospheric methane 
are now related to human activities.4 
Nitrous oxide concentration is increasing as a re-
sult of fertilizer use and fossil fuel burning. 
Halocarbon emissions come from the 
release of certain manufactured chemi-
cals to the atmosphere. Examples include 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), which were 
used extensively in refrigeration and for 
other industrial processes before their pres-
ence in the atmosphere was found to cause 
stratospheric ozone depletion. The abun-
dance of these gases in the atmosphere is 
now decreasing as a result of international 
regulations designed to protect the ozone 
layer. Continued decreases in ozone-deplet-
ing halocarbon emissions are expected to 
reduce their relative influence on climate 
change in the future.3,5 Many halocarbon 
replacements, however, are potent green-
house gases, and their concentrations  
are increasing.6 
Increases in concentrations of these gases since 1750 are due to human activities 
in the industrial era. Concentration units are parts per million (ppm) or parts per 
billion (ppb), indicating the number of molecules of the greenhouse gas per million 
or billion molecules of air.
Forster et al.3;Blasing7
2,000 Years of Greenhouse Gas Concentrations
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Another type of aerosol, often referred to as soot 
or black carbon, absorbs incoming sunlight and 
traps heat in the atmosphere. Thus, depending on 
their type, aerosols can either mask or increase the 
warming caused by increased levels of greenhouse 
gases.13 On a globally averaged basis, the sum of 
these aerosol effects offsets some of the warming 
caused by heat-trapping gases.10 
The effects of various greenhouse gases and 
aerosol particles on Earth’s climate depend in part 
on how long these gases and particles remain in 
the atmosphere. After emission, the atmospheric 
concentration of carbon dioxide remains elevated 
for thousands of years, and that of methane for 
decades, while the elevated concentrations of aero-
sols only persist for days to weeks.11,12 The climate 
effects of reductions in emissions of carbon dioxide 
and other long-lived gases do not become apparent 
for at least several decades. In contrast, reductions 
in emissions of short-lived compounds can have a 
rapid, but complex effect since the geographic pat-
terns of their climatic influence and the resulting 
surface temperature responses are quite different. 
One modeling study found that while the greatest 
emissions of short-lived pollutants in summertime 
by late this century are projected to come from 
Asia, the strongest climate response is projected to 
be over the central United States.13 
Human activities have also changed the land sur-
face in ways that alter how much heat is reflected 
or absorbed by the surface. Such changes include 
the cutting and burning of forests, the replacement 
of other areas of natural vegetation with agricul-
ture and cities, and large-scale irrigation. These 
transformations of the land surface can cause local 
(and even regional) warming or cooling. Globally, 
the net effect of these changes has probably been a 
slight cooling of the Earth’s surface over the past 
100 years.14,15 
Natural influences
Two important natural factors also influence cli-
mate: the Sun and volcanic eruptions. Over the past 
three decades, human influences on climate have 
become increasingly obvious, and global tempera-
tures have risen sharply. During the same period, 
the Sun’s energy output (as measured by satellites 
since 1979) has followed its historical 11-year cycle 
Ozone is a greenhouse gas, and is continually pro-
duced and destroyed in the atmosphere by chemical 
reactions. In the troposphere, the lowest 5 to 10 
miles of the atmosphere near the surface, human 
activities have increased the ozone concentration 
through the release of gases such as carbon mon-
oxide, hydrocarbons, and nitrogen oxides. These 
gases undergo chemical reactions to produce ozone 
in the presence of sunlight. In addition to trapping 
heat, excess ozone in the troposphere causes respi-
ratory illnesses and other human health problems. 
In the stratosphere, the layer above the troposphere, 
ozone exists naturally and protects life on Earth 
from exposure to excessive ultraviolet radiation 
from the Sun. As mentioned previously, halocar-
bons released by human activities destroy ozone 
in the stratosphere and have caused the ozone hole 
over Antarctica.8 Changes in the stratospheric 
ozone layer have contributed to changes in wind 
patterns and regional climates in Antarctica.9
Water vapor is the most important and abundant 
greenhouse gas in the atmosphere. Human activi-
ties produce only a very small increase in water  
vapor through irrigation and combustion process-
es.3 However, the surface warming caused by hu-
man-produced increases in other greenhouse gases 
leads to an increase in atmospheric water vapor, 
since a warmer climate increases evaporation and 
allows the atmosphere to hold more moisture. This 
creates an amplifying “feedback loop,” leading to 
more warming.
Other human influences
In addition to the global-scale climate effects of 
heat-trapping gases, human activities also produce 
additional local and regional effects. Some of these 
activities partially offset the warming caused by 
greenhouse gases, while others increase the warm-
ing. One such influence on climate is caused by 
tiny particles called “aerosols” (not to be confused 
with aerosol spray cans). For example, the burning 
of coal produces emissions of sulfur-containing 
compounds. These compounds form “sulfate aero-
sol” particles, which reflect some of the incoming 
sunlight away from the Earth, causing a cooling 
influence at the surface. Sulfate aerosols also tend 
to make clouds more efficient at reflecting sun-
light, causing an additional indirect cooling effect. 
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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of small ups and downs, but with no net increase 
(see figure page 20).16 The two major volcanic erup-
tions of the past 30 years have had short-term cool-
ing effects on climate, lasting 2 to 3 years.17 Thus, 
these natural factors cannot explain the warming of 
recent decades; in fact, their net effect on climate 
has probably been a slight cooling influence over 
this period. Slow changes in Earth’s orbit around 
the Sun and its tilt toward or away from the Sun 
are also a purely natural influence on climate, but 
are only important on timescales from thousands to 
many tens of thousands of years.
The climate changes that have occurred over the 
last century are not solely caused by the human and 
natural factors described above. In addition to these 
influences, there are also fluctuations in climate 
that occur even in the absence of changes in human 
activities, the Sun, or volcanoes. One example is 
the El Niño phenomenon, which has important 
influences on many aspects of regional and global 
climate. Many other modes of variability have been 
identified by climate scientists and their effects 
on climate occur at the same time as the effects of 
human activities, the Sun, and volcanoes.
Carbon release and uptake 
Once carbon dioxide is emitted to the atmosphere, 
some of it is absorbed by the oceans and taken up 
by vegetation, although this storage may be tempo-
rary. About 45 percent of the carbon dioxide emit-
ted by human activities in the last 50 years is now 
stored in the oceans and vegetation. The 
rest has remained in the air, increasing 
the atmospheric concentration.2,3,18 It is 
thus important to understand not only 
how much carbon dioxide is emitted, 
but also how much is taken up, over 
what time scales, and how these sources 
and “sinks” of carbon dioxide might 
change as climate continues to warm. 
For example, it is known from long 
records of Earth’s climate history that 
under warmer conditions, carbon tends 
to be released, for instance, from thaw-
ing permafrost, initiating a feedback 
loop in which more carbon release leads 
to more warming which leads to further 
release, and so on.19,20 
Global emissions of carbon dioxide 
have been accelerating. The growth rate 
increased from 1.3 percent per year in 
the 1990s to 3.3 percent per year be-
tween 2000 and 2006.21 The increasing 
emissions of carbon dioxide are the pri-
mary cause of the increased concentra-
tion of carbon dioxide observed in the 
atmosphere. There is also evidence that 
a smaller fraction of the annual human-
induced emissions is now being taken 
up than in the past, leading to a greater 
fraction remaining in the atmosphere 
and an accelerating rate of increase in 
the carbon dioxide concentration.21 
Major Warming and Cooling Influences on Climate  
1750-2005
The figure above shows the amount of warming influence (red bars) or cooling influence 
(blue bars) that different factors have had on Earth’s climate over the industrial age 
(from about 1750 to the present). Results are in watts per square meter. The longer the 
bar, the greater the influence on climate. The top part of the box includes all the major 
human-induced factors, while the second part of the box includes the Sun, the only 
major natural factor with a long-term effect on climate. The cooling effect of individual 
volcanoes is also natural, but is relatively short-lived (2 to 3 years), thus their influence 
is not included in this figure. The bottom part of the box shows that the total net effect 
(warming influences minus cooling influences) of human activities is a strong warming 
influence. The thin lines on each bar provide an estimate of the range of uncertainty.
Forster et al.3
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Ocean acidification
As the ocean absorbs carbon dioxide from the 
atmosphere, seawater is becoming less alkaline 
(its pH is decreasing) through a process gener-
ally referred to as ocean acidification. The pH of 
seawater has decreased significantly since 1750,22,23 
and is projected to drop much more dramatically by 
the end of the century if carbon dioxide concentra-
tions continue to increase.24 Such ocean acidifica-
tion is essentially irreversible over a time scale of 
centuries. As discussed in the Ecosystems sector 
and Coasts region, ocean acidification affects the 
process of calcification by which living things cre-
ate shells and skeletons, with substantial negative 
consequences for coral reefs, mollusks, and some 
plankton species important to ocean food chains.25 
Global average temperature and sea 
level have increased, and precipitation 
patterns have changed. 
Temperatures are rising 
Global average surface air temperature has in-
creased substantially since 1970.26 The estimated 
change in the average temperature of Earth’s 
surface is based on measurements from thousands 
of weather stations, ships, and buoys around the 
world, as well as from satellites. These measure-
ments are independently compiled, analyzed, and 
processed by different research groups. There are a 
number of important steps in the data processing. 
These include identifying and adjusting for the ef-
fects of changes in the instruments used to measure 
temperature, the measurement times and loca-
tions, the local environment around the measuring 
site, and such factors as satellite orbital drift. For 
instance, the growth of cities can cause localized 
“urban heat island” effects. 
A number of research groups around the world 
have produced estimates of global-scale changes 
in surface temperature. The warming trend that is 
apparent in all of these temperature records is con-
firmed by other independent observations, such as 
the melting of Arctic sea ice, the retreat of moun-
tain glaciers on every continent,27 reductions in the 
extent of snow cover, earlier blooming of plants 
in spring, and increased melting of the Greenland 
and Antarctic ice sheets.28,29 Because snow and ice 
reflect the Sun’s heat, this melting causes more heat 
to be absorbed, which causes more melting, result-
ing in another feedback loop.20
Additionally, temperature measurements above the 
surface have been made by weather balloons since 
the late 1940s, and from satellites since 1979. These 
measurements show warming of the troposphere, 
consistent with the surface warming.30,31 They also 
reveal cooling in the stratosphere.30 This pattern 
of tropospheric warming and stratospheric cooling 
agrees with our understanding of how atmospheric 
temperature would be expected to change in re-
sponse to increasing greenhouse gas concentrations 
and the observed depletion of stratospheric ozone.14
Precipitation patterns are changing
Precipitation is not distributed evenly over the 
globe. Its average distribution is governed primarily 
by atmospheric circulation patterns, the availability 
of moisture, and surface terrain effects. The first 
two of these factors are influenced by temperature. 
Thus, human-caused changes in temperature are 
expected to alter precipitation patterns.
Global annual average temperature (as measured over both land 
and oceans). Red bars indicate temperatures above and blue bars 
indicate temperatures below the average temperature for the period 
1901-2000. The black line shows atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) 
concentration in parts per million (ppm). While there is a clear long-
term global warming trend, each individual year does not show a 
temperature increase relative to the previous year, and some years 
show greater changes than others.33 These year-to-year fluctuations 
in temperature are due to natural processes, such as the effects of 
El Niños, La Niñas, and the eruption of large volcanoes.
NOAA/NCDC32
Global Temperature and Carbon Dioxide
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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Observations show that such shifts are occur-
ring. Changes have been observed in the amount, 
intensity, frequency, and type of precipitation. 
Pronounced increases in precipitation over the past 
100 years have been observed in eastern North 
America, southern South America, and northern 
Europe. Decreases have been seen in the Mediter-
ranean, most of Africa, and southern Asia. Changes 
in the geographical distribution of droughts and 
flooding have been complex. In some regions, there 
have been increases in the occurrences of both 
droughts and floods.28 As the world warms, north-
ern regions and mountainous areas are experienc-
ing more precipitation falling as rain rather than 
snow.34 Widespread increases in heavy precipitation 
events have occurred, even in places where total 
rain amounts have decreased. These changes are 
associated with the fact that warmer air holds more 
water vapor evaporating from the world’s oceans 
and land surface.31 This increase in atmospheric 
water vapor has been observed from satellites, and 
is primarily due to human influences.35,36 
Sea level is rising
After at least 2,000 years of little change, sea level 
rose by roughly 8 inches over the past century. 
Satellite data available over the past 15 years show 
sea level rising at a rate roughly double the rate 
observed over the past century.37 
There are two principal ways in which 
global warming causes sea level to 
rise. First, ocean water expands as it 
warms, and therefore takes up more 
space. Warming has been observed in 
each of the world’s major ocean basins, 
and has been directly linked to human 
influences.38,39 
Second, warming leads to the melting 
of glaciers and ice sheets, which raises 
sea level by adding water to the oceans. 
Glaciers have been retreating worldwide 
for at least the last century, and the 
rate of retreat has increased in the past 
decade.29,40 Only a few glaciers are actu-
ally advancing (in locations that were 
well below freezing, and where increased precipi-
tation has outpaced melting). The total volume of 
glaciers on Earth is declining sharply. The progres-
sive disappearance of glaciers has implications not 
only for the rise in global sea level, but also for 
water supplies in certain densely populated regions 
of Asia and South America.
The Earth has major ice sheets on Greenland and 
Antarctica. These ice sheets are currently losing 
ice volume by increased melting and calving of 
icebergs, contributing to sea-level rise. The Green-
land Ice Sheet has also been experiencing record 
amounts of surface melting, and a large increase in 
the rate of mass loss in the past decade.41 If the en-
tire Greenland Ice Sheet melted, it would raise sea 
level by about 20 feet. The Antarctic Ice Sheet con-
sists of two portions, the West Antarctic Ice Sheet 
and the East Antarctic Ice Sheet. The West Antarc-
tic Ice Sheet, the more vulnerable to melting of the 
two, contains enough water to raise global sea lev-
els by about 16 to 20 feet.29 If the East Antarctic Ice 
Sheet melted entirely, it would raise global sea level 
by about 200 feet. Complete melting of these ice 
sheets over this century or the next is thought to be 
virtually impossible, although past climate records 
provide precedent for very significant decreases in 
ice volume, and therefore increases in sea level.42,43 
As temperatures have risen, glaciers around the world have shrunk. The graph 
shows the cumulative decline in glacier ice worldwide. 
Cumulative Decrease in Global Glacier Ice
Meier et al.27
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The third line of evidence is based on the broad, 
qualitative consistency between observed changes 
in climate and the computer model simulations 
of how climate would be expected to change in 
response to human activities. For example, when 
climate models are run with historical increases 
in greenhouse gases, they show gradual warming 
of the Earth and ocean surface, increases in ocean 
heat content and the temperature of the lower atmo-
sphere, a rise in global sea level, retreat of  
sea ice and snow cover, cooling of the stratosphere, 
an increase in the amount of atmospheric water 
vapor, and changes in large-scale precipitation and 
pressure patterns. These and other aspects  
of modeled climate change are in agreement  
with observations.14,49 
Finally, there is extensive statistical evidence 
from so-called “fingerprint” studies. Each fac-
tor that affects climate produces a unique pattern 
of climate response, much as each person has a 
unique fingerprint. Fingerprint studies exploit these 
unique signatures, and allow detailed comparisons 
of modeled and observed climate change patterns.44 
Scientists rely on such studies to attribute observed 
changes in climate to a particular cause or set of 
causes. In the real world, the climate changes that 
have occurred since the start of the Industrial Revo-
lution are due to a complex mixture of human and 
natural causes. The importance of each individual 
influence in this mixture changes over time. Of 
course, there are not multiple Earths, which would 
allow an experimenter to change one factor at a 
time on each Earth, thus helping to isolate different 
fingerprints. Therefore, climate models are used 
to study how individual factors affect climate. For 
example, a single factor (like greenhouse gases) or 
a set of factors can be varied, and the response of 
the modeled climate system to these individual or 
combined changes can thus be studied.50 
For example, when climate model simulations of 
the last century include all of the major influences 
on climate, both human-induced and natural, they 
can reproduce many important features of observed 
climate change patterns. When human influences 
are removed from the model experiments, results 
suggest that the surface of the Earth would actu-
ally have cooled slightly over the last 50 years. The 
clear message from fingerprint studies is that the 
The global warming of the past 50 years 
is due primarily to human-induced 
increases in heat-trapping gases. Human 
“fingerprints” also have been identified 
in many other aspects of the climate 
system, including changes in ocean heat 
content, precipitation, atmospheric 
moisture, and Arctic sea ice.
In 1996, the IPCC Second Assessment Report44 
cautiously concluded that “the balance of evi-
dence suggests a discernible human influence on 
global climate.” Since then, a number of national 
and international assessments have come to much 
stronger conclusions about the reality of human 
effects on climate. Recent scientific assessments 
find that most of the warming of the Earth’s surface 
over the past 50 years has been caused by human 
activities.45,46 
This conclusion rests on multiple lines of evi-
dence. Like the warming “signal” that has gradu-
ally emerged from the “noise” of natural climate 
variability, the scientific evidence for a human 
influence on global climate has accumulated over 
the past several decades, from many hundreds of 
studies. No single study is a “smoking gun.” Nor 
has any single study or combination of studies 
undermined the large body of evidence supporting 
the conclusion that human activity is the primary 
driver of recent warming.  
The first line of evidence is our basic physical 
understanding of how greenhouse gases trap heat, 
how the climate system responds to increases in 
greenhouse gases, and how other human and natu-
ral factors influence climate. The second line of ev-
idence is from indirect estimates of climate changes 
over the last 1,000 to 2,000 years. These records are 
obtained from living things and their remains (like 
tree rings and corals) and from physical quantities 
(like the ratio between lighter and heavier isotopes 
of oxygen in ice cores) which change in measurable 
ways as climate changes. The lesson from these 
data is that global surface temperatures over the 
last several decades are clearly unusual, in that they 
were higher than at any time during at least the 
past 400 years.47 For the Northern Hemisphere, the 
recent temperature rise is clearly unusual in at least 
the last 1,000 years.47,48 
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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observed warming over the last half-century can-
not be explained by natural factors, and is instead 
caused primarily by human factors.14,50 
Another fingerprint of human effects on 
climate has been identified by looking at a 
slice through the layers of the atmosphere, and 
studying the pattern of temperature changes 
from the surface up through the stratosphere. 
In all climate models, increases in carbon di-
oxide cause warming at the surface and in the 
troposphere, but lead to cooling of the strato-
sphere. For straightforward physical reasons, 
models also calculate that the human-caused 
depletion of stratospheric ozone has had a 
strong cooling effect in the stratosphere. There 
is a good match between the model fingerprint 
in response to combined carbon dioxide and 
ozone changes and the observed pattern of tro-
pospheric warming and stratospheric cooling 
(see figure on next page).14 
In contrast, if most of the observed tempera-
ture change had been due to an increase in 
solar output rather than an increase in green-
house gases, Earth’s atmosphere would have 
warmed throughout its full vertical extent, 
including the stratosphere.9 The observed pat-
tern of atmospheric temperature changes, with its 
pronounced cooling in the stratosphere, is therefore 
inconsistent with the hypothesis that changes in the 
Sun can explain the warming of recent decades. 
Moreover, direct satellite measurements of solar 
output show slight decreases during the recent 
period of warming. 
The earliest fingerprint work51 focused on changes 
in surface and atmospheric temperature. Scientists 
then applied fingerprint methods to a whole range 
of climate variables,50,52 identifying human-caused 
climate signals in the heat content of the oceans,38,39 
the height of the tropopause53 (the boundary be-
tween the troposphere and stratosphere, which has 
shifted upward by hundreds of feet in recent de-
cades), the geographical patterns of precipitation,54 
drought,55 surface pressure,56 and the runoff from 
major river basins.57 
Studies published after the appearance of the 
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report in 2007 have also 
found human fingerprints in the increased levels of 
atmospheric moisture35,36 (both close to the surface 
and over the full extent of the atmosphere), in the 
The blue band shows how global average temperatures would 
have changed due to natural forces only, as simulated by climate 
models. The red band shows model projections of the effects 
of human and natural forces combined. The black line shows 
actual observed global average temperatures. As the blue band 
indicates, without human influences, temperature over the 
past century would actually have first warmed and then cooled 
slightly over recent decades.58 
Separating Human and
Natural Influences on Climate
Hegerl et al.49
The Sun’s energy received at the top of Earth’s atmosphere has 
been measured by satellites since 1978. It has followed its natural 
11-year cycle of small ups and downs, but with no net increase 
(bottom). Over the same period, global temperature has risen 
markedly (top).60 
Measurements of Surface Temperature  
and Sun’s Energy
NOAA/NCDC; Frölich and Lean; Willson and Mordvinov; Dewitte et al.59
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decline of Arctic sea ice extent,61 and in the  
patterns of changes in Arctic and Antarctic  
surface temperatures.62 
The message from this entire body of work is that 
the climate system is telling a consistent story 
of increasingly dominant human influence – the 
changes in temperature, ice extent, moisture, and 
circulation patterns fit together in a physically con-
sistent way, like pieces in a complex puzzle. 
Increasingly, this type of fingerprint work is shift-
ing its emphasis. As noted, clear and compelling 
scientific evidence supports the case for a pro-
nounced human influence 
on global climate. Much 
of the recent attention is 
now on climate changes at 
continental and regional 
scales,64,65 and on variables 
that can have large impacts 
on societies. For example, 
scientists have established 
causal links between human 
activities and the changes in 
snowpack, maximum and 
minimum temperature, and 
the seasonal timing of runoff 
over mountainous regions of 
the western United States.34 
Human activity is likely 
to have made a substantial 
contribution to ocean surface 
temperature changes in hur-
ricane formation regions.66-68 
Researchers are also looking 
beyond the physical climate 
system, and are begin-
ning to tie changes in the 
distribution and seasonal 
behavior of plant and animal 
species to human-caused 
changes in temperature and 
precipitation.69,70 
For over a decade, one aspect 
of the climate change story 
seemed to show a signifi-
cant difference between 
models and observations.14 
In the tropics, all models predicted that with a rise in 
greenhouse gases, the troposphere would be expected 
to warm more rapidly than the surface. Observa-
tions from weather balloons, satellites, and surface 
thermometers seemed to show the opposite behavior 
(more rapid warming of the surface than the tropo-
sphere). This issue was a stumbling block in our un-
derstanding of the causes of climate change. It is now 
largely resolved.71 Research showed that there were 
large uncertainties in the satellite and weather balloon 
data. When uncertainties in models and observations 
are properly accounted for, newer observational data 
sets (with better treatment of known problems) are in 
agreement with climate model results.31,72-75 
Climate simulations of the vertical profile of temperature change due to various factors, and the effect 
due to all factors taken together. The panels above represent a cross-section of the atmosphere from 
the north pole to the south pole, and from the surface up into the stratosphere. The black lines show 
the location of the tropopause, the boundary between the lower atmosphere (troposphere) and the 
stratosphere. 
Patterns of Temperature Change
Produced by Various Atmospheric Factors, 1958-1999
Modified from CCSP SAP 1.163 
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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This does not mean, however, that all remain-
ing differences between models and observations 
have been resolved. The observed changes in some 
climate variables, such as Arctic sea ice,61,76 some 
aspects of precipitation,54,77 and patterns of surface 
pressure,56 appear to be proceeding much more 
rapidly than models have projected. The reasons for 
these differences are not well understood. Never-
theless, the bottom-line conclusion from climate 
fingerprinting is that most of the observed changes 
studied to date are consistent with each other, and 
are also consistent with our scientific understand-
ing of how the climate system would be expected 
to respond to the increase in heat-trapping gases 
resulting from human activities.14,49
Scientists are sometimes asked whether extreme 
weather events can be linked to human activities.24 
Scientific research has concluded that human influ-
ences on climate are indeed changing the likelihood 
of certain types of extreme events. For example, 
an analysis of the European summer heat wave of 
2003 found that the risk of such a heat wave is now 
roughly four times greater than it would  
have been in the absence of human-induced  
climate change.68,78 
Like fingerprint work, such analyses of human-
caused changes in the risks of extreme events rely 
on information from climate models, and on our 
understanding of the physics of the climate system. 
All of the models used in this work have imperfec-
tions in their representation of the complexities of 
the “real world” climate system.79,80 These are due 
to both limits in our understanding of the climate 
system, and in our ability to represent its com-
plex behavior with available computer resources. 
Despite this, models are extremely useful, for a 
number of reasons. 
First, despite remaining imperfections, the current 
generation of climate models accurately portrays 
many important aspects of today’s weather pat-
terns and climate.79,80 Models are constantly being 
improved, and are routinely tested against many 
observations of Earth’s climate system. Second, 
the fingerprint work shows that models capture not 
only our present-day climate, but also key features 
of the observed climate changes over the past cen-
tury.47 Third, many of the large-scale observed cli-
mate changes (such as the warming of the surface 
and troposphere, and the increase in the amount 
of moisture in the atmosphere) are driven by very 
basic physics, which is well-represented in mod-
els.35 Fourth, climate models can be used to predict 
changes in climate that can be verified in the real 
world. Examples include the short-term global 
cooling subsequent to the eruption of Mount Pi-
natubo and the stratospheric cooling with increas-
ing carbon dioxide. Finally, models are the only 
tools that exist for trying to understand the climate 
changes likely to be experienced over the course of 
this century. No period in Earth’s geological history 
provides an exact analogue for the climate condi-
tions that will unfold in the coming decades.20 
Global temperatures are projected to 
continue to rise over this century; by 
how much and for how long depends 
on a number of factors, including the 
amount of heat-trapping gas emissions 
and how sensitive the climate is to  
those emissions.
Some continued warming of the planet is projected  
over the next few decades due to past emissions. 
Choices made now will influence the amount of fu-
ture warming. Lower levels of heat-trapping emis-
sions will yield less future warming, while higher 
levels will result in more warming, and more severe 
impacts on society and the natural world.
Emissions scenarios
The IPCC developed a set of scenarios in a Special 
Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES).81 These 
have been extensively used to explore the potential 
for future climate change. None of these scenarios, 
not even the one called “lower”, includes imple-
mentation of policies to limit climate change or 
to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of heat-
trapping gases. Rather, differences among these 
scenarios are due to different assumptions about 
changes in population, rate of adoption of new 
technologies, economic growth, and other factors. 
The IPCC emission scenarios also do not encom-
pass the full range of possible futures: emissions 
can change less than those scenarios imply, or they 
can change more. Recent carbon dioxide emissions 
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are, in fact, above the highest emissions scenario 
developed by the IPCC82 (see figure below). Wheth-
er this will continue is uncertain.
There are also lower possible emissions paths than 
those put forth by the IPCC. The Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change, to which the United 
States and 191 other countries are signatories, 
calls for stabilizing concentrations of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere at a level that would avoid 
dangerous human interference with the climate 
system. What exactly constitutes such interference 
is subject to interpretation. 
A variety of research studies suggest that a further 
2°F increase (relative to the 1980-1999 period)  
would lead to severe, widespread, and irreversible 
impacts.83-85 To have a good chance (but not a guar-
antee) of avoiding temperatures above those levels, 
it has been estimated that atmospheric concentra-
tion of carbon dioxide would need to stabilize in 
the long term at around today’s levels.86-89
Reducing emissions of carbon dioxide would re-
duce warming over this century and beyond. Imple-
menting sizable and sustained reductions in carbon 
dioxide emissions as soon as possible would signif-
icantly reduce the pace and the overall amount of 
climate change, and would be more effective than 
reductions of the same size initiated later. Reducing 
emissions of some shorter-lived greenhouse gases, 
such as methane, and some types of particles, such 
as soot, would begin to reduce the warming influ-
ence within weeks to decades.13 
The graphs below show emissions scenarios and 
resulting carbon dioxide concentrations for three 
IPCC scenarios90,91 and one stabilization scenario.25 
The graphs show recent and projected global emissions of carbon dioxide in gigatons of carbon, on the left, and atmospheric 
concentrations on the right under five emissions scenarios. The top three in the key are IPCC scenarios that assume no explicit 
climate policies (these are used in model projections that appear throughout this report). The bottom line is a “stabilization 
scenario,” designed to stabilize atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration at 450 parts per million. The inset expanded below 
these charts shows emissions for 1990-2010 under the three IPCC scenarios along with actual emissions to 2007 (in black). 
Scenarios of Future Carbon Dioxide
Global Emissions and Concentrations
Nakićenović and Swart; Clarke et al.; Marland et al.; Tans92
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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emissions. The range of possible outcomes has 
been explored using a range of different emissions 
scenarios, and a variety of climate models that en-
compass the known range of climate sensitivity.
Changing precipitation patterns
Projections of changes in precipitation largely 
follow recently observed patterns of change, with 
overall increases in the global average but substan-
tial shifts in where and how precipitation falls.90 
Generally, higher latitudes are projected to receive 
more precipitation, while the dry belt that lies just 
outside the tropics expands further poleward,96,97 
and also receives less rain. Increases in tropical 
precipitation are projected during rainy seasons 
(such as monsoons), and especially over the tropical 
Pacific. Certain regions, including the U.S. West 
(especially the Southwest) and the Mediterranean, 
are expected to become drier. The widespread 
trend toward more heavy downpours is expected to 
continue, with precipitation becoming less frequent 
but more intense.90 More precipitation is expected 
to fall as rain rather than snow.
Currently rare extreme events are becoming 
more common
In a warmer future climate, models project there 
will be an increased risk of more intense, more 
frequent, and longer-lasting heat waves.90 The 
European heat wave of 2003 is an example of the 
type of extreme heat event that is likely to become 
much more common.90 If greenhouse gas emissions 
continue to increase, by the 2040s more than half  
of European summers will be hotter than the 
summer of 2003, and by the end of this century, a 
summer as hot as that of 2003 will be considered 
unusually cool.78
Increased extremes of summer dryness and winter 
wetness are projected for much of the globe, mean-
ing a generally greater risk of droughts and floods. 
This has already been observed,55 and is projected 
to continue. In a warmer world, precipitation tends 
to be concentrated into heavier events, with longer 
dry periods in between.90 
Models project a general tendency for more intense 
but fewer storms overall outside the tropics, with 
more extreme wind events and higher ocean waves 
in a number of regions in association with those 
The stabilization scenario is aimed at stabilizing 
the atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration at 
roughly 450 parts per million (ppm); this is 70 ppm 
above the 2008 concentration of 385 ppm. Result-
ing temperature changes depend on atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gases and particles 
and the climate’s sensitivity to those concentra-
tions.87 Of those shown on the previous page, only 
the 450 ppm stabilization target has the potential to 
keep the global temperature rise at or below about 
3.5°F from pre-industrial levels and 2°F above the 
current average temperature, a level beyond which 
many concerns have been raised about dangerous 
human interference with the climate system.88,89 
Scenarios that stabilize carbon dioxide below 450 
ppm (not shown in the figure) offer an increased 
chance of avoiding dangerous climate change.88,89 
Carbon dioxide is not the only greenhouse gas of 
concern. Concentrations of other heat-trapping 
gases like methane and nitrous oxide and particles 
like soot will also have to be stabilized at low 
enough levels to prevent global temperatures from 
rising higher than the level mentioned above. When 
these other gases are added, including the offsetting 
cooling effects of sulfate aerosol particles, analyses 
suggest that stabilizing concentrations around 400 
parts per million of “equivalent carbon dioxide” 
would yield about an 80 percent chance of avoid-
ing exceeding the 2°F above present temperature 
threshold. This would be true even if concentra-
tions temporarily peaked as high as 475 parts per 
million and then stabilized at 400 parts per million 
roughly a century later.72,88,89,93-95 Reductions in 
sulfate aerosol particles would necessitate lower 
equivalent carbon dioxide targets. 
Rising global temperature 
All climate models project that human-caused 
emissions of heat-trapping gases will cause further 
warming in the future. Based on scenarios that 
do not assume explicit climate policies to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, global average tempera-
ture is projected to rise by 2 to 11.5°F by the end 
of this century90 (relative to the 1980-1999 time 
period). Whether the actual warming in 2100 will 
be closer to the low or the high end of this range 
depends primarily on two factors: first, the fu-
ture level of emissions of heat-trapping gases, and 
second, how sensitive climate is to past and future 
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more likely, though more research is required on 
these issues.68 More discussion of Atlantic hurri-
canes, which most affect the United States, appears 
on page 34 in the National Climate Change section.
Sea level will continue to rise
Projecting future sea-level rise presents special 
challenges. Scientists have a well-developed under-
standing of the contributions of thermal expansion 
and melting glaciers to sea-level rise, so the models 
used to project sea-level rise include these process-
es. However, the contributions to past and future 
sea-level rise from ice sheets are less well under-
stood. Recent observations of the polar ice sheets 
show that a number of complex processes control 
the movement of ice to the sea, and thus affect the 
contributions of ice sheets to sea-level rise.29 Some 
of these processes are already producing substantial 
loss of ice mass. Because these processes are not 
well understood it is difficult to predict their future 
contributions to sea-level rise.102 
Because of this uncertainty, the 2007 assessment 
by the IPCC could not quantify the contributions to 
sea-level rise due to changes in ice sheet dynamics, 
and thus projected a rise of the world’s oceans from 
8 inches to 2 feet by the end of this century.90 
More recent research has attempted to quantify 
the potential contribution to sea-level rise from 
the accelerated flow of ice sheets to the sea27,42 or 
to estimate future sea level based on its observed 
relationship to temperature.103 The resulting esti-
mates exceed those of the IPCC, and the average 
estimates under higher emissions scenarios are for 
sea-level rise between 3 and 4 feet by the end of 
this century. An important question that is often 
asked is, what is the upper bound of sea-level rise 
expected over this century? Few analyses have 
focused on this question. There is some evidence 
to suggest that it would be virtually impossible to 
have a rise of sea level higher than about 6.5 feet by 
the end of this century.42
The changes in sea level experienced at any par-
ticular location along the coast depend not only on 
the increase in the global average sea level, but also 
on changes in regional currents and winds, prox-
imity to the mass of melting ice sheets, and on the 
vertical movements of the land due to geological 
storms. Models also project a shift of storm tracks 
toward the poles in both hemispheres.90 
Changes in hurricanes are difficult to project be-
cause there are countervailing forces. Higher ocean 
temperatures lead to stronger storms with higher 
wind speeds and more rainfall.98 But changes in 
wind speed and direction with height are also pro-
jected to increase in some regions, and this tends 
to work against storm formation and growth.99-101 It 
currently appears that stronger, more rain-produc-
ing tropical storms and hurricanes are generally 
Global Average Temperature
1900 to 2100
Observed and projected changes in the global average 
temperature under three IPCC no-policy emissions 
scenarios. The shaded areas show the likely ranges 
while the lines show the central projections from a set 
of climate models. A wider range of model types shows 
outcomes from 2 to 11.5ºF.90 Changes are relative to the 
1960-1979 average. 
Smith et al.72; CMIP3-A93
Simulated and projected changes in the amount of 
precipitation falling in the heaviest 5 percent of daily 
events. The shaded areas show the likely ranges while the 
lines show the central projections from a set of climate 
models. Changes are relative to the 1960-1979 average. 
Global Increase in Heavy Precipitation
1900 to 2100
CMIP3-A93
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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forces.104 The consequences of sea-level rise at any 
particular location depend on the amount of sea-
level rise relative to the adjoining land. Although 
some parts of the U.S. coast are undergoing uplift 
(rising), most shorelines are subsiding (sinking) to 
various degrees – from a few inches to over 2 feet 
per century. 
Abrupt climate change
There is also the possibility of even larger changes 
in climate than current scenarios and models 
project. Not all changes in the climate are gradual. 
The long record of climate found in ice cores, tree 
rings, and other natural records show that Earth’s 
climate patterns have undergone rapid shifts from 
one stable state to another within as short a period 
as a decade. The occurrence of abrupt changes in 
climate becomes increasingly likely as the human 
disturbance of the climate system grows.90 Such 
changes can occur so rapidly that they would chal-
lenge the ability of human and natural systems to 
adapt.105 Examples of such changes are abrupt shifts 
in drought frequency and duration. Ancient climate 
records suggest that in the United States, the South-
west may be at greatest risk for this kind of change, 
but that other regions including the Midwest and 
Great Plains have also had these kinds of abrupt 
shifts in the past and could experience them again 
in the future. 
Rapid ice sheet collapse with related sea-level rise 
is another type of abrupt change that is not well 
understood or modeled and that poses a risk for 
the future. Recent observations show that melt-
ing on the surface of an ice sheet produces water 
that flows down through large cracks that create 
conduits through the ice to the base of the ice sheet 
where it lubricates ice previously frozen to the rock 
below.29 Further, the interaction with warm ocean 
water, where ice meets the sea, can lead to sudden 
losses in ice mass and accompanying rapid global 
sea-level rise. Observations indicate that ice loss 
has increased dramatically over the last decade, 
though scientists are not yet confident that they  
can project how the ice sheets will respond in  
the future. 
There are also concerns regarding the potential for 
abrupt release of methane from thawing of frozen 
soils, from the sea floor, and from wetlands in the 
tropics and the Arctic. While analyses suggest that 
an abrupt release of methane is very unlikely to oc-
cur within 100 years, it is very likely that warming 
will accelerate the pace of chronic methane emis-
sions from these sources, potentially increasing the 
rate of global temperature rise.106 
A third major area of concern regarding pos-
sible abrupt change involves the operation of the 
ocean currents that transport vast quantities of 
heat around the globe. One branch of the ocean 
circulation is in the North Atlantic. In this region, 
warm water flows northward from the tropics to 
the North Atlantic in the upper layer of the ocean, 
while cold water flows back from the North Atlan-
tic to the tropics in the ocean’s deep layers, creating 
a “conveyor belt” for heat. Changes in this circula-
tion have profound impacts on the global climate 
system, from changes in African and Indian mon-
soon rainfall, to atmospheric circulation relevant 
to hurricanes, to changes in climate over North 
America and Western Europe.
Recent findings indicate that it is very likely that 
the strength of this North Atlantic circulation will 
decrease over the course of this century in response 
to increasing greenhouse gases. This is expected 
because warming increases the melting of glaciers 
and ice sheets and the resulting runoff of fresh-
water to the sea. This additional water is virtually 
salt-free, which makes it less dense than sea water. 
Increased precipitation also contributes fresh, less-
dense water to the ocean. As a result, less surface 
water is dense enough to sink, thereby reducing the 
conveyor belt’s transport of heat. The best estimate 
is that the strength of this circulation will decrease 
25 to 30 percent in this century, leading to a reduc-
tion in heat transfer to the North Atlantic. It is 
considered very unlikely that this circulation would 
collapse entirely during the next 100 years or so, 
though it cannot be ruled out. While very unlikely, 
the potential consequences of such an abrupt event 
would be severe. Impacts would likely include 
sea-level rise around the North Atlantic of up to 2.5 
feet (in addition to the rise expected from thermal 
expansion and melting glaciers and ice sheets), 
changes in atmospheric circulation conditions that 
influence hurricane activity, a southward shift of 
tropical rainfall belts with resulting agricultural 
impacts, and disruptions to marine ecosystems.76 
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Key Messages:
U.S. average temperature has risen more than 2ºF over the past 50 years and is • 
projected to rise more in the future; how much more depends primarily on the 
amount of heat-trapping gases emitted globally and how sensitive the climate is 
to those emissions.
Precipitation has increased an average of about 5 percent over the past 50 years. • 
Projections of future precipitation generally indicate that northern areas will 
become wetter, and southern areas, particularly in the West, will become drier.
The amount of rain falling in the heaviest downpours has increased approximately • 
20 percent on average in the past century, and this trend is very likely to 
continue, with the largest increases in the wettest places.
Many types of extreme weather events, such as heat waves and regional • 
droughts, have become more frequent and intense during the past 40 to 50 years. 
The destructive energy of Atlantic hurricanes has increased in recent decades. • 
The intensity of these storms is likely to increase in this century. 
In the eastern Pacific, the strongest hurricanes have become stronger since the • 
1980s, even while the total number of storms has decreased.
Sea level has risen along most of the U.S. coast over the last 50 years, and will • 
rise more in the future. 
Cold-season storm tracks are shifting northward and the strongest storms are • 
likely to become stronger and more frequent.
Arctic sea ice is declining rapidly and this is very likely to continue.• 
National Climate Change
The maps show annual temperature difference 
from the 1961-1990 average for the 3 years that 
were the hottest on record in the United States: 
1998, 1934 and 2006 (in rank order). Red areas 
were warmer than average, blue were cooler 
than average. The 1930s were very warm in 
much of the United States, but they were not 
unusually warm globally. On the other hand, the 
warmth of 1998 and 2006, as for most years in 
recent decades, has been global in extent. 
Smith72
Key Sources
Like the rest of the world, the United States has been warming significantly 
over the past 50 years in response to the build up of heat-trapping gases in 
the atmosphere. When looking at national climate, however, it is important 
to recognize that climate responds to local, regional, and global factors. 
Therefore, national climate varies more than the average global climate. 
While various parts of the world have had particularly hot or cold periods 
earlier in the historical record, these periods have not been global in scale, 
whereas the warming of recent decades has been global in scale – hence the 
term global warming. It is also important to recognize that at both the global 
and national scales, year-to-year fluctuations in natural weather and climate 
patterns can produce a period that does not follow the long-term trend. Thus, 
each year will not necessarily be warmer than every year before it, though 
the warming trend continues.
From 1901 to 2008, each year’s temperature departure from the long-term average is 
one bar, with blue bars representing years cooler than the long-term average and red 
bars representing years warmer than that average. National temperatures vary much 
more than global temperatures, in part because of the moderating influence of the 
oceans on global temperatures. 
Annual Average Temperature 
(Departure from the 1901-2000 Average)
Smith72NOAA/NCDC107
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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U.S. average temperature has risen 
more than 2°F over the past 50 years 
and is projected to rise more in the 
future; how much more depends 
primarily on the amount of heat-
trapping gases emitted globally  
and how sensitive the climate is to  
those emissions. 
The series of maps and thermometers on these two 
pages shows the magnitude of the observed and 
projected changes in annual average temperature. 
The map for the period around 2000 shows that 
most areas of the United States have warmed 1 to 
2°F compared to the 1960s and 1970s. Although 
not reflected in these maps of annual average tem-
perature, this warming has generally resulted  
in longer warm seasons and shorter, less intense 
cold seasons.
The remaining maps show projected warming over 
the course of this century under a lower emissions 
scenario and a higher emissions scenario91 (see 
Global Climate Change section, page 23). Tempera-
tures will continue to rise throughout the century 
under both emissions scenarios,91 although higher 
emissions result in more warming by the middle of 
the century and significantly more by the end of  
the century.
Temperature increases in the next couple of de-
cades will be primarily determined by past emis-
sions of heat-trapping gases. As a result, there is 
little difference in projected temperature between 
the higher and lower emissions scenarios91 in the 
near-term (around 2020), so only a single map is 
shown for this timeframe. Increases after the next 
couple of decades will be primarily determined by 
future emissions.90 This is clearly evident in greater 
projected warming in the higher emissions sce-
nario91 by the middle (around 2050) and end of this 
century (around 2090). 
On a seasonal basis, most of the United States is 
projected to experience greater warming in sum-
mer than in winter, while Alaska experiences far 
more warming in winter than summer.108
The maps and thermometers on this page and the next page show temperature differences (either measured or projected) from 
conditions as they existed during the period from 1961-1979. Comparisons to this period are made because the influence on climate 
from increasing greenhouse gas emissions has been greatest during the past five decades. The present-day map is based on the aver-
age observed temperatures from 1993-2008 minus the average from 1961-1979. Projected temperatures are based on results from 16 
climate models for the periods 2010-2029, 2040-2059, and 2080-2099. The brackets on the thermometers represent the likely range 
of model projections, though lower or higher outcomes are possible. The mid-century and end-of-century maps show projections 
for both the higher and lower emission scenarios.91 The projection for the near-term is the average of the higher and lower emission 
scenarios91 because there is little difference in that timeframe.
Near-Term (2010-2029)  
Projected Average Change (°F)  
from 1961-1979 Baseline 
Present-Day (1993-2008)  
Average Change (°F)  
from 1961-1979 Baseline  
 
CMIP3-C109NOAA/NCDC107
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The average warming for the country as a whole is shown on the thermometers adjacent to each map. By the end 
of the century, the average U.S. temperature is projected to increase by approximately 7 to 11°F under the higher 
emissions scenario91 and by approximately 4 to 6.5°F under the lower emissions scenario.91 These ranges are due 
to differences among climate model results for the same emissions scenarios. Emissions scenarios even lower 
than the lower scenario shown here, such as the 450 ppm stabilization scenario described on pages 23-24, would 
yield lower temperature increases than those shown below.25
The maps on this page and the previous page are based on projections of future temperature by 16 of the Coupled Model 
Intercomparison Project Three (CMIP3) climate models using two emissions scenarios from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES).91 The “lower” scenario here is B1, while the “higher” is A2.91 The brackets 
on the thermometers represent the likely range of model projections, though lower or higher outcomes are possible. Additional 
information on these scenarios is on pages 22 and 23 in the previous section, Global Climate Change. These maps, and others in this 
report, show projections at national, regional, and sub-regional scales, using well-established techniques.110
CMIP3-C109CMIP3-C109
 Higher Emissions Scenario91 Projected Temperature Change (°F) 
from 1961-1979 Baseline
Mid-Century (2040-2059 average) End-of-Century (2080-2099 average)
 Lower Emissions Scenario91 Projected Temperature Change (°F)  
from 1961-1979 Baseline
Mid-Century (2040-2059 average) End-of-Century (2080-2099 average)
CMIP3-C109 CMIP3-C109
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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cipitation generally indicate that northern areas will 
become wetter, and southern areas, particularly in 
the West, will become drier.97,108 
Confidence in projected changes is higher for 
winter and spring than for summer and fall. In 
winter and spring, northern areas are expected 
to receive significantly more precipitation than 
they do now, because the interaction of warm and 
moist air coming from the south with colder air 
from the north is projected to occur farther north 
than it did on average in the last century. The more 
northward incursions of warmer and moister air 
masses are expected to be particularly noticeable 
in northern regions that will change from very 
cold and dry atmospheric conditions to warmer but 
moister conditions.68 Alaska, the Great Plains, the 
upper Midwest, and the Northeast are beginning 
to experience such changes for at least part of the 
year, with the likelihood of these changes increas-
ing over time. 
In some northern areas, warmer conditions will re-
sult in more precipitation falling as rain and less as 
snow. In addition, potential water resource benefits 
from increasing precipitation could be countered 
by the competing influences of increasing evapo-
ration and runoff. In southern areas, significant 
reductions in precipitation are projected in winter 
and spring as the subtropical dry 
belt expands.108 This is particularly 
pronounced in the Southwest, 
where it would have serious rami-
fications for water resources.
Precipitation has increased an average 
of about 5 percent over the past 50 
years. Projections of future precipitation 
generally indicate that northern areas 
will become wetter, and southern  
areas, particularly in the West, will 
become drier. 
While precipitation over the United States as a 
whole has increased, there have been important 
regional and seasonal differences. Increasing trends 
throughout much of the year have been predomi-
nant in the Northeast and large parts of the Plains 
and Midwest. Decreases occurred in much of the 
Southeast in all but the fall season and in the North-
west in all seasons except spring. Precipitation also 
generally decreased during the summer and fall in 
the Southwest, while winter and spring, which are 
the wettest seasons in states such as California and 
Nevada, have had increases in precipitation.111
Future changes in total precipitation due to human-
induced warming are more difficult to project than 
changes in temperature. In some seasons, some 
areas will experience an increase in precipitation, 
other areas will experience a decrease, and others 
will see little discernible change. The difficulty 
arises in predicting the extent of those areas and the 
amount of change. Model projections of future pre-
Observed Change in Annual Average Precipitation
1958 to 2008
While U.S. annual average precipitation has increased about 5 percent over the past 50 
years, there have been important regional differences as shown above.
NOAA/NCDC111
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Projected Change in North American Precipitation
 by 2080-2099
The maps show projected future changes in precipitation relative to the recent past as simulated by 15 climate models. The simulations 
are for late this century, under a higher emissions scenario.91 For example, in the spring, climate models agree that northern areas are 
likely to get wetter, and southern areas drier. There is less confidence in exactly where the transition between wetter and drier areas 
will occur. Confidence in the projected changes is highest in the hatched areas.
CMIP3-A93
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The amount of rain falling in the heaviest 
downpours has increased approximately 20 
percent on average in the past century, and this 
trend is very likely to continue, with the largest 
increases in the wettest places.
One of the clearest precipitation trends in the United States is the 
increasing frequency and intensity of heavy downpours. This in-
crease was responsible for most of the observed increase in over-
all precipitation during the last 50 years. In fact, there has been 
little change or a decrease in the frequency of light and moderate 
precipitation during the past 30 years, while heavy precipita-
tion has increased. In addition, while total average precipitation 
over the nation as a whole increased by about 7 percent over the 
past century, the amount of precipitation falling in the heaviest 1 
percent of rain events increased nearly 20 percent.112
During the past 50 years, the greatest increases in heavy precipi-
tation occurred in the Northeast and the Midwest. There have 
also been increases in heavy downpours in the other regions of 
the continental United States, as well as Alaska, Hawaii, and 
Puerto Rico.112 
Climate models project continued increases in the heaviest downpours during this century, while the lightest pre-
cipitation is projected to decrease. Heavy downpours that are now 1-in-20-year occurrences are projected to occur 
about every 4 to 15 years by the end of this century, depending on location, and the intensity of heavy downpours is 
also expected to increase. The 1-in-20-year heavy downpour is expected to be between 10 and 25 percent heavier by 
the end of the century than it is now.112
Changes in these kinds of extreme weather and cli-
mate events are among the most serious challenges 
to our nation in coping with a changing climate. 
Many types of extreme weather 
events, such as heat waves and regional 
droughts, have become more frequent 
and intense during the past 40 to  
50 years. 
Many extremes and their associated impacts are 
now changing. For example, in recent decades 
most of North America has been experienc-
ing more unusually hot days and nights, fewer 
unusually cold days and nights, and fewer frost 
days. Droughts are becoming more severe in 
some regions. The power and frequency of 
Atlantic hurricanes have increased substan-
tially in recent decades. The number of North 
American mainland landfalling hurricanes does 
CCSP SAP 3.368
The figure shows projected changes from the 1990s average to the 
2090s average in the amount of precipitation falling in light, moderate, 
and heavy events in North America. Projected changes are displayed in 5 
percent increments from the lightest drizzles to the heaviest downpours. 
As shown here, the lightest precipitation is projected to decrease, while 
the heaviest will increase, continuing the observed trend. The higher 
emission scenario91 yields larger changes. Projections are based on the 
models used in the IPCC 2007 Fourth Assessment Report.
Projected Changes in Light, Moderate, and Heavy 
Precipitation (by 2090s)
Increases in Amounts of Very Heavy 
Precipitation (1958 to 2007)
The map shows percent increases in the amount falling 
in very heavy precipitation events (defined as the heavi-
est 1 percent of all daily events) from 1958 to 2007 for 
each region. There are clear trends toward more very 
heavy precipitation for the nation as a whole, and par-
ticularly in the Northeast and Midwest.
Updated from Groisman et al.113
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not appear to have increased over the past 
century. Outside the tropics, cold-season 
storm tracks are shifting northward and 
the strongest storms are becoming even 
stronger. These trends in storms outside the 
tropics are projected to continue throughout 
this century.68,112,114 
Drought
Like precipitation, trends in drought have 
strong regional variations. In much of the 
Southeast and large parts of the West, the 
frequency of drought has increased coinci-
dent with rising temperatures over the past 50 
years. In other regions, such as the Midwest 
and Great Plains, there has been a reduction 
in drought frequency. 
Although there has been an overall increase 
in precipitation and no clear trend in drought for 
the nation as a whole, increasing temperatures 
have made droughts more severe and widespread 
than they would have otherwise been. Without the 
observed increase in precipitation, higher tempera-
tures would have led to an increase in the area of 
the contiguous United States in severe to extreme 
drought, with some estimates of a 30 percent 
increase.112 In the future, droughts are likely to be-
come more frequent and severe in some regions.68 
The Southwest, in particular, is expected to experi-
ence increasing drought as changes in atmospheric 
circulation patterns cause the dry zone just outside 
the tropics to expand farther northward into the 
United States.97
Rising temperatures have also led to earlier melt-
ing of the snowpack in the western United States.40 
Because snowpack runoff is critical to the water 
resources in the western United States, changes in 
the timing and amount of runoff can exacerbate 
problems with already limited water supplies in  
the region. 
Heat waves
A heat wave is a period of several days to weeks 
of abnormally hot weather, often with high humid-
ity. During the 1930s, there was a high frequency 
of heat waves due to high daytime temperatures 
resulting in large part from an extended multi-year 
period of intense drought. By contrast, in the past 
3 to 4 decades, there has been an increasing trend 
in high-humidity heat waves, which are character-
ized by the persistence of extremely high nighttime 
temperatures.112 
As average temperatures continue to rise through-
out this century, the frequency of cold extremes 
will decrease and the frequency and intensity of 
high temperature extremes will increase.115 The 
number of days with high temperatures above 
Observed Spring Snowmelt Dates
Date of onset of spring runoff pulse. Reddish-brown circles indicate significant 
trends toward onsets more than 20 days earlier. Lighter circles indicate less advance 
of the onset. Blue circles indicate later onset. The changes depend on a number of 
factors in addition to temperature, including altitude and timing of snowfall.
USGS116
Projected Frequency of Extreme Heat
(2080-2099 Average)
Simulations for 2080-2099 indicate how currently rare extremes (a 
1-in-20-year event) are projected to become more commonplace. 
A day so hot that it is currently experienced once every 20 years 
would occur every other year or more frequently by the end of 
the century under the higher emissions scenario.91 
CMIP3-A93
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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90°F is projected to increase throughout the country 
as illustrated in the maps on the left. Parts of the South 
that currently have about 60 days per year with tem-
peratures over 90°F are projected to experience 150 or 
more days a year above 90°F by the end of this century, 
under a higher emissions scenario.91 There is higher 
confidence in the regional patterns than in results for 
any specific location (see An Agenda for Climate Im-
pacts Science section).
With rising high temperatures, extreme heat waves that 
are currently considered rare will occur more fre-
quently in the future. Recent studies using an ensemble 
of models show that events that now occur once every 
20 years are projected to occur about every other year 
in much of the country by the end of this century. In 
addition to occurring more frequently, at the end of this 
century these very hot days are projected to be about 
10°F hotter than they are today.68 
The destructive energy of Atlantic 
hurricanes has increased in recent decades. 
The intensity of these storms is likely to 
increase in this century.
Of all the world’s tropical storm and hurricane basins, 
the North Atlantic has been the most thoroughly moni-
tored and studied. The advent of routine aircraft moni-
toring in the 1940s and the use of satellite observations 
since the 1960s have greatly aided monitoring of tropi-
cal storms and hurricanes. In addition, observations of 
tropical storm and hurricane strength made from island 
and mainland weather stations and from ships at sea 
began in the 1800s and continue today. Because of new 
and evolving observing techniques and technologies, 
scientists pay careful attention to ensuring consistency 
in tropical storm and hurricane records from the earli-
est manual observations to today’s automated mea-
surements. This is accomplished through collection, 
analysis, and cross-referencing of data from numer-
ous sources and, where necessary, the application of 
adjustment techniques to account for differences in 
observing and reporting methodologies through time. 
Nevertheless, data uncertainty is larger in the early 
part of the record. Confidence in the tropical storm and 
hurricane record increases after 1900 and is greatest 
during the satellite era, from 1965 to the present.112
The average number of days per year when the maximum tem-
perature exceeded 90°F from 1961-1979 (top) and the projected 
number of days per year above 90°F by the 2080s and 2090s for 
lower emissions (middle) and higher emissions (bottom).91 Much of 
the southern United States is projected to have more than twice 
as many days per year above 90°F by the end of this century.
Days Above 90°F
CMIP3-B117
CMIP3-B117
CMIP3-B117
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ocean heat content. This highlights the importance 
of understanding the broader changes occurring 
throughout the Atlantic Basin beyond the storms 
making landfall along the U.S. coast.112
Tropical storms and hurricanes develop and gain 
strength over warm ocean waters. As oceans 
warm, they provide a source of energy for hurri-
cane growth. During the past 30 years, annual sea 
surface temperatures in the main Atlantic hurricane 
development region increased nearly 2°F. This 
warming coincided with an increase in the 
destructive energy (as defined by the Power 
Dissipation Index, a combination of intensity, 
duration, and frequency) of Atlantic tropical 
storms and hurricanes. The strongest hurri-
canes (Category 4 and 5) have, in particular, 
increased in intensity.112 The graph below 
shows the strong correlation between hur-
ricane power and sea surface temperature in 
the Atlantic and the overall increase in both 
during the past 30 years. Climate models 
project that hurricane intensity will continue 
to increase, though at a lesser rate than that 
observed in recent decades.100
New evidence has emerged recently for other 
temperature related linkages that can help 
The total number of hurricanes and strongest hur-
ricanes (Category 4 and 5) observed from 1881 
through 2008 shows multi-decade periods of above 
average activity in the 1800s, the mid-1900s, and 
since 1995. The power and frequency of Atlantic 
hurricanes have increased substantially in recent 
decades.112 There has been little change in the total 
number of landfalling hurricanes, in part because 
a variety of factors affect whether a hurricane will 
make landfall. These include large-scale steer-
ing winds, atmospheric stability, wind shear, and 
Observed Relationship Between 
Sea Surface Temperatures and 
Hurricane Power in the North Atlantic Ocean
Observed sea surface temperature (blue) and the Power 
Dissipation Index (green), which combines frequency, intensity 
and duration for North Atlantic hurricanes.120 Hurricane rainfall 
and wind speeds are likely to increase in response to human-
caused warming. Analyses of model simulations suggest that 
for each 1.8ºF increase in tropical sea surface temperatures, 
rainfall rates will increase by 6 to 18 percent.68
Emanuel120
Atlantic Tropical Storms and Hurricanes
Top:  Tot a l  numbers o f 
N or t h  A t l a n t i c  n amed 
storms (tropical storms and 
hurricanes) (black) and total 
U.S. landfalling hurricanes 
(yellow) in 5-year periods 
based on annual data from 
1881 to 2008. The bar for the 
last 5-year period is based 
on the assumption that the 
level of activity from 2006 to 
2008 persists through 2010. 
In the era before satellites, 
indicated by the arrow above, 
the total number of named 
storms is less certain and 
has been adjusted upward to 
account for missing storms. 
Adjustments are based on relationships established during the satellite 
era between the number of observed storms and the number that 
would have been missed if satellite data had not been available. 
Bottom: Total number of strongest (Category 4 and 5) North Atlan-
tic basin hurricanes (purple) and strongest U.S. landfalling hurricanes 
(orange) in 5-year periods based on annual data from 1946 to 2008. 
The bar for the last 5-year period is based on the assumption that 
the level of activity from 2006 to 2008 persists through 2010. From 
1946 to the mid-1960s, as indicated by the arrow above, hurricane 
intensity was measured primarily by aircraft reconnaissance. Data 
prior to aircraft reconnaissance are not shown due to the greater 
uncertainty in estimates of a hurricane's maximum intensity. Satellites 
have increased the reliability of hurricane intensity estimates since 
the mid-1960s.  
NOAA121
Atlantic Basin
Strongest Hurricanes
NOAA121
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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of model simulations suggest that for each 1.8°F 
increase in tropical sea surface temperatures, core 
rainfall rates will increase by 6 to 18 percent and 
the surface wind speeds of the strongest hurri-
canes will increase by about 1 to 8 percent.114 Even 
without further coastal development, storm surge 
levels and hurricane damages are likely to increase 
because of increasing hurricane intensity coupled 
with sea-level rise, the latter being a virtually cer-
tain outcome of the warming global climate.68
In the eastern Pacific, the strongest 
hurricanes have become stronger since 
the 1980s, even while the total number 
of storms has decreased.
Although on average more hurricanes form in the 
eastern Pacific than the Atlantic each year, cool 
ocean waters along the U.S. West Coast and atmo-
spheric steering patterns help protect the contigu-
ous U.S. from landfalls. Threats to the Hawaiian 
Islands are greater, but landfalling storms are rare 
in comparison to those of the U.S. East and Gulf 
Coasts. Nevertheless, changes in hurricane inten-
sity and frequency could influence the impact of 
landfalling Pacific hurricanes in the future.
The total number of tropical storms and hurricanes 
in the eastern Pacific on seasonal to multi-decade 
time periods is generally opposite to that observed 
in the Atlantic. For example, during El Niño events 
it is common for hurricanes in the Atlantic to be 
suppressed while the eastern Pacific is more active. 
This reflects the large-scale atmospheric circulation 
patterns that extend across both the Atlantic and the 
Pacific oceans.123,124
Within the past three decades the total number of 
tropical storms and hurricanes and their destructive 
energy have decreased in the eastern Pacific.68,124 
However, satellite observations have shown that 
like the Atlantic, the strongest hurricanes (the top 
5 percent), have gotten stronger since the early 
1980s.122,125 As ocean temperatures rise, the stron-
gest hurricanes are likely to increase in both the 
eastern Pacific and the Atlantic.68 
explain the increase in Atlantic hurricane activity. 
This includes the contrast in sea surface tempera-
ture between the main hurricane development 
region and the broader tropical ocean.99,118,119  
Other causes beyond the rise in ocean temperature, 
such as atmospheric stability and circulation,  
can also influence hurricane power. For these and 
other reasons, a confident assessment requires 
further study.68 
Evidence of increasing hurricane strength in the 
Atlantic and other oceans with linkages to rising 
sea surface temperatures is also supported by satel-
lite records dating back to 1981. An increase in the 
maximum wind speeds of the strongest hurricanes 
has been documented and linked to increasing sea 
surface temperatures.122
Projections are that sea surface temperatures in the 
main Atlantic hurricane development region will 
increase at even faster rates during the second half 
of this century under higher emissions scenarios. 
This highlights the need to better understand the 
relationship between increasing temperatures 
and hurricane intensity. As ocean temperatures 
continue to increase in the future, it is likely that 
hurricane rainfall and wind speeds will increase 
in response to human-caused warming.68 Analyses 
Observed and Projected Sea 
Surface Temperature Change 
Atlantic Hurricane Formation Region 
Observed (black) and projected temperatures (blue = lower scenario; 
red = higher scenario) in the Atlantic hurricane formation region. Increased 
intensity of hurricanes is linked to rising sea surface temperatures in the 
region of the ocean where hurricanes form. The shaded areas show the 
likely ranges while the lines show the central projections from a set of 
climate models.
CMIP3-A93
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Sea level has risen along most of the 
U.S. coast over the past 50 years, and 
will rise more in the future. 
Recent global sea-level rise has been caused by the 
warming-induced expansion of the oceans, ac-
celerated melting of most of the world’s glaciers, 
and loss of ice on the Greenland and Antarctic ice 
sheets.37 There is strong evidence that global sea 
level is currently rising at an increased rate.37,126 A 
warming global climate will cause further sea-
level rise over this century and beyond.90,105 
During the past 50 years, sea level has risen up to 
8 inches or more along some coastal areas of the 
United States, and has fallen in other locations. 
The amount of relative sea-level rise experienced 
along different parts of the U.S. coast depends on 
the changes in elevation of the land that occur as a 
result of subsidence (sinking) or uplift (rising), as 
well as increases in global sea level due to warm-
ing. In addition, atmospheric and oceanic circula-
tion, which will be affected by climate change, will 
influence regional sea level. Regional differences 
Relative Sea-Level Changes on U.S. Coastlines, 1958 to 2008
Observed changes in relative sea level from 1958 to 2008 for locations on the U.S. coast. Some areas along the Atlantic 
and Gulf coasts saw increases greater than 8 inches over the past 50 years. 
Updated from Zervas127
in sea-level rise are also expected to be related to 
where the meltwater originates.104 
Human-induced sea-level rise is occurring globally. 
Large parts of the Atlantic Coast and Gulf of Mexico 
Coast have experienced significantly higher rates of 
relative sea-level rise than the global average during 
the last 50 years, with the local differences mainly 
due to land subsidence.127 Portions of the Northwest 
and Alaska coast have, on the other hand, experi-
enced slightly falling sea level as a result of long-
term uplift as a consequence of glacier melting and 
other geological processes.
Regional variations in relative sea-level rise are 
expected in the future. For example, assuming 
historical geological forces continue, a 2-foot rise in 
global sea level (which is within the range of recent 
estimates) by the end of this century would result 
in a relative sea-level rise of 2.3 feet at New York 
City, 2.9 feet at Hampton Roads, Virginia, 3.5 feet at 
Galveston, Texas, and 1 foot at Neah Bay in Wash-
ington state.128 
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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moisture and thus heavier snowstorms. Among re-
cent extreme lake-effect snow events was a Febru-
ary 2007 10-day storm total of over 10 feet of snow 
in western New York state. Climate models suggest 
that lake-effect snowfalls are likely to increase over 
the next few decades.130 In the longer term, lake-
effect snows are likely to decrease as temperatures 
continue to rise, with the precipitation then falling 
as rain.129 
Tornadoes and severe thunderstorms
Reports of severe weather including tornadoes and 
severe thunderstorms have increased during the 
past 50 years. However, the increase in the number 
of reports is widely believed to be due to improve-
ments in monitoring technologies such as Doppler 
radars combined with changes in population and 
increasing public awareness. When adjusted to ac-
count for these factors, there is no clear trend in the 
frequency or strength of tornadoes since the 1950s 
for the United States as a whole.112
The distribution by intensity for the strongest 10 
percent of hail and wind reports is little changed, 
providing no evidence of an observed increase in 
the severity of events.112 Climate models project 
future increases in the frequency of environmental 
conditions favorable to severe thunderstorms.131 But 
the inability to adequately model the small-scale 
conditions involved in thunderstorm development 
remains a limiting factor in projecting the future 
character of severe thunderstorms and other small-
scale weather phenomena.68
Cold-season storm tracks are shifting 
northward and the strongest storms are 
likely to become stronger and  
more frequent. 
Large-scale storm systems are the dominant 
weather phenomenon during the cold season in 
the United States. Although the analysis of these 
storms is complicated by a relatively short length of 
most observational records and by the highly vari-
able nature of strong storms, some clear patterns 
have emerged.112
Storm tracks have shifted northward over the 
last 50 years as evidenced by a decrease in the 
frequency of storms in mid-latitude areas of the 
Northern Hemisphere, while high-latitude activity 
has increased. There is also evidence of an increase 
in the intensity of storms in both the mid- and high-
latitude areas of the Northern Hemisphere, with 
greater confidence in the increases occurring in 
high latitudes.112 The northward shift is projected to 
continue, and strong cold season storms are likely 
to become stronger and more frequent, with greater 
wind speeds and more extreme wave heights.68
Snowstorms
The northward shift in storm tracks is reflected 
in regional changes in the frequency of snow-
storms. The South and lower Midwest saw reduced 
snowstorm frequency during the last century. In 
contrast, the Northeast and upper Midwest saw 
increases in snowstorms, although considerable 
decade-to-decade variations were present in all 
regions, influenced, for example, by the frequency 
of El Niño events.112
There is also evidence of an increase in lake-effect 
snowfall along and near the southern and eastern 
shores of the Great Lakes since 1950.97 Lake-effect 
snow is produced by the strong flow of cold air 
across large areas of relatively warmer ice-free 
water. As the climate has warmed, ice coverage on 
the Great Lakes has fallen. The maximum seasonal 
coverage of Great Lakes ice decreased at a rate of 
8.4 percent per decade from 1973 through 2008, 
amounting to a roughly 30 percent decrease in ice 
coverage (see Midwest region). This has created 
conditions conducive to greater evaporation of 
Areas in New York state east of Lake Ontario received 
over 10 feet of lake-effect snow during a 10-day period 
in early February 2007.
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Arctic sea ice is declining rapidly and 
this is very likely to continue. 
Sea ice is a very important part of the climate 
system. In addition to direct impacts on coastal 
areas of Alaska, it more broadly affects surface 
reflectivity, ocean currents, cloudiness, humid-
ity, and the exchange of heat and moisture at the 
ocean’s surface. Open ocean water is darker in 
color than sea ice, which causes it to absorb more 
of the Sun’s heat, which increases the warming of 
the water even more.40,132 
The most complete record of sea ice is provided 
by satellite observations of sea ice extent since the 
1970s. Prior to that, aircraft, ship, and coastal ob-
servations in the Arctic make it possible to extend 
the record of Northern Hemisphere sea ice extent 
back to at least 1900, although there is a lower 
level of confidence in the data prior to 1953.40 
Arctic sea ice extent has fallen at a rate of 3 to 4 
percent per decade over the last three decades. 
End-of-summer Arctic sea ice has fallen at an 
even faster rate of more than 11 percent per 
decade in that time. The observed decline in 
Arctic sea ice has been more rapid than projected 
by climate models.133 Year-to-year changes in 
sea ice extent and record low amounts are influenced by natural variations in atmospheric pressure and 
wind patterns.134 However, clear linkages between rising greenhouse gas concentrations and declines in 
Arctic sea ice have been identified in the climate record as far back as the early 1990s.61 The extreme loss 
in Arctic sea ice that occurred in 2007 would not 
have been possible without the long-term reductions 
that have coincided with a sustained increase in the 
atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide and the 
rapid rise in global temperatures that have occurred 
since the mid-1970s.135 Although the 2007 record 
low was not eclipsed in 2008, the 2008 sea ice extent 
is well below the long-term average, reflecting a 
continuation of the long-term decline in Arctic sea 
ice. In addition, the total volume of Arctic sea ice 
in 2008 was likely a record low because the ice was 
unusually thin.136
It is expected that declines in Arctic sea ice will 
continue in the coming decades with year-to-year 
fluctuations influenced by natural atmospheric vari-
ability. The overall rate of decline will be influenced 
mainly by the rate at which carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gas concentrations increase.137 
Arctic Sea Ice Extent
Annual Average
Observations of annual average Arctic sea ice extent for 
the period 1900 to 2008. The gray shading indicates less 
confidence in the data before 1953. 
Johannessen135; Fetterer et al.139 
Arctic Sea Ice 
Annual Minimum
Arctic sea ice reaches its annual minimum in September. The 
satellite images above show September Arctic sea ice in 1979, 
the first year these data were available, and 2007.
NASA/GSFC138
NASA/GSFC138
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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U.S. Emission and Absorption of Heat-Trapping Gases
Since the industrial revolution, the United States has been 
the world’s largest emitter of heat-trapping gases. With 
4.5 percent of world's population, the United States is 
responsible for about 28 percent of the human-induced 
heat-trapping gases in the atmosphere today.136 Although 
China has recently surpassed the United States in current 
total annual emissions, per capita emissions remain much 
higher in the United States. Carbon dioxide, the most 
important of the heat-trapping gases produced directly by 
human activities, is a cumulative problem because it has a 
long atmospheric lifetime. Roughly one-half of the carbon 
dioxide released from fossil fuel burning remains in the 
atmosphere after 100 years, and roughly one-fifth of it 
remains after 1,000 years.90 
U.S. carbon dioxide emissions grew dramatically over the past century. These emissions come almost 
entirely from burning fossil fuels. These sources of carbon dioxide are one side of the equation and on the 
other side are “sinks” that take up carbon dioxide. The growth of trees and other plants is an important 
natural carbon sink. In recent years, it is estimated that about 20 percent of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions 
have been offset by U.S. forest growth and other sinks (see figure below).140 It is not known whether 
U.S. forests and other sinks will continue to take up roughly this amount of carbon dioxide in the future 
as climate change alters carbon release and uptake. For example, a warming-induced lengthening of the 
growing season would tend to increase carbon uptake. On the other hand, the increases in forest fires and 
in the decomposition rate of dead plant matter would decrease uptake, and might convert the carbon sink 
into a source.140
The amount of carbon released and taken up by natural sources varies considerably from year to year 
depending on climatic and other conditions. For example, fires release carbon dioxide, so years with many 
large fires result in more carbon release and less uptake as natural sinks (the vegetation) are lost. Similarly, 
the trees destroyed by intense 
storms or droughts release carbon 
dioxide as they decompose, and the 
loss results in reduced strength of 
natural sinks until regrowth is well 
underway. For example, Hurricane 
Katrina killed or severely damaged 
over 320 million large trees. As these 
trees decompose over the next few 
years, they will release an amount 
of carbon dioxide equivalent to 
that taken up by all U.S. forests in 
a year.112 The net change in carbon 
storage in the long run will depend 
on how much is taken up by the 
regrowth as well as how much was 
released by the original disturbance.
U.S. carbon dioxide emissions and uptake in millions of tons of carbon per 
year in 2003. The bar marked “Emitted” indicates the amount of carbon as 
carbon dioxide added to the atmosphere from U.S. emissions. The bars marked 
“Absorbed” indicate amounts of carbon as carbon dioxide removed from the 
atmosphere. The thin lines on each bar indicate estimates of uncertainty.
Modified from CCSP SAP 2.2140
Marland et al.141
U.S. annual emissions of CO2 from fossil-fuel use.141
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Key Messages:
Climate change has already altered, and will continue to alter, the water cycle, • 
affecting where, when, and how much water is available for all uses.
Floods and droughts are likely to become more common and more intense as • 
regional and seasonal precipitation patterns change, and rainfall becomes more 
concentrated into heavy events (with longer, hotter dry periods in between).
   Precipitation and runoff are likely to increase in the Northeast and Midwest • 
in winter and spring, and decrease in the West, especially the Southwest, in 
spring and summer. 
In areas where snowpack dominates, the timing of runoff will continue to shift • 
to earlier in the spring and flows will be lower in late summer.
Surface water quality and groundwater quantity will be affected by a changing • 
climate.
Climate change will place additional burdens on already stressed water • 
systems.
The past century is no longer a reasonable guide to the future for water • 
management.
Changes in the water cycle, which are consistent 
with the warming observed over the past several 
decades, include: 
changes in precipitation patterns and intensity • 
changes in the incidence of drought• 
widespread melting of snow and ice• 
increasing atmospheric water vapor• 
increasing evaporation• 
increasing water temperatures• 
reductions in lake and river ice• 
changes in soil moisture and runoff• 
For the future, marked regional differences are 
projected, with increases in annual precipitation, 
runoff, and soil moisture in much of the Midwest 
and Northeast, and declines in much of the West, 
especially the Southwest. 
The impacts of climate change include too little wa-
ter in some places, too much water in other places, 
and degraded water quality. Some locations are ex-
pected to be subject to all of these conditions during 
different times of the year. Water cycle changes are 
expected to continue and to adversely affect energy 
production and use, human health, transportation, 
agriculture, and ecosystems (see table on page 50).142
Climate change has already altered, and 
will continue to alter, the water cycle, 
affecting where, when, and how much 
water is available for all uses.
Substantial changes to the water cycle are expected 
as the planet warms because the movement of water 
in the atmosphere and oceans is one of the primary 
mechanisms for the redistribution of heat around the 
world. Evidence is mounting that human-induced 
climate change is already altering many of the exist-
ing patterns of precipitation in the United States, 
including when, where, how much, and what kind of 
precipitation falls.68,142 A warmer climate increases 
evaporation of water from land and sea, and allows 
more moisture to be held in the atmosphere. For ev-
ery 1°F rise in temperature, the water holding capac-
ity of the atmosphere increases by about 4 percent.49 Skagit River and surrounding mountains in the Northwest
Key Sources
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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In addition, changes in atmospheric circulation will tend to move storm tracks northward with the result that dry 
areas will become drier and wet areas wetter. Hence, the arid Southwest is projected to experience longer and more 
severe droughts from the combination of increased evaporation and reductions in precipitation.108 
The additional atmospheric moisture 
contributes to more overall precipita-
tion in some areas, especially in much 
of the Northeast, Midwest, and Alas-
ka. Over the past 50 years, precipita-
tion and streamflow have increased in 
much of the Northeast and Midwest, 
with a reduction in drought duration 
and severity. Much of the South-
east and West has had reductions in 
precipitation and increases in drought 
severity and duration, especially in 
the Southwest. 
In most areas of the country, the frac-
tion of precipitation falling as rain 
versus snow has increased during 
the last 50 years. Despite this general 
shift from snow to rain, snowfalls 
Projected Changes in the Water Cycle
The water cycle exhibits many changes as the Earth warms. Wet and dry areas respond differently. NOAA/NCDC 
Changes in Snowfall Contributions to Wintertime Precipitation 
1949 to 2005
Trends in winter snow-to-total precipitation ratio from 1949 to 2005. Red circles indicate 
less snow, while blue squares indicate more snow. Large circles and squares indicate 
the most significant trends.143 Areas south of 37ºN latitude were excluded from the 
analysis because most of that area receives little snowfall. White areas above that line 
have inadequate data for this analysis. 
Feng and Hu143
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Observed Water-Related Changes During the Last Century142
Observed Change Direction of Change Region Affected
One to four week earlier peak streamflow 
due to earlier warming-driven snowmelt
Earlier West and Northeast
Proportion of precipitation falling as snow Decreasing West and Northeast
Duration and extent of snow cover Decreasing Most of the United States
Mountain snow water equivalent Decreasing West
Annual precipitation Increasing Most of the United States
Annual precipitation Decreasing Southwest
Frequency of heavy precipitation events Increasing Most of the United States
Runoff and streamflow Decreasing
Colorado and Columbia River 
Basins
Streamflow Increasing Most of East
Amount of ice in mountain glaciers Decreasing
U.S. western mountains, 
Alaska
Water temperature of lakes and streams Increasing Most of the United States
Ice cover on lakes and rivers Decreasing Great Lakes and Northeast
Periods of drought Increasing Parts of West and East
Salinization of surface waters Increasing Florida, Louisiana
Widespread thawing of permafrost Increasing Alaska
Observed Drought Trends 1958 to 2007
Trends in end-of-summer drought as measured by the Palmer Drought Severity Index from 1958 to 
2007 in each of 344 U.S. climate divisions.144 Hatching indicates significant trends.
Guttman and Quayle144
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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along the downwind coasts of the Great Lakes 
have increased. Factors contributing to this 
increase include reduced ice cover due to 
warming, which lengthens the period of open 
water. In addition, cold air moving over rela-
tively warm, open lake water induces strong 
evaporation, often causing heavy lake-effect 
snow. Heavy snowfall and snowstorm fre-
quency have increased in many northern parts 
of the United States. In the South however, 
where temperatures are already marginal for 
heavy snowfall, climate warming has led to 
a reduction in heavy snowfall and snowstorm 
frequency. These trends suggest a northward 
shift in snowstorm occurrence.68
Floods and droughts are likely to 
become more common and more 
intense as regional and seasonal 
precipitation patterns change, and 
rainfall becomes more concentrated 
into heavy events (with longer, 
hotter dry periods in between).
While it sounds counterintuitive, a warmer 
world produces both wetter and drier conditions. 
Even though total global precipitation increases, the 
regional and seasonal distribution of precipitation 
changes, and more precipitation comes in heavier 
rains (which can cause flooding) rather than light 
events. In the past century, averaged over the 
United States, total precipitation has increased by 
about 7 percent, while the heaviest 1 percent of rain 
events increased by nearly 20 percent.68 This has 
been especially noteworthy in the Northeast, where 
the annual number of days with very heavy precipi-
tation has increased most in the past 50 years, as 
shown in the adjacent figure. Flooding often occurs 
when heavy precipitation persists for weeks to 
months in large river basins. Such extended periods 
of heavy precipitation have also been increasing 
over the past century, most notably in the past two 
to three decades in the United States.112 
Observations also show that over the past several 
decades, extended dry periods have become more 
frequent in parts of the United States, especially 
the Southwest and the eastern United States.146,147 
Longer periods between rainfalls, combined with 
Increases in the Number of Days with  
Very Heavy Precipitation (1958 to 2007)
The map shows the percentage increases in the average number 
of days with very heavy precipitation (defined as the heaviest 
1 percent of all events) from 1958 to 2007 for each region. There 
are clear trends toward more days with very heavy precipitation 
for the nation as a whole, and particularly in the Northeast 
and Midwest. 
Updated from Groisman et al.145
higher air temperatures, dry out soils and vegeta-
tion, causing drought. 
For the future, precipitation intensity is projected 
to increase everywhere, with the largest increases 
occurring in areas in which average precipitation 
increases the most. For example, the Midwest and 
Northeast, where total precipitation is expected 
to increase the most, would also experience the 
largest increases in heavy precipitation events. The 
number of dry days between precipitation events 
is also projected to increase, especially in the more 
arid areas. Mid-continental areas and the Southwest 
are particularly threatened by future drought. The 
magnitude of the projected changes in extremes is 
expected to be greater than changes in averages, 
and hence detectable sooner.49,68,90,142,148  
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Precipitation and runoff are likely 
to increase in the Northeast and 
Midwest in winter and spring,  
and decrease in the West, 
especially the Southwest, in  
spring and summer. 
Runoff, which accumulates as streamflow, 
is the amount of precipitation that is not 
evaporated, stored as snowpack or soil 
moisture, or filtered down to groundwater. 
The proportion of precipitation that runs off 
is determined by a variety of factors includ-
ing temperature, wind speed, humidity, solar 
intensity at the ground, vegetation, and soil 
moisture. While runoff generally tracks 
precipitation, increases and decreases in 
precipitation do not necessarily lead to equal 
increases and decreases in runoff. For ex-
ample, droughts cause soil moisture reduc-
tions that can reduce expected runoff until 
soil moisture is replenished. Conversely, water-sat-
urated soils can generate floods with only moderate 
additional precipitation. During the last century, 
consistent increases in precipitation have been 
found in the Midwest and Northeast along with 
increased runoff.149,150 Climate models consistently 
project that the East will experience increased run-
off, while there will be substantial declines in the 
interior West, especially the Southwest. Projections 
for runoff in California and other parts of the West 
also show reductions, although less than in the 
interior West. In short, wet areas are projected to 
get wetter and dry areas drier. Climate models also 
consistently project heat-related summer soil 
moisture reductions in the middle of  
the continent.115,142,146,149 
In areas where snowpack 
dominates, the timing of runoff will 
continue to shift to earlier in the 
spring and flows will be lower in 
late summer.
Large portions of the West and some ar-
eas in the Northeast rely on snowpack as a 
natural reservoir to hold winter precipita-
tion until it later runs off as streamflow in 
spring, summer, and fall. Over the last 50 
years, there have been widespread temperature-
related reductions in snowpack in the West, with 
the largest reductions occurring in lower elevation 
mountains in the Northwest and California where 
snowfall occurs at temperatures close to the freez-
ing point.142,153 The Northeast has also experienced 
snowpack reductions during a similar period. 
Observations indicate a transition to more rain and 
less snow in both the West and Northeast in the last 
50 years.143,154-156 Runoff in snowmelt-dominated 
areas is occurring up to 20 days earlier in the West, 
and up to 14 days earlier in the Northeast.157,158 Fu-
ture projections for most snowmelt-dominated ba-
sins in the West consistently indicate earlier spring 
Simulated Changes in Annual Runoff Pattern
General schematic of changes in the annual pattern of runoff for snowmelt-
dominated streams. Compared to the historical pattern, runoff peak is projected 
to shift to earlier in the spring and late summer flows are expected to be lower. The 
above example is for the Green River, which is part of the Colorado River watershed.
Christensen et al.152
Projected Changes in Annual Runoff
Projected changes in median runoff for 2041-2060, relative to a 1901-1970 
baseline, are mapped by water-resource region. Colors indicate percentage 
changes in runoff. Hatched areas indicate greater confidence due to strong 
agreement among model projections. White areas indicate divergence among 
model projections. Results are based on emissions in between the lower and 
higher emissions scenarios.91 
Milly et al.151
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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Surface water quality and groundwater 
quantity will be affected by a  
changing climate.
Changes in water quality
Increased air temperatures lead to higher water 
temperatures, which have already been detected in 
many streams, especially during low-flow periods. 
In lakes and reservoirs, higher water temperatures 
lead to longer periods of summer stratification 
(when surface and bottom waters do not mix). 
Dissolved oxygen is reduced in lakes, reservoirs, 
and rivers at higher temperatures. Oxygen is an 
essential resource for many living things, and its 
availability is reduced at higher temperatures both 
because the amount that can be dissolved in water 
is lower and because respiration rates of living 
things are higher. Low oxygen stresses aquatic 
animals such as coldwater fish and the insects and 
crustaceans on which they feed.142 Lower oxygen 
levels also decrease the self-purification capabili-
ties of rivers.
The negative effects of water pollution, includ-
ing sediments, nitrogen from agriculture, disease 
pathogens, pesticides, herbicides, salt, and ther-
mal pollution, will be amplified by observed and 
projected increases in precipitation intensity and 
longer periods when streamflows are low.146 The 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency expects the 
number of waterways considered “impaired” by 
water pollution to increase.162 Heavy downpours 
lead to increased sediment in runoff and outbreaks 
of waterborne diseases.163,164 Increases in pollution 
carried to lakes, estuaries, and the coastal ocean, 
especially when coupled with increased tempera-
ture, can result in blooms of harmful algae and 
bacteria. However, pollution has the potential  
of being diluted in regions that experience  
increased streamflow.
Water-quality changes during the last century were 
probably due to causes other than climate change, 
primarily changes in pollutants.149 
Changes in groundwater
Many parts of the United States are heavily de-
pendent on groundwater for drinking, residential, 
and agricultural water supplies.164 How climate 
change will affect groundwater is not well known, 
runoff, in some cases up to 60 days earlier.157,159 For 
the Northeast, projections indicate spring runoff 
will advance by up to 14 days.150 Earlier runoff 
produces lower late-summer streamflows, which 
stress human and environmental systems through 
less water availability and higher water tempera-
tures.145 Scientific analyses to determine the causes 
of recent changes in snowpack, runoff timing, and 
increased winter temperatures have attributed these 
changes to human-caused climate change.34,160,161 
Trends in Peak Streamflow Timing
Top map shows changes in runoff timing in snowmelt-driven streams 
from 1948 to 2002 with red circles indicating earlier runoff, and blue 
circles indicating later runoff. Bottom map shows projected changes 
in snowmelt-driven streams by 2080-2099, compared to 1951-1980, 
under a higher emissions scenario.91
Stewart et al.157
46 47
Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States Water Resources
but increased water demands by society in regions 
that already rely on groundwater will clearly stress 
this resource, which is often drawn down faster 
than it can be recharged.164 In many locations, 
groundwater is closely connected to surface water 
and thus trends in surface water supplies over time 
affect groundwater. Changes in the water cycle that 
reduce precipitation or increase evaporation and 
runoff would reduce the amount of water avail-
able for recharge. Changes in vegetation and soils 
that occur as temperature changes or due to fire or 
pest outbreaks are also likely to affect recharge by 
altering evaporation and infiltration rates. More 
frequent and larger floods are likely to increase 
groundwater recharge in semi-arid and arid areas, 
where most recharge occurs through dry stream-
beds after heavy rainfalls and floods.142 
Sea-level rise is expected to increase saltwater 
intrusion into coastal freshwater aquifers, making 
some unusable without desalination.146 Increased 
evaporation or reduced recharge into coastal 
aquifers exacerbates saltwater intrusion. Shallow 
groundwater aquifers that exchange water with 
streams are likely to be the most sensitive part of 
the groundwater system to climate change. Small 
reductions in groundwater levels can lead to large 
reductions in streamflow and increases in ground-
water levels can increase streamflow.165 Further, 
the interface between streams and groundwater is 
an important site for pollution removal by microor-
ganisms. Their activity will change in response to 
increased temperature and increased or decreased 
streamflow as climate changes, and this will affect 
water quality. Like water quality, research on the 
impacts of climate change on groundwater has  
been minimal.149 
Climate change will place additional 
burdens on already stressed  
water systems.
In many places, the nation’s water systems are al-
ready taxed due to aging infrastructure, population 
increases, and competition among water needs for 
farming, municipalities, hydropower, recre-
ation, and ecosystems.167-169 Climate change 
will add another factor to existing water 
management challenges, thus increasing 
vulnerability.170 The U.S. Bureau of Recla-
mation has identified many areas in the West 
that are already at risk for serious conflict 
over water, even in the absence of climate 
change171 (see figure next page). 
Adapting to gradual changes, such as 
changes in average amounts of precipitation, 
is less difficult than adapting to changes in 
extremes. Where extreme events, such as 
droughts or floods, become more intense or 
more frequent with climate change, the eco-
nomic and social costs of these events will 
increase.172 Water systems have life spans 
of many years and are designed with spare 
Heavy rain can cause sediments to become suspended in water, 
reducing its quality, as seen in the brown swath above in New 
York City’s Ashokan reservoir following Hurricane Floyd in 
September 1999.
Lake Superior Summer Air and Water Temperatures
1979 to 2006
The recent large jump in summer water temperature is related to the 
recent large reduction in ice cover (see Midwest region).
Austin and Colman166
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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capacity. These systems are thus able to cope with small changes in average conditions.172 Water resource 
planning today considers a broad range of stresses and hence adaptation to climate change will be one factor 
among many in deciding what actions will be taken to minimize vulnerability.172-174
 
Rapid regional population growth
The U.S. population is estimated to have grown to more than 300 million people, nearly a 7 percent increase 
since the 2000 Census. Current Census Bureau projections are for this growth rate to continue, with the 
national population projected to reach 350 million by 2025 and 420 
million by 2050. The highest rates of population growth to 2025 are 
projected to occur in areas such as the Southwest that are at risk for 
reductions in water supplies due to climate change.167
Aging water infrastructure
The nation’s drinking water and wastewater infrastructure is aging. 
In older cities, some buried water mains are over 100 years old and 
breaks of these lines are a significant problem. Sewer overflows re-
sulting in the discharge of untreated wastewater also occur frequently. 
Heavier downpours will exacerbate existing problems in many cities, 
especially where stormwater catchments and sewers are combined. 
Drinking water and sewer infrastructure is very expensive to install and maintain. Climate change will 
present a new set of challenges for designing upgrades to the nation’s water delivery and sewage  
removal infrastructure.168
Existing water disputes across
the country
Many locations in the United States are 
already undergoing water stress. The Great 
Lakes states are establishing an interstate 
compact to protect against reductions in 
lake levels and potential water exports. 
Georgia, Alabama, and Florida are in a 
dispute over water for drinking, recreation, 
farming, environmental purposes, and 
hydropower in the Apalachicola–Chatta-
hoochee–Flint River system.175,176 
The State Water Project in California is 
facing a variety of problems in the Sacra-
mento Delta, including endangered species, 
saltwater intrusion, and potential loss of 
islands due to flood- or earthquake-caused 
levee failures.177-182 A dispute over endan-
gered fish in the Rio Grande has been on-
going for many years.183 The Klamath River 
in Oregon and California has been the 
location of a multi-year disagreement over 
native fish, hydropower, and farming.184,185 
The Colorado River has been the site of 
numerous interstate quarrels over the last 
century.186,187 Large, unquantified Native 
Potential Water Supply Conflicts by 2025
USBR171
The map shows regions in the West where water supply conflicts are likely to occur 
by 2025 based on a combination of factors including population trends and potential 
endangered species’ needs for water. The red zones are where the conflicts are 
most likely to occur. This analysis does not factor in the effects of climate change, 
which is expected to exacerbate many of these already-identified issues.171 
Damage to the city water system in Asheville, 
North Carolina, due to heavy rain in 2004.
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American water rights challenge existing uses in 
the West (see Southwest region).188 By changing 
the existing patterns of precipitation and runoff, 
climate change will add another stress to  
existing problems. 
Changing water demands
Water demands are expected to change with in-
creased temperatures. Evaporation is projected to 
increase over most of the United States as tempera-
tures rise. Higher temperatures and longer dry peri-
ods are expected to lead to increased water demand 
for irrigation. This may be partially offset by more 
efficient use of water by plants due to rising atmo-
spheric carbon dioxide. Higher temperatures are 
projected to increase cooling water withdrawals by 
electrical generating stations. In addition, greater 
cooling requirements in summer will increase elec-
tricity use, which in turn will require more cooling 
water for power plants. Industrial and municipal 
demands are expected to increase slightly.146
The past century is no longer a 
reasonable guide to the future for  
water management.
Water planning and management have been based 
on historical fluctuations in records of stream 
flows, lake levels, precipitation, temperature, 
and water demands. All aspects of water 
management including reservoir sizing, 
reservoir flood operations, maximum urban 
stormwater runoff amounts, and projected 
water demands have been based on these 
records. Water managers have proven adept 
at balancing supplies and demand through 
the significant climate variability of the 
past century.142 Because climate change 
will significantly modify many aspects 
of the water cycle, the assumption of an 
unchanging climate is no longer appropriate 
for many aspects of water planning. Past 
assumptions derived from the historical 
record about supply and demand will need to 
be revisited for existing and proposed water 
projects.142,151,174
Drought studies that consider the past 1,200 
years indicate that in the West, the last 
century was significantly wetter than most other 
centuries. Multi-decade “megadroughts” in the 
years 900 to 1300 were substantially worse than 
the worst droughts of the last century, including 
the Dust Bowl era. The causes of these events are 
only partially known; if they were to reoccur, they 
would clearly stress water management, even in the 
absence of climate change (see figure below).97,149,189 
The intersection of substantial changes in the water 
cycle with multiple stresses such as population 
growth and competition for water supplies means 
that water planning will be doubly challenging. 
The ability to modify operational rules and water 
allocations is likely to be critical for the protection 
of infrastructure, for public safety, to ensure reli-
ability of water delivery, and to protect the environ-
ment. There are, however, many institutional and 
legal barriers to such changes in both the short and 
long term.190 Four examples:
The allocation of the water in many interstate • 
rivers is governed by compacts, international 
treaties, federal laws, court decrees, and other 
agreements that are difficult to modify. 
Reservoir operations are governed by “rule • 
curves” that require a certain amount of space 
to be saved in a reservoir at certain times of 
Long-Term Aridity Changes in the West
The black line shows the percentage of the area affected by drought (Palmer 
Drought Severity Index less than –1) in the West over the past 1,200 years. 
The red line indicates the average drought area in the years 900 to 1300. The 
blue horizontal line in the yellow box indicates the average during the period 
from 1900 to 2000, illustrating that the most recent period, during which 
population and water infrastructure grew rapidly in the West, was wetter 
than the long-term average (thin horizontal black line).189 Droughts shown in 
the period 1100-1300 significantly exceed those that have occurred over the 
past 100 years. 
Cook et al.189
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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In most parts of the West, water is allocated • 
based on a “first in time means first in right” 
system, and because agriculture was developed 
before cities were established, large volumes 
of water typically are allocated to agriculture. 
Transferring agricultural rights to municipali-
ties, even for short periods during drought, can 
involve substantial expense and time 
and can be socially divisive.
Conserving water does not neces-• 
sarily lead to a right to that saved 
water, thus creating a disincentive 
for conservation.
Total U.S. water diversions peaked in 
the 1980s, which implies that expand-
ing supplies in many areas to meet new 
needs are unlikely to be a viable option, 
especially in arid areas likely to experi-
ence less precipitation. However, over 
the last 30 years, per capita water use 
has decreased significantly (due, for 
example, to more efficient technologies 
such as drip irrigation) and it is antici-
pated that per capita use will continue 
to decrease, thus easing stress.149
year to capture a potential flood. Devel-
oped by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
based on historical flood data, many of these 
rule curves have never been modified, and 
modifications might require Environmental 
Impact Statements.151 
Adaptation:   New York City Begins Planning for Climate Change
The New York City Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), the agency in charge of 
providing the city’s drinking water and wastewater treatment, is beginning to alter its planning to 
take into account the effects of climate change – sea-level rise, higher temperatures, increases in 
extreme events, and changing precipitation patterns – on the city’s water systems. In partnership with 
Columbia University, DEP is evaluating climate change projections, impacts, indicators, and adaptation 
and mitigation strategies.
City planners have begun to address these issues by defining risks using probabilistic climate scenarios 
and considering potential adaptations that relate to operations/management, infrastructure, and policy. 
For example, DEP is examining the feasibility of relocating critical control systems to higher floors in 
low-lying buildings or to higher ground, building flood walls, and modifying design criteria to reflect 
changing hydrologic processes.
Important near-term goals of the overall effort include updating the existing 100-year flood elevations 
using climate model projections and identifying additional monitoring stations needed to track changes. 
DEP will also establish a system for reporting the impacts of extreme weather events on the City’s 
watershed and infrastructure. In the immediate future, DEP will evaluate flood protection measures 
for three existing water pollution control plants that are scheduled for renovation.194
Highlights of Water-Related Impacts by Sector
Sector Examples of Impacts
Human Health
Heavy downpours increase incidence of waterborne dis-
ease and floods, resulting in potential hazards to human life 
and health.163
Energy Supply
and Use
Hydropower production is reduced due to low flows in 
some regions. Power generation is reduced in fossil fuel 
and nuclear plants due to increased water temperatures 
and reduced cooling water availability.191
Transportation
Floods and droughts disrupt transportation. Heavy down-
pours affect harbor infrastructure and inland waterways. 
Declining Great Lakes levels reduce freight capacity.192
Agriculture and 
Forests
Intense precipitation can delay spring planting and damage 
crops. Earlier spring snowmelt leads to increased number 
of forest fires.193
Ecosystems Coldwater fish threatened by rising water temperatures. Some warmwater fish will expand ranges.70
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Spotlight on the 
Colorado River The Colorado River system supplies water 
to over 30 million people in the Southwest 
including Los Angeles, Phoenix, Las Vegas, and 
Denver. Reservoirs in the system, including the 
giant lakes Mead and Powell, were nearly full in 
1999, with almost four times the annual flow of 
the river stored. By 2007, the system had lost 
approximately half of that storage after enduring 
the worst drought in 100 years of record 
keeping.29 Runoff was reduced due to low winter 
precipitation, and warm, dry, and windy spring 
seasons that substantially reduced snowpack.
Numerous studies over the last 30 years have 
indicated that the river is likely to experience 
reductions in runoff due to climate change. In 
addition, diversions from the river to meet the 
needs of cities and agriculture are approaching 
its average flow. Under current conditions, 
even without climate change, large year-to-year 
fluctuations in reservoir storage are possible.152 
If reductions in flow projected to accompany 
global climate change occur, water managers will 
be challenged to satisfy all existing demands, let 
alone the increasing demands of a rapidly  
growing population.167,195
Efforts are underway to address these challenges. 
In 2005, the Department of Interior’s Bureau 
of Reclamation began a process to formalize 
operating rules for lakes Mead and Powell during 
times of low flows and to apportion limited water 
among the states.196  Matching photographs taken 18 months apart during the most serious period of recent drought show a significant decrease in 
Lake Powell.
June 29, 2002
December 23, 2003
The filling of Lake Mead (green) was initiated in 1935, and that of Lake Powell 
(blue) in 1963. In 1999, the lakes were nearly full, but by 2007, the lakes had lost 
nearly half of their storage water after the worst drought in 100 years.
Change in Water Volume of Lakes Mead and Powell
USBR171
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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:   Water and Energy Connections
Water and energy are tightly interconnected; water systems use large 
amounts of energy, and energy systems use large amounts of water. 
Both are expected to be under increasing pressure in the future 
and both will be affected by a changing climate. In the energy sector, 
water is used directly for hydropower, and cooling water is critical for 
nearly all other forms of electrical power generation. Withdrawals 
of freshwater used to cool power plants that use heat to generate 
electricity are very large, nearly equaling the water withdrawn for 
irrigation. Water consumption by power plants is about 20 percent of 
all non-agricultural uses, or half that of all domestic use.197 
In the water sector, two very unusual attributes of water, significant weight due to its relatively 
high density, and high heat capacity, make water use energy intensive. Large amounts of energy 
are needed for pumping, heating, and treating drinking water and wastewater. Water supply and 
treatment consumes roughly 4 percent of the nation’s power supply, and electricity accounts for 
about 75 percent of the cost of municipal water processing and transport. In California, 30 percent 
of all non-power plant natural gas is used for water-related activities.198,199 The energy required 
to provide water depends on its source (groundwater, surface water, desalinated water, treated 
wastewater, or recycled water), the distance the water is conveyed, the amount of water moved, and 
the local topography. Surface water often requires more treatment than groundwater. Desalination 
requires large amounts of energy to produce freshwater. Treated wastewater and recycled water 
(used primarily for agriculture and industry) require energy for treatment, but little energy for supply 
and conveyance. Conserving water has the dual benefit of conserving energy and potentially reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions if fossil fuels are the predominant source of that energy. 
U.S. DOE197
Water and energy are intimately connected. Water is used by the power generation sector for cooling, and energy is used 
by the water sector for pumping, drinking water treatment, and wastewater treatment. Without energy, there would be 
limited water distribution, and without water, there would be limited energy production.
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Key Messages:
Warming will be accompanied by decreases in demand for heating energy and • 
increases in demand for cooling energy. The latter will result in significant 
increases in electricity use and higher peak demand in most regions.
Energy production is likely to be constrained by rising temperatures and limited • 
water supplies in many regions.
Energy production and delivery systems are exposed to sea-level rise and • 
extreme weather events in vulnerable regions.
Climate change is likely to affect some renewable energy sources across the • 
nation, such as hydropower production in regions subject to changing patterns 
of precipitation or snowmelt.
Energy is at the heart of the global warming 
challenge.3 It is humanity’s production and use of 
energy that is the primary cause of global warming, 
and in turn, climate change will eventually affect 
our production and use of energy. The vast majority 
of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, about 87 percent, 
come from energy production and use.200
At the same time, other U.S. trends are increasing 
energy use: population shifts to the South, espe-
cially the Southwest, where 
air conditioning use is high, 
an increase in the square 
footage built per person, 
increased electrification of 
the residential and commer-
cial sectors, and increased 
market penetration of  
air conditioning.201
Many of the effects of 
climate change on energy 
production and use in the 
United States are not well 
studied. Some of the effects 
of climate change, however, 
have clear implications for 
energy production and use. For instance, rising 
temperatures are expected to increase energy re-
quirements for cooling and reduce energy require-
ments for heating.164,201 Changes in precipitation 
have the potential to affect prospects for hydropow-
er, positively or negatively.201 Increases in hurricane 
intensity are likely to cause further disruptions 
to oil and gas operations in the Gulf, like those 
experienced in 2005 with Hurricane Katrina and in 
2008 with Hurricane Ike.201 Concerns about climate 
Sources of U.S. Greenhouse Emissions (2003)
About 87 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions come from energy production and use, as 
shown in the left pie chart. The right pie chart breaks down these emissions by greenhouse gas.
Adapted from U.S. EPA202
Key Sources
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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change impacts will almost certainly alter percep-
tions and valuations of energy technology alterna-
tives. These effects are very likely to be relevant 
for energy policies, decisions, and institutions in 
the United States, affecting courses of action and 
appropriate strategies for risk management.201 
The overall scale of the national energy economy 
is very large, and the energy industry has both 
the financial and the managerial resources to be 
adaptive. Impacts due to climate change are likely 
to be most apparent at sub-national scales, such as 
regional effects of extreme weather events and re-
duced water availability, and effects of increased 
cooling demands on especially vulnerable places 
and populations.204 
Warming will be accompanied by 
decreases in demand for heating energy 
and increases in demand for cooling 
energy. The latter will result in significant 
increases in electricity use and higher 
peak demand in most regions.
Research on the effects of climate change on en-
ergy production and use has largely been limited 
to impacts on energy use in buildings. These 
studies have considered effects of global warming 
on energy requirements for heating and cooling 
in buildings in the United States.205 They find that 
the demand for cooling energy increases from 5 
to 20 percent per 1.8°F of warming, and the de-
mand for heating energy drops by 3 to 15 percent 
per 1.8°F of warming.205 These ranges reflect 
different assumptions about factors such as the 
rate of market penetration of improved building 
equipment technologies.205
Studies project that temperature increases due to 
global warming are very likely to increase peak 
demand for electricity in most regions of the 
country.205 An increase in peak demand can lead 
to a disproportionate increase in energy infra-
structure investment.205
Since nearly all of the cooling of buildings is 
provided by electricity use, whereas the vast 
majority of the heating of buildings is provided 
by natural gas and fuel oil,201,206 the projected 
Primary Energy Consumption
 by Major Source (1949 to 2007)
U.S. energy supply is dominated by fossil fuels. Petroleum, 
the top source of energy shown above, is primarily used for 
transportation (70 percent of oil use). Natural gas is used in 
roughly equal parts to generate electricity, power industrial 
processes, and heat water and buildings. Coal is primarily used 
to generate electricity (91 percent of coal use). Nuclear power 
is used entirely for electricity generation.
EIA203
U.S. Electricity Sources (2007) 
Coal, natural gas, and nuclear power plants together account for 
about 90 percent of current U.S. electricity production.
EIA203
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changes imply increased demands 
for electricity. This is especially the 
case where climate change would 
result in significant increases in the 
heat index in summer, and where 
relatively little space cooling has 
been needed in the past, but demands 
are likely to increase in the future.205 
The increase in electricity demand is 
likely to be accelerated by population 
movements to the South and South-
west, which are regions of especially 
high per capita electricity use, due to 
demands for cooling in commercial 
buildings and households.205 Because 
nearly half of the nation’s electric-
ity is currently generated from coal, 
these factors have the potential to 
increase total national carbon dioxide 
emissions in the absence of improved 
energy efficiency, development of 
non-carbon energy sources, and/or 
carbon capture and storage.205
 
Other effects of climate change on 
energy consumption are less clear, 
because little research has been done.205 
For instance, in addition to cooling, 
air conditioners also remove moisture 
from the air; thus the 
increase in humidity 
projected to accompany 
global warming is likely 
to increase electric-
ity consumption by 
air conditioners even 
further.205 As other ex-
amples, warming would 
increase the use of air 
conditioners in high-
way vehicles, and water 
scarcity in some regions 
has the potential to in-
crease energy demands 
for water pumping. It is 
important to improve 
the information avail-
able about these other 
kinds of effects.
Shifting Energy Demand in the United States by 2080-2099
“Degree days” are a way of measuring the energy needed for heating and cooling by adding up how many 
degrees hotter or colder each day’s average temperature is from 65ºF over the course of a year. Colder 
locations have high numbers of heating degree days and low numbers of cooling degree days, while hotter 
locations have high numbers of cooling degree days and low numbers of heating degree days. Nationally, 
the demand for energy will increase in summer and decrease in winter. Cooling uses electricity while 
heating uses a combination of energy sources, so the overall effect nationally and in most regions will be 
an increased need for electricity. The projections shown in the chart are for late this century. The higher 
emissions scenario91 used here is referred to as “even higher” on page 23.
CMIP3-B117
Change in Population
from 1970 to 2008
The map above, showing percentage changes in county population between 1970 and 
2008, graphically illustrates the large increases in places that require air conditioning. 
Areas with very large increases are shown in orange, red, and maroon. Some places had 
enormous growth, in the hundreds of thousands of people. For example, counties in the 
vicinity of South Florida, Atlanta, Los Angeles, Phoenix, Las Vegas, Denver, Dallas, and 
Houston all had very large increases.
U.S. Census207
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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Energy production is likely to be 
constrained by rising temperatures and 
limited water supplies in many regions. 
In some regions, reductions in water supply due 
to decreases in precipitation and/or water from 
melting snowpack are likely to be significant, 
increasing the competition for water among vari-
ous sectors including energy production (see Water 
Resources sector).191,208
The production of energy from fossil fuels (coal, 
oil, and natural gas) is inextricably linked to the 
availability of adequate and sustainable supplies of 
water.191,208 While providing the United States with 
the majority of its annual energy needs, fossil fuels 
also place a high demand on the nation’s water 
resources in terms of both quantity and quality 
impacts.191,208 Generation of electricity in thermal 
power plants (coal, nuclear, gas, or oil) is water 
intensive. Power plants rank only slightly behind 
irrigation in terms of freshwater withdrawals in the 
United States.191 
There is a high likelihood that water shortages will 
limit power plant electricity production in many 
regions. Future water constraints on electricity 
production in thermal power plants are projected 
for Arizona, Utah, Texas, Louisiana, Georgia, Ala-
bama, Florida, California, Oregon, and Washington 
state by 2025.191 Additional parts of the United 
States could face similar constraints as a result 
of drought, growing populations, and increasing 
demand for water for various uses, at least season-
ally.209 Situations where the development of new 
power plants is being slowed down or halted due 
to inadequate cooling water are becoming more 
frequent throughout the nation.191 
The issue of competition among various water uses 
is dealt with in more detail in the Water Resources 
sector. In connection with these issues and other re-
gional water scarcity impacts, energy is likely to be 
needed to move and manage water. This is one of 
many examples of interactions among the impacts 
of climate change on various sectors that, in this 
case, affects energy requirements.
In addition to the problem of water availability, 
there are issues related to an increase in water 
temperature. Use of warmer water reduces the effi-
ciency of thermal power plant cooling technologies. 
And, warmer water discharged from power plants 
can alter species composition in aquatic ecosys-
tems.210 Large coal and nuclear plants have been 
limited in their operations by reduced river levels 
caused by higher temperatures and thermal limits 
on water discharge.191
The efficiency of thermal power plants, fossil 
or nuclear, is sensitive to ambient air and water 
temperatures; higher temperatures reduce power 
outputs by affecting the efficiency of cooling.191 
Although this effect is not large in percentage 
terms, even a relatively small change could have 
significant implications for total national electric 
power supply.191 For example, an average reduction 
of 1 percent in electricity generated by thermal 
power plants nationwide would mean a loss of 25 
billion kilowatt-hours per year,211 about the amount 
of electricity consumed by 2 million Americans, a 
loss that would need to be supplied in some other 
way or offset through measures that improve  
energy efficiency.
Nuclear, coal, and natural gas power plants require large 
amounts of water for cooling.191
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Energy production and delivery  
systems are exposed to sea-level 
rise and extreme weather events in 
vulnerable regions.
Sea-level rise 
A significant fraction of America’s energy infra-
structure is located near the coasts, from power 
plants, to oil refineries, to facilities that receive oil 
and gas deliveries.191 Rising sea levels are likely to 
lead to direct losses, such as equipment damage 
from flooding or erosion, and indirect effects, such 
as the costs of raising vulnerable assets to higher 
levels or building new facilities farther inland, in-
creasing transportation costs.191 The U.S. East Coast 
and Gulf Coast have been identified as particularly 
vulnerable to sea-level rise because the land is rela-
tively flat and also sinking in many places.191 
Extreme events
Observed and projected increases in a variety of 
extreme events will have significant impacts on the 
energy sector. As witnessed in 2005, hurricanes 
can have a debilitating impact on energy infrastruc-
ture. Direct losses to the energy industry in 2005 
are estimated at $15 billion,191 with millions more 
in restoration and recovery costs. As one example, 
the Yscloskey Gas Processing Plant (located on 
the Louisiana coast) was forced to close for six 
months following Hurricane Katrina, resulting in 
lost revenues to the plant’s owners and employees, 
and higher prices to consumers, as gas had to be 
procured from other sources.191
The impacts of an increase in severe weather are 
not limited to hurricane-prone areas. For example, 
rail transportation lines, which carry approxi-
mately two-thirds of the coal to the nation’s power 
plants,212 often follow riverbeds, especially in the 
Appalachian region.191 More intense rainstorms, 
which have been observed and projected,68,112 can 
lead to rivers flooding, which can “wash out” or 
degrade nearby railbeds and roadbeds.191 This is 
also a problem in the Midwest, which experienced 
major flooding of the Mississippi River in 1993  
and 2008.213
Development of new energy facilities could be re-
stricted by siting concerns related to sea-level rise, 
exposure to extreme events, and increased capital 
costs resulting from a need to provide greater pro-
tection from extreme events.191 
The electricity grid is also vulnerable to climate 
change effects, from temperature changes to severe 
weather events.191 The most familiar example is  
The Gulf Coast is home to the U.S. oil and gas industries, representing 
nearly 30 percent of the nation’s crude oil production and approximately 
20 percent of its natural gas production. One-third of the national refining 
and processing capacity lies on coastal plains adjacent to the Gulf of Mexico. 
Several thousand offshore drilling platforms, dozens of refineries, and thousands 
of miles of pipelines are vulnerable to damage and disruption due to sea-level rise 
and the high winds and storm surge associated with hurricanes and other tropical 
storms. For example, hurricanes Katrina and Rita halted all oil and gas production 
from the Gulf, disrupted nearly 20 percent of the nation’s refinery capacity, and closed 
many oil and gas pipelines.214 Relative sea-level rise in parts of the Gulf Coast region (Louisiana 
and East Texas) is projected to be as high as 2 to 4 feet by 2050 to 2100, due to the combination 
of global sea-level rise caused by warming oceans and melting ice and local land sinking.215 Combined 
with onshore and offshore storm activity, this would represent an increased threat to this regional energy 
infrastructure. Some adaptations to these risks are beginning to emerge (see Adaptation box, page 58).
Offshore oil production is particularly susceptible to extreme weather events. Hurricane Ivan in 2004 destroyed 
seven platforms in the Gulf of Mexico, significantly damaged 24 platforms, and damaged 102 pipelines. Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita in 2005 destroyed more than 100 platforms and damaged 558 pipelines. For example, Chevron’s 
$250 million “Typhoon” platform was damaged beyond repair. Plans are being made to sink its remains to 
the seafloor.
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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The number of incidents caused by extreme weather has increased tenfold since 1992. The portion of all events 
that are caused by weather-related phenomena has more than tripled from about 20 percent in the early 1990s 
to about 65 percent in recent years. The weather-related events are more severe, with an average of about 
180,000 customers affected per event compared to about 100,000 for non-weather-related events (and 50,000 
excluding the massive blackout of August 2003).201 The data shown include disturbances that occurred on the 
nation’s large-scale “bulk” electric transmission systems. Most outages occur in local distribution networks and 
are not included in the graph. Although the figure does not demonstrate a cause-effect relationship between 
climate change and grid disruption, it does suggest that weather and climate extremes often have important 
effects on grid disruptions. We do know that more frequent weather and climate extremes are likely in the 
future,68 which poses unknown new risks for the electric grid.
Significant Weather-Related U.S. Electric Grid Disturbances
EIA216
Adaptation:   Addressing Oil Infrastructure Vulnerabilities in the Gulf Coast
Port Fourchon, Louisiana, supports 75 percent of deepwater oil and gas 
production in the Gulf of Mexico, and its role in supporting oil production 
in the region is increasing. The Louisiana Offshore Oil Port, located 
about 20 miles offshore, links daily imports of 1 million barrels of oil and 
production of 300,000 barrels in the Gulf of Mexico to 50 percent of 
national refining capacity. One road, Louisiana Highway 1, connects Port 
Fourchon with the nation. It transports machinery, supplies, and workers 
and is the evacuation route for onshore and offshore workers. Responding 
to threats of storm surge and flooding, related in part to concerns about 
climate change, Louisiana is currently upgrading Highway 1, including 
elevating it above the 500-year flood level and building a higher bridge over 
Bayou LaFourche and the Boudreaux Canal.217 
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Northwest.191 It is likely to be significantly affected 
by climate change in regions subject to reduced 
precipitation and/or water from melting snowpack. 
Significant changes are already being detected in 
the timing and amount of streamflows in many 
western rivers,164 consistent with the predicted ef-
fects of global warming. More precipitation coming 
as rain rather than snow, reduced snowpack, earlier 
peak runoff, and related effects are beginning to 
affect hydropower availability.164 
Hydroelectric generation is very sensitive to chang-
es in precipitation and river discharge. For example, 
every 1 percent decrease in precipitation results 
in a 2 to 3 percent drop in streamflow;219 every 1 
percent decrease in streamflow in the Colorado 
River Basin results in a 3 percent drop in power 
generation.191 Such magnifying sensitivities occur 
because water flows through multiple power plants 
in a river basin.191 
Climate impacts on hydropower occur when either 
the total amount or the timing of runoff is altered, 
such as when natural water storage in snowpack 
and glaciers is reduced under hotter conditions. 
Glaciers, snowpack, and their associated runoff are 
already declining in the West, and larger declines 
are projected.164
Hydropower operations are also affected by chang-
es to air temperatures, humidity, or wind patterns 
due to climate change.191 These variables cause 
changes in water quantity and quality, including 
water temperature. Warmer air and water generally 
increase the evaporation of water from the surface 
effects of severe weather events on power lines, 
such as from ice storms, thunderstorms, and hur-
ricanes. In the summer heat wave of 2006, for 
example, electric power transformers failed in 
several areas (including St. Louis, Missouri, and 
Queens, New York) due to high temperatures, caus-
ing interruptions of electric power supply. It is not 
yet possible to project effects of climate change on 
the grid, because so many of the effects would be 
more localized than current climate change models 
can depict; but, weather-related grid disturbances 
are recognized as a challenge for strategic planning 
and risk management.
Climate change is likely to affect some 
renewable energy sources across the 
nation, such as hydropower production 
in regions subject to changing patterns 
of precipitation or snowmelt. 
Renewable sources currently account for about 
9 percent of electricity production in the United 
States.203 Hydroelectric power is by far the largest 
renewable contributor to electricity generation,191 
accounting for about 7 percent of total U.S. elec-
tricity.218 Like many things discussed in this report, 
renewable energy resources have strong interrela-
tionships with climate change; using renewable en-
ergy can reduce the magnitude of climate change, 
while climate change can affect the prospects for 
using some renewable energy sources.
Hydropower is a major source of electricity in 
some regions of the United States, notably in the 
Florida’s energy infrastructure is particularly vulnerable to sea-level 
rise and storm impacts. Most of the petroleum products consumed 
in Florida are 
delivered by barge to 
three ports, two on 
the east coast and one 
on the west coast. The 
interdependencies of natural 
gas distribution, transportation 
fuel distribution and delivery, and 
electrical generation and distribution 
were found to be major issues in Florida’s 
recovery from recent major hurricanes.191 
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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winds affect wind power, and temperature and wa-
ter availability affect biomass production (particu-
larly related to water requirements for biofuels).191 
The limited research to date on these important is-
sues does not support firm conclusions about where 
such impacts would occur and how significant they 
would be.205 This is an area that calls for much 
more study (see An Agenda for Climate Impacts 
Science section, Recommendation 2).
of reservoirs, reducing the 
amount of water available 
for power production and 
other uses. Huge reservoirs 
with large surface areas, 
located in arid, sunny parts 
of the country, such as Lake 
Mead (located on Arizona-
Nevada border on the Colo-
rado River), are particularly 
susceptible to increased 
evaporation due to warming, 
meaning less water will be 
available for all uses, includ-
ing hydropower.191 And, 
where hydropower dams 
flow into waterways that 
support trout, salmon or other coldwater fisheries, 
warming of reservoir releases might have detrimen-
tal consequences that require changes in operations 
that reduce power production.191 Such impacts  
will increasingly translate into competition for 
water resources. 
Climate change is also likely to affect other renew-
able energy sources. For example, changing cloud 
cover affects solar energy resources, changes in 
Hydroelectric dam in the Northwest
Significant impacts of warming on the energy sector can 
already be observed in Alaska, where temperatures have risen 
about twice as much as the rest of the nation. In Alaska, frozen 
ground and ice roads are an important means of winter travel, 
and warming has resulted in a much shorter cold season. Impacts 
on the oil and natural gas industries on Alaska’s North Slope have 
been one of the results. For example, the season during which oil 
and gas exploration and extraction equipment can be operated on the 
tundra has been shortened due to warming. In addition, the thawing of 
permafrost, on which buildings, pipelines, airfields, and coastal installations 
supporting oil and gas development are located, adversely affects these structures 
and increases the cost of maintaining them.191 
Different energy impacts are expected in the marine environment as sea 
ice continues to retreat and thin. These trends are expected to improve 
shipping accessibility, including oil and gas transport by sea, around 
the margins of the Arctic Basin, at least in the summer. The improved 
accessibility, however, will not be uniform throughout the different 
regions. Offshore oil exploration and extraction might benefit from 
less extensive and thinner sea ice, although equipment will have to be 
designed to withstand increased wave forces and ice movement.191,220
The U.S. transport sector is a significant source of greenhouse gases, accounting for 27 percent 
of U.S. emissions.221 While it is widely recognized that emissions from transportation have  
a major impact on climate, climate change will also have a major impact  
on transportation. 
Climate change impacts pose significant challenges to our nation’s multi-
modal transportation system and cause disruptions in other sectors across 
the economy. For example, major flooding in the Midwest in 1993 and 2008 
restricted regional travel of all types, and disrupted freight and rail shipments 
across the country, such as those bringing coal to power plants and chlorine 
to water treatment systems. The U.S. transportation network is vital to the na-
tion’s economy, safety, and quality of life.
Extreme events present major challenges for transportation, and such events 
are becoming more frequent and intense. Historical weather patterns are no 
longer a reliable predictor of the future.222 Transportation planners have not 
typically accounted for climate change in their long-term planning and project 
development. The longevity of transportation infrastructure, the long-term 
nature of climate change, and the potential impacts identified by recent studies 
warrant serious attention to climate change in planning new or rehabilitated 
transportation systems.223
The strategic examination of national, regional, state, and local networks is an important step 
toward understanding the risks posed by climate change. A range of adaptation responses can be 
employed to reduce risks through redesign or relocation of infrastructure, increased redundancy 
of critical services, and operational improvements. Adapting to climate change is an evolutionary 
process. Through adoption of longer planning horizons, risk management, and adaptive respons-
es, vulnerable transportation infrastructure can be made more resilient.215 
Transportation
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Key Messages:
Sea-level rise and storm surge will increase the risk of major coastal impacts, • 
including both temporary and permanent flooding of airports, roads, rail lines, 
and tunnels.
Flooding from increasingly intense downpours will increase the risk of • 
disruptions and delays in air, rail, and road transportation, and damage from 
mudslides in some areas.
The increase in extreme heat will limit some transportation operations and • 
cause pavement and track damage. Decreased extreme cold will provide some 
benefits such as reduced snow and ice removal costs.
Increased intensity of strong hurricanes would lead to more evacuations, • 
infrastructure damage and failure, and transportation interruptions.
Arctic warming will continue to reduce sea ice, lengthening the ocean • 
transport season, but also resulting in greater coastal erosion due to waves. 
Permafrost thaw in Alaska will damage infrastructure. The ice road season will 
become shorter.
Buildings and debris float up against 
a railroad bridge on the Cedar River 
during record flooding in June 2008, 
in Cedar Rapids, Iowa.
Key Sources
Sea-level rise and storm surge will 
increase the risk of major coastal 
impacts, including both temporary and 
permanent flooding of airports, roads, 
rail lines, and tunnels.
Sea-level rise
Transportation infrastructure in U.S. coastal areas 
is increasingly vulnerable to sea-level rise. Given 
the high population density near the coasts, the 
potential exposure of transportation infrastructure 
to flooding is immense. Population swells in these 
areas during the summer months because beaches 
are very important tourist destinations.222 
In the Gulf Coast area alone, an estimated 2,400 
miles of major roadway and 246 miles of freight 
rail lines are at risk of permanent flooding 
within 50 to 100 years as global warming and 
land subsidence (sinking) combine to produce an 
anticipated relative sea-level rise in the range of 4 
feet.217 Since the Gulf Coast region’s transportation 
network is interdependent and relies on minor roads 
and other low-lying infrastructure, the risks of 
service disruptions due to sea-level rise are likely to 
be even greater.217 
Coastal areas are also major centers of economic 
activity. Six of the nation’s top 10 freight gateways 
(measured by the value of shipments) will be threat-
ened by sea-level rise.222 Seven of the 10 largest 
ports (by tons of traffic) are located on the Gulf 
Coast.222 The region is also home to the U.S. oil and 
gas industry, with its offshore drilling platforms, 
refineries, and pipelines. Roughly two-thirds of 
all U.S. oil imports are transported through this 
region224 (see Energy sector). Sea-level rise would 
potentially affect commercial transportation activ-
ity valued in the hundreds of billions of dollars an-
nually through inundation of area roads, railroads, 
airports, seaports, and pipelines.217
Storm surge
More intense storms, especially when coupled 
with sea-level rise, will result in far-reaching and 
damaging storm surges. An estimated 60,000 miles 
of coastal highway are already exposed to periodic 
flooding from coastal storms and high waves.222 
Some of these highways currently serve as evacu-
ation routes during hurricanes and other coastal 
storms, and these routes could become seriously 
compromised in the future. 
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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Gulf Coast Area Roads at Risk from Sea-Level Rise
Within 50 to 100 years, 2,400 miles of major roadway are projected to be inundated by sea-level rise in the Gulf Coast region. 
The map shows roadways at risk in the event of a sea-level rise of about 4 feet, within the range of projections for this region 
in this century under medium- and high-emissions scenarios.91 In total, 24 percent of interstate highway miles and 28 percent 
of secondary road miles in the Gulf Coast region are at elevations below 4 feet.217  
CCSP SAP 4.7217
With the potential for 
significant sea-level rise 
estimated under continued high levels of 
emissions, the combined effects of sea-level 
rise and storm surge are projected to increase 
the frequency of flooding. What is currently 
called a 100-year storm is projected to occur 
as often as every 10 years by late this century. 
Portions of lower Manhattan and coastal areas 
of Brooklyn, Queens, Staten Island, and Nassau 
County, would experience a marked increase 
in flooding frequency. Much of the critical 
transportation infrastructure, including tunnels, 
subways, and airports, lies well within the range 
of projected storm surge and would be flooded 
during such events.222,225,369 
Regional Spotlight: 
New York  
Metropolitan Area
ground. Underground tunnels and other low-lying 
infrastructure will experience more frequent and 
severe flooding. Higher sea levels and storm surges 
will also erode road base and undermine bridge 
supports. The loss of coastal wetlands and barrier 
islands will lead to further coastal erosion due to 
the loss of natural protection from wave action.
Water
Impacts on harbor infrastructure from wave dam-
age and storm surges are projected to increase. 
Changes will be required in harbor and port 
facilities to accommodate higher tides and storm 
surges. There will be reduced clearance under some 
waterway bridges for boat traffic. Changes in the 
navigability of channels are expected; some will 
become more accessible (and extend farther inland) 
because of deeper waters, while others will be 
restricted because of changes in sedimentation rates 
and sandbar locations. In some areas, waterway 
systems will become part of open water as barrier 
islands disappear. Some channels are likely to have 
to be dredged more frequently as has been done 
across large open-water bodies in Texas.222 
Coastal areas are projected to experience 
continued development pressures as both 
retirement and tourist destinations. Many of the 
most populous counties of the Gulf Coast, which 
already experience the effects of tropical storms, 
are expected to grow rapidly in the coming 
decades.222 This growth will generate demand for 
more transportation infrastructure and services, 
challenging transportation planners to meet the 
demand, address current and future flooding, and 
plan for future conditions.223
Land
More frequent inundation and interruptions in 
travel on coastal and low-lying roadways and rail 
lines due to storm surge are projected, potentially 
requiring changes to minimize disruptions. More 
frequent evacuations due to severe storm surges 
are also likely. Across the United States, many 
coastal cities have subways, tunnels, parking lots, 
and other transportation infrastructure below 
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Sea-level rise, 
combined with high 
rates of subsidence 
in some areas, 
will make much 
of the existing 
infrastructure more 
prone to frequent 
or permanent 
inundation; 27 
percent of the major roads, 9 percent of the rail 
lines, and 72 percent of the ports in the area 
shown on the map on the previous page are 
built on land at or below 4 feet in elevation, a 
level within the range of projections for relative 
sea-level rise in this region in this century. 
Increased storm intensity may lead to increased 
service disruption and infrastructure damage. 
More than half of the area’s major highways (64 
percent of interstates, 57 percent of arterials), 
almost half of the rail miles, 29 airports, and 
virtually all of the ports, are below 23 feet in 
elevation and subject to flooding and damage 
due to hurricane storm surge. These factors 
merit consideration in today’s transportation 
decisions and planning processes.217
Regional 
Spotlight: 
Gulf Coast
Air
Airports in coastal cities are often located adjacent 
to rivers, estuaries, or open ocean. Airport runways 
in coastal areas face inundation unless effective 
protective measures are taken. There is the po-
tential for closure or restrictions for several of the 
nation’s busiest airports that lie in coastal zones, 
affecting service to the highest density populations 
in the United States. 
Flooding from increasingly intense 
downpours will increase the risk of 
disruptions and delays in air, rail, and 
road transportation, and damage from 
mudslides in some areas.
Heavy downpours have already increased substan-
tially in the United States; the heaviest 1 percent 
of precipitation events increased by 20 percent, 
while total precipitation increased by only 7 percent 
over the past century.112 Such intense precipitation 
is likely to increase the frequency and severity 
of events such as the Great Flood of 1993, which 
caused catastrophic flooding along 500 miles of 
the Mississippi and Missouri river system, paralyz-
ing surface transportation systems, including rail, 
truck, and marine traffic. Major east-west traffic 
was halted for roughly six weeks in an area stretch-
ing from St. Louis, Missouri, west to Kansas City, 
Missouri and north to Chicago, Illinois, affecting 
one-quarter of all U.S. freight, which either origi-
nated or terminated in the flood-affected region.222
The June 2008 Midwest flood was the second 
record-breaking flood in the past 15 years. Dozens 
of levees were breached or overtopped in Iowa, 
Illinois, and Missouri, flooding huge areas, includ-
ing nine square miles in and around Cedar Rapids, 
Iowa. Numerous highway and rail bridges were 
impassable due to flooding of approaches and 
transport was shut down along many stretches of 
highway, rail lines, and normally navigable water-
ways.
Planners have generally relied on weather extremes 
of the past as a guide to the future, planning, for 
example, for a “100-year flood,” which is now 
likely to come more frequently as a result of 
climate change. Historical analysis of weather data 
has thus become less reliable as a forecasting tool. 
The accelerating changes in climate make it more 
difficult to predict the frequency and intensity of 
weather events that can affect transportation.222
 
Land
The increase in heavy precipitation will inevita-
bly cause increases in weather-related accidents, 
delays, and traffic disruptions in a network already 
challenged by increasing congestion.215 There will 
be increased flooding of evacuation routes, and 
construction activities will be disrupted. Changes 
in rain, snowfall, and seasonal flooding will impact 
safety and maintenance operations on the nation’s 
roads and railways. For example, if more precipita-
tion falls as rain rather than snow in winter and 
spring, there will be an increased risk of landslides, 
slope failures, and floods from the runoff, causing 
road closures as well as the need for road repair and 
reconstruction222 (see Water Resources sector).
Increased flooding of roadways, rail lines, and 
underground tunnels is expected. Drainage systems 
will be overloaded more frequently and severely, 
causing backups and street flooding. Areas where 
flooding is already common will face more fre-
quent and severe problems. For example, Louisiana 
Highway 1, a critical link in the transport of oil 
from the Gulf of Mexico, has recently experienced 
increased flooding, prompting authorities to elevate 
the road (see Adaptation Box page 58).217 Increases 
in road washouts, damage to railbed support struc-
tures, and landslides and mudslides that damage 
roads and other infrastructure are expected. If soil 
moisture levels become too high, the structural 
integrity of roads, bridges, and tunnels, which in 
some cases are already under age-related stress and 
in need of repair, could be compromised. Stand-
ing water will have adverse impacts on road base. 
For example, damage due to long term submersion 
of roadways in Louisiana was estimated to be $50 
million for just 200 miles of state-owned highway. 
The Louisiana Department of Transportation and 
Development noted that a total of 1,800 miles of 
roads were under water for long periods, requiring 
costly repairs.217 Pipelines are likely to be damaged 
because intense precipitation can cause the ground 
to sink underneath the pipeline; in shallow river-
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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beds, pipelines are more exposed to the elements 
and can be subject to scouring and shifting due to 
heavy precipitation.217
Water
Facilities on land at ports and harbors will be vul-
nerable to short term flooding from heavy down-
pours, interrupting shipping service. Changes in 
silt and debris buildup resulting from extreme pre-
cipitation events will affect channel depth, increas-
ing dredging costs. The need to expand stormwater 
treatment facilities, which can be a significant ex-
pense for container and other terminals with large 
impermeable surfaces, will increase.
Air
Increased delays due to heavy downpours are 
likely to affect operations, causing increasing flight 
delays and cancellations.222 Stormwater runoff that 
exceeds the capacity of collection and drainage 
systems will cause flooding, delays, and airport 
closings. Heavy downpours will affect the struc-
tural integrity of airport facilities, such as through 
flood damage to runways and other infrastructure. 
All of these impacts have implications for emer-
gency evacuation planning, facility maintenance, 
and safety.222
The increase in extreme heat will limit 
some transportation operations and 
cause pavement and track damage. 
Decreased extreme cold will provide 
some benefits such as reduced snow and 
ice removal costs.
Land
Longer periods of extreme heat in summer can 
damage roads in several ways, including softening 
of asphalt that leads to rutting from heavy traffic.164 
Sustained air temperature over 90°F is a significant 
threshold for such problems (see maps page 34). 
Extreme heat can cause deformities in rail tracks,  
at minimum resulting in speed restrictions and,  
at worst, causing derailments. Air temperatures 
above 100°F can lead to equipment failure (see 
maps page 90). Extreme heat also causes thermal 
expansion of bridge joints, adversely affecting 
bridge operations and increasing maintenance 
costs. Vehicle overheating and tire deterioration are 
additional concerns.222 Higher temperatures will 
also increase refrigeration needs for goods during 
transport, particularly in the South, raising trans-
portation costs.217
Increases in very hot days and heat waves are ex-
pected to limit construction activities due to health 
and safety concerns for highway workers. Guid-
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Adaptation:   Climate Proofing a Road
Completion of a road around the 42-square mile 
island of Kosrae in the U.S.-affiliated Federated 
States of Micronesia provides a good example of 
adaptation to climate change. A road around the 
island’s perimeter existed, except for a 10-mile gap. 
Filling this gap would provide all-weather land access 
to a remote village and allow easier access to the 
island’s interior. 
In planning this new section of road, authorities decided to “climate-proof” it against 
projected increases in heavy downpours and sea-level rise. This led to the section of road 
being placed higher above sea level and with an improved drainage system to handle the 
projected heavier rainfall. While there were additional capital costs for incorporating 
this drainage system, the accumulated costs, including repairs and maintenance, would be 
lower after about 15 years, equating to a good rate of return on investment. Adding this 
improved drainage system to roads that are already built is more expensive than on new 
construction, but still has been found to be cost effective.226
ance from the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration states that concern for heat stress 
for moderate to heavy work begins at about 80°F 
as measured by an index that combines tempera-
ture, wind, humidity, and direct sunlight. For dry 
climates, such as Phoenix and Denver, National 
Weather Service heat indices above 90°F might 
allow work to proceed, while higher humidity areas 
such as New Orleans or Miami should consider 80 
to 85°F as an initial level for work restrictions.227 
These trends and associated impacts will be exac-
erbated in many places by urban heat island effects 
(see Human Health and Society sectors). 
Wildfires are projected to increase, especially in 
the Southwest (see Southwest region), threatening 
communities and infrastructure directly and bring-
ing about road and rail closures in affected areas. 
In many northern states, warmer winters will bring 
about reductions in snow and ice removal costs, 
lessen adverse environmental impacts from the use 
of salt and chemicals on roads and bridges, extend 
the construction season, and improve the mobility 
and safety of passenger and freight travel through 
reduced winter hazards. On the other hand, more 
freeze-thaw conditions are projected to occur in 
northern states, creating frost heaves and potholes 
on road and bridge surfaces and resulting in load 
restrictions on certain roads to minimize the dam-
age. With the expected earlier onset of seasonal 
warming, the period of springtime load restrictions 
might be reduced in some areas, but it is likely to 
expand in others with shorter winters but longer 
thaw seasons. Longer construction seasons will be 
a benefit in colder locations.222
Water
Warming is projected to mean a longer shipping 
season but lower water levels for the Great Lakes 
and St. Lawrence Seaway. Higher temperatures, 
reduced lake ice, and increased evaporation are 
expected to combine to produce lower water levels 
as climate warming proceeds (see Midwest re-
gion). With lower lake levels, ships will be unable 
to carry as much cargo and hence shipping costs 
will increase. A recent study, for example, found 
that the projected reduction in Great Lakes water 
levels would result in an estimated 13 to 29 percent 
increase in shipping costs for Canadian commercial 
navigation by 2050, all else remaining equal.222
If low water levels become more common because 
of drier conditions due to climate change, this could 
create problems for river traffic, reminiscent of the 
stranding of more than 4,000 barges on the Mis-
sissippi River during the drought in 1988. Freight 
movements in the region could be seriously im-
paired, and extensive dredging could be required 
to keep shipping channels open. On the other hand, 
a longer shipping season afforded by a warmer 
climate could offset some of the resulting adverse 
economic effects. 
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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An example of intense precipitation affecting 
transportation infrastructure was the record-
breaking 24-hour rainstorm in July 1996, which 
resulted in flash flooding in Chicago and its 
suburbs, with major impacts. Extensive travel 
delays occurred on metropolitan highways and 
railroads, and streets and bridges were damaged. 
Commuters were unable to reach Chicago for 
up to three days, and more than 300 freight 
trains were delayed or rerouted.222
The June 2008 Midwest floods caused I-80 
in eastern Iowa to be closed for more than 
five days, disrupting major east-west shipping 
routes for trucks and the east-west rail lines 
through Iowa. These floods exemplify the kind 
of extreme precipitation events and their direct 
impacts on transportation that are likely to 
become more frequent in a warming world. 
These extremes create new and more difficult 
problems that must be addressed in the design, 
construction, rehabilitation, and operation of 
the nation’s transportation infrastructure.
Regional Spotlight:  
the Midwest
In cold areas, the projected decrease in very cold 
days will mean less ice accumulation on vessels, 
decks, riggings, and docks; less ice fog; and fewer 
ice jams in ports.222 
Air 
Rising temperatures will affect airport ground 
facilities, runways in particular, in much the same 
way they affect roads. Airports in some areas are 
likely to benefit from reduction in the cost of snow 
and ice removal and the impacts of salt and chemi-
cal use, though some locations have seen increases 
in snowfall. Airlines could benefit from reduced 
need to de-ice planes. 
More heat extremes will create added operational 
difficulties, for example, causing greater energy 
consumption by planes on the ground. Extreme 
heat also affects aircraft lift; because hotter air is 
less dense, it reduces the lift produced by the wing 
and the thrust produced by the engine – problems 
exacerbated at high altitudes and high tempera-
tures. As a result, planes need to take off faster, 
and if runways are not sufficiently long for aircraft 
to build up enough speed to generate lift, aircraft 
weight must be reduced. Thus, increases in ex-
treme heat will result in payload restrictions, could 
cause flight cancellations and service disruptions 
at affected airports, and could require 
some airports to lengthen runways. 
Recent hot summers have seen flights 
cancelled due to heat, especially in 
high altitude locations. Economic 
losses are expected at affected air-
ports. A recent illustrative analysis 
projects a 17 percent reduction in 
freight carrying capacity for a single 
Boeing 747 at the Denver airport by 
2030 and a 9 percent reduction at the 
Phoenix airport due to increased tem-
perature and water vapor.222 
Drought
Rising air temperatures increase 
evaporation, contributing to dry 
conditions, especially when accompa-
nied by decreasing precipitation. Even 
where total annual precipitation does 
not decrease, precipitation is projected 
to become less frequent in many parts 
of the country.68 Drought is expected to be an in-
creasing problem in some regions; this, in turn, has 
impacts on transportation. For example, increased 
susceptibility to wildfires during droughts could 
threaten roads and other transportation infrastruc-
ture directly, or cause road closures due to fire 
threat or reduced visibility such as has occurred 
in Florida and California in recent years. There is 
also increased susceptibility to mudslides in areas 
deforested by wildfires. Airports could suffer from 
decreased visibility due to wildfires. River trans-
port is seriously affected by drought, with reduc-
tions in the routes available, shipping season, and 
cargo carrying capacity.
Increased intensity of strong hurricanes 
would lead to more evacuations, 
infrastructure damage and failure, and 
transportation interruptions.
More intense hurricanes in some regions are a 
projected effect of climate change. Three aspects 
of tropical storms are relevant to transportation: 
precipitation, winds, and wind-induced storm 
surge. Stronger hurricanes have longer periods of 
intense precipitation, higher wind speeds (dam-
age increases exponentially with wind speed228), 
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Navigable Inland Waterways
Inland waterways are an important part of the transportation network in 
various parts of the United States. For example, these waterways provide 
20 states with access to the Gulf of Mexico.217 As conditions become drier, 
these main transportation pathways are likely to be adversely affected by the 
resulting lower water levels, creating problems for river traffic. Names of 
navigable rivers are shown above.
CCSP SAP 4.7217
Development spent $74 million for debris removal 
alone in the wake of hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
The Mississippi Department of Transportation  
expected to spend in excess of $1 billion to re-
place the Biloxi and Bay St. Louis bridges, repair 
other portions of roadway, and remove debris. As 
of June 2007, more than $672 million had  
been spent.
There will be more frequent and potentially 
more extensive emergency evacuations. Dam-
age to signs, lighting fixtures, and supports will 
increase. The lifetime of highways that have been 
exposed to flooding is expected to decrease. Road 
and rail infrastructure for passenger and freight 
services are likely to face increased flooding by 
strong hurricanes. In the Gulf Coast, more than 
one-third of the rail miles are likely to flood when 
subjected to a storm surge of 18 feet.217
and higher storm surge and waves. Transporta-
tion planners, designers, and operators may need 
to adopt probabilistic approaches to developing 
transportation projects rather than relying on 
standards and the deterministic approaches of the 
past. The uncertainty associated with projecting 
impacts over a 50- to 100-year time period makes 
risk management a reasonable approach for realis-
tically incorporating climate change into decision 
making and investment.215
Land
There will be a greater probability of infrastruc-
ture failures such as highway and rail bridge 
decks being displaced and railroad tracks being 
washed away. Storms leave debris on roads and 
rail lines, which can damage the infrastructure 
and interrupt travel and shipments of goods. In 
Louisiana, the Department of Transportation and 
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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Hurricane Katrina was one of the most 
destructive and expensive natural disasters in 
U.S. history, claiming more than 1,800 lives and 
causing an estimated $134 billion in damage.217,229 It 
also seriously disrupted transportation systems as key 
highway and railroad bridges were heavily damaged or de-
stroyed, necessitating rerouting of traffic and placing increased 
strain on other routes, particularly other rail lines. Replacement of 
major infrastructure took from months to years. The CSX Gulf Coast line 
was re-opened after five months and $250 million in reconstruction costs, while the 
Biloxi-Ocean Springs Bridge took more than two years to reopen. Barge shipping was halted, as 
was grain export out of the Port of New Orleans, the nation’s largest site of grain exports. The extensive 
oil and gas pipeline network was shut down by the loss of electrical power, producing shortages of natural 
gas and petroleum products. Total recovery costs for the roads, bridges, and utilities as well as debris 
removal have been estimated at $15 billion to $18 billion.217 
Redundancies in the transportation system, as well as the storm 
timing and track, helped keep the storm from having major or 
long-lasting impacts on national-level freight flows. For example, 
truck traffic was diverted from the collapsed bridge that carries 
highway I-10 over Lake Pontchartrain to highway I-12, which 
parallels I-10 well north of the Gulf Coast. The primary north-
south highways that connect the Gulf Coast with major inland 
transportation hubs were not damaged and were open for nearly 
full commercial freight movement within days. The railroads were 
able to route some traffic not bound directly for New Orleans through Memphis and other Midwest rail 
hubs. While a disaster of historic proportions, the effects of Hurricane Katrina could have been even 
worse if not for the redundancy and resilience of the transportation network in the area.
Spotlight on 
Hurricane Katrina
Hurricane Katrina damage to bridge
Water
All aspects of shipping are disrupted by major 
storms. For example, freight shipments need to 
be diverted from the storm region. Activities at 
offshore drilling sites and coastal pumping facili-
ties are generally suspended and extensive damage 
to these facilities can occur, as was amply demon-
strated during the 2005 hurricane season. Refiner-
ies and pipelines are also vulnerable to damage 
and disruption due to the high winds and storm 
surge associated with hurricanes and other tropical 
storms (see Energy sector). Barges that are unable 
to get to safe harbors can be destroyed or severely 
damaged. Waves and storm surge will damage 
harbor infrastructure such as cranes, docks, and 
other terminal facilities. There are implications for 
emergency evacuation planning, facility mainte-
nance, and safety management. 
Air
More frequent interruptions in air service and 
airport closures can be expected. Airport facili-
ties including terminals, navigational equipment, 
perimeter fencing, and signs are likely to sustain 
increased wind damage. Airports are frequently 
located in low-lying areas and can be expected to 
flood with more intense storms. As a response to 
this vulnerability, some airports, such as LaGuar-
dia in New York City, are already protected by 
levees. Eight airports in the Gulf Coast region of 
Louisiana and Texas are located in historical 100-
year flood plains; the 100-year flood events will be 
more frequent in the future, creating the likelihood 
of serious costs and disruption.217
Arctic warming will continue to 
reduce sea ice, lengthening the ocean 
transport season, but also resulting in 
greater coastal erosion due to waves. 
Permafrost thaw in Alaska will damage 
infrastructure. The ice road season will 
become shorter.
Special issues in Alaska
Warming has been most rapid in high northern 
regions. As a result, Alaska is warming at twice the 
rate of the rest of the nation, bringing both major 
opportunities and major challenges. Alaska’s trans-
portation infrastructure differs sharply from that of 
the lower 48 states. Although Alaska is twice the 
size of Texas, its population and road mileage are 
more like Vermont’s. Only 30 percent of Alaska’s 
roads are paved. Air travel is much more common 
than in other states. Alaska has 84 commercial air-
ports and more than 3,000 airstrips, many of which 
are the only means of transport for rural communi-
ties. Unlike other states, over much of Alaska, the 
land is generally more accessible in winter, when 
the ground is frozen and ice roads and bridges 
formed by frozen rivers are available.
Sea ice decline
The striking thinning and downward trend in the 
extent of Arctic sea ice is regarded as a consider-
able opportunity for shippers. Continued reduction 
in sea ice should result in opening of additional 
ice-free ports, improved access to ports and natu-
ral resources in remote areas, and longer shipping 
seasons, but it is likely to increase erosion rates on 
land as well, raising costs for maintaining ports and 
other transportation infrastructure.132,220 
Later this century and beyond, shippers are looking 
forward to new Arctic shipping routes, including 
the fabled Northwest Passage, which could provide 
significant costs savings in shipping times and 
distances. However, the next few decades are likely 
to be very unpredictable for shipping through these 
new routes. The past three decades have seen very 
high year-to-year variability of sea ice extent in the 
Canadian Arctic, despite the overall decrease in 
September sea ice extent. The loss of sea ice from 
the shipping channels of the Canadian Archipelago 
might actually allow more frequent intrusions of 
icebergs, which would continue to impede shipping 
through the Northwest Passage.
Lack of sea ice, especially on the northern shores of 
Alaska, creates conditions whereby storms produce 
waves that cause serious coastal erosion.137,219 Al-
ready a number of small towns, roads, and airports 
are threatened by retreating coastlines, necessitat-
ing the planned relocation of these communities 
(see Alaska region).132,220
Thawing ground
The challenges warming presents for transportation 
on land are considerable.164 For highways, thawing 
of permafrost causes settling of the roadbed and 
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sediment in rivers and scouring of bridge sup-
porting piers and abutments. Temporary ice roads 
and bridges are commonly used in many parts of 
Alaska to access northern communities and provide 
support for the mining and oil and gas industries. 
Rising temperatures have already shortened the 
season during which these critical facilities can be 
used. Like the highway system, the Alaska Rail-
road crosses permafrost terrain, and frost heave and 
settlement from thawing affect some portions of the 
track, increasing maintenance costs.28,132,220
A significant number of Alaska’s airstrips in the 
southwest, northwest, and interior of the state are 
built on permafrost. These airstrips will require 
major repairs or relocation if their foundations are 
compromised by thawing.
The cost of maintaining Alaska’s public infrastruc-
ture is projected to increase 10 to 20 percent by 
2030 due to warming, costing the state an addition-
al $4 billion to $6 billion, with roads and airports 
accounting for about half of this cost.230 Private 
infrastructure impacts have not been evaluated.217
The Trans-Alaska Pipeline System, which stretches 
from Prudhoe Bay in the north to the ice-free port 
of Valdez in the south, crosses a wide range of per-
mafrost types and varying temperature conditions. 
More than half of the 800-mile pipeline is elevated 
on vertical supports over potentially unstable per-
mafrost. Because the system was designed in the 
early 1970s on the basis of permafrost and climate 
conditions of the 1950 to 1970 period, it requires 
continuous monitoring and some supports have had 
to be replaced. 
Travel over the tundra for oil and gas exploration 
and extraction is limited to the period when the 
ground is sufficiently frozen to avoid damage to 
the fragile tundra. In recent decades, the number 
of days that exploration and extraction equipment 
could be used has dropped from 200 days to 100 
days per year due to warming.220 With continued 
warming, the number of exploration days is expect-
ed to decline even more. 
frost heaves that adversely affect the integrity of 
the road structure and its load-carrying capacity. 
The majority of Alaska’s highways are located in 
areas where permafrost is discontinuous, and deal-
ing with thaw settlement problems already claims a 
significant portion of highway maintenance dollars.
Bridges and large culverts are particularly sensitive 
to movement caused by thawing permafrost and 
are often much more difficult than roads to repair 
and modify for changing site conditions. Thus, 
designing these facilities to take climate change 
into account is even more critical than is the case 
for roads. 
Another impact of climate change on bridges is in-
creased scouring. Hotter, drier summers in Alaska 
have led to increased glacial melting and longer pe-
riods of high streamflows, causing both increased 
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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Arctic Sea Ice Decline
The pink line shows the average September sea ice 
extent from 1979 through the present. The white area 
shows September 2007 sea ice extent. In 2008, the 
extent was slightly larger than 2007, but the ice was 
thinner, resulting in a lower total volume of sea ice. In 
addition, recent years have had less ice that persisted 
over numerous years and more first-year ice, which 
melts more quickly.139
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Agriculture
Key Messages:
Many crops show positive responses to elevated carbon dioxide and low • 
levels of warming, but higher levels of warming often negatively affect 
growth and yields.
Extreme events such as heavy downpours and droughts are likely to reduce • 
crop yields because excesses or deficits of water have negative impacts on 
plant growth.
Weeds, diseases, and insect pests benefit from warming, and weeds also • 
benefit from a higher carbon dioxide concentration, increasing stress on 
crop plants and requiring more attention to pest and weed control. 
Forage quality in pastures and rangelands generally declines with increasing • 
carbon dioxide concentration because of the effects on plant nitrogen and 
protein content, reducing the land’s ability to supply adequate livestock feed. 
Increased heat, disease, and weather extremes are likely to reduce livestock • 
productivity.
Agriculture in the United States is extremely diverse in the range of crops 
grown and animals raised, and produces over $200 billion a year in food com-
modities, with livestock accounting for more than half. Climate change will 
increase productivity in certain crops and regions and reduce productivity in 
others (see for example Midwest and Great Plains regions).193
While climate change clearly affects agriculture, climate is also affected by 
agriculture, which contributes 13.5 percent of all human-induced greenhouse 
gas emissions globally. In the United States, agriculture represents 8.6 percent 
of the nation’s total greenhouse gas emissions, 
including 80 percent of its nitrous oxide emissions 
and 31 percent of its methane emissions.231
Increased agricultural productivity will be required 
in the future to supply the needs of an increasing 
population. Agricultural productivity is depen-
dent upon the climate and land resources. Climate 
change can have both beneficial and detrimental 
impacts on plants. Throughout history, agricultural 
enterprises have coped with changes in climate 
through changes in management and in crop or 
animal selection. However, under higher heat-trap-
ping gas emissions scenarios, the projected climate 
changes are likely to increasingly challenge U.S. 
capacity to as efficiently produce food, feed, fuel, 
and livestock products. 
Relative Contributions to  
Agricultural Products, 2002
NASS232
Market Value of Agricultural Products Sold, 2002
NASS232
Key Sources
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the fruit or grain. Further, as temperatures continue 
to rise and drought periods increase, crops will be 
more frequently exposed to temperature thresholds 
at which pollination and grain-set processes begin 
to fail and quality of vegetable crops decreases. 
Grain, soybean, and canola crops have relatively 
low optimal temperatures, and thus will have re-
duced yields and will increasingly begin to expe-
rience failure as warming proceeds.193 Common 
snap beans show substantial yield reduction when 
nighttime temperatures exceed 80°F.
Higher temperatures will mean a longer grow-
ing season for crops that do well in the heat, such 
as melon, okra, and sweet potato, but a shorter 
growing season for crops more suited to cooler 
conditions, such as potato, lettuce, broccoli, and 
spinach.193 Higher temperatures also cause plants to 
use more water to keep cool. This is one example of 
how the interplay between rising temperatures and 
water availability is critical to how plants respond 
to climate change. But fruits, vegetables, and grains 
can suffer even under well-watered conditions if 
temperatures exceed the maximum level for pol-
len viability in a particular plant; if temperatures 
exceed the threshold for that plant, it won’t produce 
seed and so it won’t reproduce.193
Temperature increases will cause the optimum 
latitude for crops to move northward; decreases in 
temperature would cause shifts toward the equa-
tor. Where plants can be efficiently grown depends 
upon climate conditions, of which temperature is 
one of the major factors.
Plants need adequate water to 
maintain their temperature within 
an optimal range. Without water 
for cooling, plants will suffer heat 
stress. In many regions, irrigation 
water is used to maintain adequate 
temperature conditions for the 
growth of cool season plants (such 
as many vegetables), even in warm 
environments. With increasing de-
mand and competition for freshwater 
supplies, the water needed for these 
crops might be increasingly limited. 
If water supply variability increases, 
it will affect plant growth and cause 
Many crops show positive responses  
to elevated carbon dioxide and low 
levels of warming, but higher levels of 
warming often negatively affect growth 
and yields.
Crop responses in a changing climate reflect the 
interplay among three factors: rising temperatures, 
changing water resources, and increasing carbon 
dioxide concentrations. Warming generally causes 
plants that are below their optimum temperature to 
grow faster, with obvious benefits. For some plants, 
such as cereal crops, however, faster growth means 
there is less time for the grain itself to grow and 
mature, reducing yields.193 For some annual crops, 
this can be compensated for by adjusting the plant-
ing date to avoid late season heat stress.164
The grain-filling period (the time when the seed 
grows and matures) of wheat and other small grains 
shortens dramatically with rising temperatures. 
Analysis of crop responses suggests that even mod-
erate increases in temperature will decrease yields 
of corn, wheat, sorghum, bean, rice, cotton, and 
peanut crops.193 
Some crops are particularly sensitive to high night-
time temperatures, which have been rising even 
faster than daytime temperatures.68 Nighttime 
temperatures are expected to continue to rise in the 
future. These changes in temperature are espe-
cially critical to the reproductive phase of growth 
because warm nights increase the respiration rate 
and reduce the amount of carbon that is captured 
during the day by photosynthesis to be retained in 
Corn and Soybean Temperature Response
For each plant variety, there is an optimal temperature for vegetative growth, with growth 
dropping off as temperatures increase or decrease. Similarly, there is a range of temperatures 
at which a plant will produce seed. Outside of this range, the plant will not reproduce. 
As the graphs show, corn will fail to reproduce at temperatures above 95°F and soybean 
above 102°F.
ARS USDA
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reduced yields. The amount and timing of precipi-
tation during the growing season are also critical, 
and will be affected by climate change. Changes  
in season length are also important and affect  
crops differently.193
Higher carbon dioxide levels generally cause plants 
to grow larger. For some crops, this is not necessar-
ily a benefit because they are often less nutritious, 
with reduced nitrogen and protein content. Carbon 
dioxide also makes some plants more water-use 
efficient, meaning they produce more plant mate-
rial, such as grain, on less water.193 This is a benefit 
in water-limited areas and in seasons with less than 
normal rainfall amounts. 
In some cases, adapting to climate change could 
be as simple as changing planting dates, which can 
be an effective no- or low-cost option for taking 
advantage of a longer growing season or avoiding 
crop exposure to adverse climatic conditions such 
as high temperature stress or low rainfall periods. 
Effectiveness will depend on the region, crop, and 
the rate and amount of warming. It is unlikely to be 
effective if a farmer goes to market when the sup-
ply-demand balance drives prices down. Predicting 
the optimum planting date for maximum profits 
will be more challenging in a future with increased 
uncertainty regarding climate effects on not 
only local productivity, but also on supply 
from competing regions.193
Another adaptation strategy involves 
changing to crop varieties with improved 
tolerance to heat or drought, or those that 
are adapted to take advantage of a longer 
growing season. This is less likely to be 
cost-effective for perennial crops, for which 
changing varieties is extremely expensive 
and new plantings take several years to 
reach maximum productivity. Even for an-
nual crops, changing varieties is not always 
a low-cost option. Seed for new stress-
tolerant varieties can be expensive, and 
new varieties often require investments in 
new planting equipment or require adjust-
ments in a wide range of farming practices. 
In some cases, it is difficult to breed for 
genetic tolerance to elevated temperature 
or to identify an alternative variety that is 
adapted to the new climate and to local soils, prac-
tices, and market demands.
Fruits that require long winter chilling periods will 
experience declines. Many varieties of fruits (such 
as popular varieties of apples and berries) require 
between 400 and 1,800 cumulative hours below 
45°F each winter to produce abundant yields the 
following summer and fall. By late this century, 
under higher emissions scenarios,91 winter tempera-
tures in many important fruit-producing regions 
such as the Northeast will be too consistently warm 
to meet these requirements. Cranberries have a par-
ticularly high chilling requirement, and there are no 
known low-chill varieties. Massachusetts and New 
Jersey supply nearly half the nation’s cranberry 
crop. By the middle of this century, under higher 
emissions scenarios,91 it is unlikely that these areas 
will support cranberry production due to a lack of 
the winter chilling they need.233,234 Such impacts 
will vary by region. For example, though there will 
still be risks of early-season frosts and damaging 
winter thaws, warming is expected to improve the 
climate for fruit production in the Great Lakes 
region.164 
A seemingly paradoxical impact of warming is that 
it appears to be increasing the risk of plant frost 
Increase in Percent of Very Warm Nights
The graph shows the observed and projected change in percent of very 
warm nights from the 1950-1990 average in the United States. Under 
the lower emissions scenario,91 the percentage of very warm nights 
is projected to increase about 20 percent by 2100. Under the higher 
emissions scenario,91 it is projected to increase by about 40 percent.68 
The shaded areas show the likely ranges while the lines show the central 
projections from a set of climate models. The projections appear 
smooth because they show the calculated average of many models. 
Adapted from CCSP SAP 3.368
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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damage. Mild winters and warm, early springs, 
which are beginning to occur more frequently 
as climate warms, induce premature plant devel-
opment and blooming, resulting in exposure of 
vulnerable young plants and plant tissues to sub-
sequent late-season frosts. For example, the 2007 
spring freeze in the eastern United States caused 
widespread devastation of crops and natural vegeta-
tion because the frost occurred during the flower-
ing period of many trees and during early grain 
development on wheat plants.235 Another example is 
occurring in the Rocky Mountains where in addi-
tion to the process described above, reduced snow 
cover leaves young plants unprotected from spring 
frosts, with some plant species already beginning 
to suffer as a result236 (see Ecosystems sector).
Extreme events such as heavy 
downpours and droughts are likely to 
reduce crop yields because excesses or 
deficits of water have negative impacts 
on plant growth.
One of the most pronounced effects of climate 
change is the increase in heavy downpours. Pre-
cipitation has become less frequent but more 
intense, and this pattern is projected to continue 
across the United States.112 One consequence of 
excessive rainfall is delayed spring planting, which 
jeopardizes profits for farmers paid a premium for 
early season production of high-value crops such 
as melon, sweet corn, and tomatoes. Field flood-
ing during the growing season causes crop losses 
due to low oxygen levels in the soil, increased 
susceptibility to root diseases, and increased soil 
compaction due to the use of heavy farm equipment 
on wet soils. In spring 2008, heavy rains caused the 
Mississippi River to rise to about 7 feet above flood 
stage, inundating hundreds of thousands of acres of 
cropland. The flood hit just as farmers were prepar-
ing to harvest wheat and plant corn, soybeans, and 
cotton. Preliminary estimates of agricultural losses 
are around $8 billion.213 Some farmers were put out 
of business and others will be recovering for years 
to come. The flooding caused severe erosion in 
some areas and also caused an increase in runoff 
and leaching of agricultural chemicals into surface 
water and groundwater.233
Another impact of heavy downpours is that wet 
conditions at harvest time result in reduced quality 
of many crops. Storms with heavy rainfall often are 
accompanied by wind gusts, and both strong winds 
and rain can flatten crops, causing significant dam-
age. Vegetable and fruit crops are sensitive to even 
short-term, minor stresses, and as such are par-
Effects of Increased Air Pollution on Crop Yields
Ground-level ozone (a component of smog) is an air pollutant that is formed when nitrogen 
oxides emitted from fossil fuel burning interact with other compounds, such as unburned gasoline 
vapors, in the atmosphere,237 in the presence of sunlight. Higher air temperatures result in greater 
concentrations of ozone. Ozone levels at the land surface have risen in rural areas of the United 
States over the past 50 years, and they are forecast to continue increasing with warming, especially 
under higher emissions scenarios.91 Plants are sensitive to ozone, and crop yields are reduced as 
ozone levels increase. Some crops that are particularly sensitive to ozone pollution include soybeans, 
wheat, oats, green beans, peppers, and some types of cotton.193
U.S. Corn Yields 1960 to 2008
While technological improvements have resulted in a general 
increase in corn yields, extreme weather events have caused 
dramatic reductions in yields in particular years. Increased 
variation in yield is likely to occur as temperatures increase 
and rainfall becomes more variable during the growing 
season. Without dramatic technological breakthroughs, 
yields are unlikely to continue their historical upward trend 
as temperatures rise above the optimum level for vegetative 
and reproductive growth. 
Updated from NAST219
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ticularly vulnerable to weather extremes.193 More 
rainfall concentrated into heavy downpours also in-
creases the likelihood of water deficiencies at other 
times because of reductions in rainfall frequency.
Drought frequency and severity are projected to in-
crease in the future over much of the United States, 
particularly under higher emissions scenarios.90,91 
Increased drought will be occurring at a time when 
crop water requirements also are increasing due to 
rising temperatures. Water deficits are detrimental 
for all crops.233
Temperature extremes will also pose problems. 
Even crop species that are well-adapted to warmth, 
such as tomatoes, can have reduced yield and/
or quality when daytime maximum temperatures 
exceed 90°F for even short periods during critical 
reproductive stages (see maps page 34).112 For many 
high-value crops, just hours or days of moderate 
heat stress at critical growth stages can reduce 
grower profits by negatively affecting visual or fla-
vor quality, even when total yield is not reduced.238
 
Weeds, diseases, and insect pests 
benefit from warming, and weeds also 
benefit from a higher carbon dioxide 
concentration, increasing stress  
on crop plants and requiring 
more attention to pest and  
weed control. 
 
Weeds benefit more than cash crops from 
higher temperatures and carbon dioxide 
levels.193 One concern with continued 
warming is the northward expansion of in-
vasive weeds. Southern farmers currently 
lose more of their crops to weeds than do 
northern farmers. For example, southern 
farmers lose 64 percent of the soybean 
crop to weeds, while northern farmers lose 
22 percent.239 Some extremely aggressive 
weeds plaguing the South (such as kudzu) 
have historically been confined to areas 
where winter temperatures do not drop 
below specific thresholds. As temperatures 
continue to rise, these weeds will expand 
their ranges northward into important ag-
ricultural areas.240 Kudzu currently has invaded 2.5 
million acres of the Southeast and is a carrier  
of the fungal disease soybean rust, which repre-
sents a major and expanding threat to U.S.  
soybean production.234
Controlling weeds currently costs the United States 
more than $11 billion a year, with the majority 
spent on herbicides;241 so both herbicide use and 
costs are likely to increase as temperatures and 
carbon dioxide levels rise. At the same time, the 
most widely used herbicide in the United States, 
glyphosate (RoundUp®), loses its efficacy on weeds 
grown at carbon dioxide levels that are projected 
to occur in the coming decades (see photos below). 
Higher concentrations of the chemical and more 
frequent spraying thus will be needed, increasing 
economic and environmental costs associated with 
chemical use.233 
Many insect pests and crop diseases thrive due to 
warming, increasing losses and necessitating great-
er pesticide use. Warming aids insects and diseases 
in several ways. Rising temperatures allow both 
insects and pathogens to expand their ranges north-
ward. In addition, rapidly rising winter tempera-
tures allow more insects to survive over the winter, 
whereas cold winters once controlled their popula-
tions. Some of these insects, in addition to directly 
Herbicide Loses Effectiveness at Higher CO2
     Current CO2 (380 ppm)      Potential Future CO2 (680 ppm)
The left photo shows weeds in a plot grown at a carbon dioxide (CO2) concentration 
of about 380 parts per million (ppm), which approximates the current level. The 
right photo shows a plot in which the CO2 level has been raised to about 680 ppm. 
Both plots were equally treated with herbicide.233
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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damaging crops, also carry diseases 
that harm crops. Crop diseases in 
general are likely to increase as 
earlier springs and warmer winters 
allow proliferation and higher sur-
vival rates of disease pathogens and 
parasites.193,234 The longer growing 
season will allow some insects to 
produce more generations in a single 
season, greatly increasing their 
populations. Finally, plants grown 
in higher carbon dioxide conditions 
tend to be less nutritious, so insects 
must eat more to meet their protein 
requirements, causing greater de-
struction to crops.193 
Due to the increased presence of 
pests, spraying is already much 
more common in warmer areas than 
in cooler areas. For example, Florida 
sweet corn growers spray their fields 
15 to 32 times a year to fight pests such as corn 
borer and corn earworm, while New York farmers 
average zero to five times.193 In addition, higher 
temperatures are known to reduce the effectiveness 
of certain classes of pesticides (pyrethroids  
and spinosad). 
A particularly unpleasant example of how carbon 
dioxide tends to favor undesirable plants is found in 
the response of poison ivy to rising carbon dioxide 
concentrations. Poison ivy thrives in air with extra 
carbon dioxide in it, growing bigger and producing 
a more toxic form of the oil, urushiol, which causes 
painful skin reactions in 80 percent of people. 
Contact with poison ivy is one of the most widely 
reported ailments at poison centers in the United 
States, causing more than 350,000 cases of contact 
dermatitis each year. The growth stimulation of 
poison ivy due to increasing carbon dioxide con-
centration exceeds that of most other woody spe-
cies. Given continued increases in carbon dioxide 
emissions, poison ivy is expected to become more 
abundant and more toxic in the future, with impli-
cations for forests and human health.234
Higher temperatures, longer growing seasons, and 
increased drought will lead to increased agricul-
tural water use in some areas. Obtaining the maxi-
mum “carbon dioxide fertilization” benefit often 
requires more efficient use of water and fertilizers 
that better synchronize plant demand with supply. 
Farmers are likely to respond to more aggressive 
and invasive weeds, insects, and pathogens with 
increased use of herbicides, insecticides, and fun-
gicides. Where increases in water and chemical in-
puts become necessary, this will increase costs for 
the farmer, as well as having society-wide impacts 
by depleting water supply, increasing reactive ni-
trogen and pesticide loads to the environment, and 
increasing risks to food safety and human exposure 
to pesticides.
Forage quality in pastures and 
rangelands generally declines with 
increasing carbon dioxide concentration 
because of the effects on plant nitrogen 
and protein content, reducing the land’s 
ability to supply adequate livestock feed. 
Beef cattle production takes place in every state 
in the United States, with the greatest number 
raised in regions that have an abundance of native 
or planted pastures for grazing. Generally, eastern 
pasturelands are planted and managed, whereas 
western rangelands are native pastures, which are 
Winter Temperature Trends, 1975 to 2007
Temperatures are rising faster in winter than in any other season, especially in 
many key agricultural regions. This allows many insect pests and crop diseases to 
expand and thrive, creating increasing challenges for agriculture. As indicated by 
the map, the Midwest and northern Great Plains have experienced increases of 
more than 7ºF in average winter temperatures over the past 30 years. 
NOAA/NCDC107
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not seeded and receive much less rainfall. There are 
transformations now underway in many semi-arid 
rangelands as a result of increasing atmospheric 
carbon dioxide concentration and the associated 
climate change. These transformations include 
which species of grasses dominate, as well as the 
forage quality of the dominant grasses. Increases in 
carbon dioxide are generally reducing the quality 
of the forage, so that more acreage is needed to 
provide animals with the same nutritional value, 
resulting in an overall decline in livestock pro-
ductivity. In addition, woody shrubs and invasive 
cheatgrass are encroaching into grasslands, further 
reducing their forage value.193 The combination  
of these factors leads to an overall decline in live-
stock productivity. 
While rising atmospheric carbon dioxide concen-
tration increases forage quantity, it has negative  
impacts on forage quality because plant nitrogen 
and protein concentrations often decline with high-
er concentrations of carbon dioxide.193 This reduc-
tion in protein reduces forage quality and counters 
the positive effects of carbon dioxide enrichment on 
carbohydrates. Rising carbon dioxide concentration 
also has the potential to reduce the digestibility of 
forages that are already of poor quality. Reductions 
in forage quality could have pronounced detrimen-
tal effects on animal growth, reproduction, and 
survival, and could render livestock production 
unsustainable unless animal diets are supplemented 
with protein, adding more costs to production. On 
shortgrass prairie, for example, a carbon dioxide 
enrichment experiment reduced the protein con-
centration of autumn forage below critical main-
tenance levels for livestock in 3 out of 4 years and 
reduced the digestibility of forage by 14 percent in 
mid-summer and by 10 percent in autumn. Signifi-
cantly, the grass type that thrived the most under 
excess carbon dioxide conditions also had the low-
est protein concentration.193 
At the scale of a region, the composition of forage 
plant species is determined mostly by climate and 
soils. The primary factor controlling the distribu-
tion and abundance of plants is water: both the 
The colors show the percent of the county that is cattle pasture or rangeland, with red indicating the highest percentage. 
Each dot represents 10,000 cattle. Livestock production occurs in every state. Increasing concentration of carbon dioxide 
reduces the quality of forage, necessitating more acreage and resulting in a decline in livestock productivity.
Distribution of Beef Cattle and Pasture/Rangeland in Continental U.S.
NASS232   NRCS242
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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amount of water plants use and water availability 
over time and space. The ability to anticipate veg-
etation changes at local scales and over shorter pe-
riods is limited because at these scales the response 
of vegetation to global-scale changes depends on 
a variety of local processes including the rate of 
disturbances such as fire and grazing, and the rate 
at which plant species can move across sometimes-
fragmented landscapes. Nevertheless, some general 
patterns of vegetation change are beginning to 
emerge. For example, experiments indicate that a 
higher carbon dioxide concentration favors weeds 
and invasive plants over native species because 
invasives have traits (such as rapid growth rate and 
prolific seed production) that allow a larger growth 
response to carbon dioxide. In addition, the effect 
of a higher carbon dioxide concentration on plant 
species composition appears to be greatest where 
the land has been disturbed (such as by fire or graz-
ing) and nutrient and light availability are high.193
Increases in temperature lengthen the growing sea-
son, and thus are likely to extend forage production 
into the late fall and early spring. However, overall 
productivity remains dependent on precipitation 
during the growing season.193 
Increased heat, disease, and weather 
extremes are likely to reduce  
livestock productivity.
Like human beings, cows, pigs, and poultry are 
warm-blooded animals that are sensitive to heat. In 
terms of production efficiency, studies show that 
the negative effects of hotter summers will out-
weigh the positive effects of warmer winters. The 
more the U.S. climate warms, the more production 
will fall. For example, an analysis projected that a 
warming in the range of 9 to 11°F (as in the higher 
emissions scenarios91) would cause a 10 percent 
decline in livestock yields in cow/calf and dairy 
operations in Appalachia, the Southeast (including 
the Mississippi Delta), and southern Plains regions, 
while a warming of 2.7°F would cause less than a 1 
percent decline. 
Temperature and humidity interact to cause stress 
in animals, just as in humans; the higher the heat 
and humidity, the greater the stress and discomfort, 
and the larger the reduction in the animals’ ability 
to produce milk, gain weight, and reproduce. Milk 
production declines in dairy operations, the number 
of days it takes for cows to reach their target weight 
grows longer in meat operations, conception rate in 
cattle falls, and swine growth rates decline due to 
heat. As a result, swine, beef, and milk production 
are all projected to decline in a warmer world.193 
The projected increases in air temperatures will 
negatively affect confined animal operations (dairy, 
beef, and swine) located in the central United 
States, increasing production costs as a result of 
reductions in performance associated with lower 
feed intake and increased requirements for energy 
to maintain healthy livestock. These costs do not 
account for the increased death of livestock as-
sociated with extreme weather events such as heat 
waves. Nighttime recovery is an essential element 
of survival when livestock are stressed by extreme 
heat. A feature of recent heat waves is the lack of 
nighttime relief. Large numbers of deaths have oc-
curred in recent heat waves, with individual states 
reporting losses of 5,000 head of cattle in a single 
heat wave in one summer.193 
Warming also affects parasites and disease patho-
gens. The earlier arrival of spring and warmer 
winters allow greater proliferation and survival 
of parasites and disease pathogens.193 In addition, 
changes in rainfall distributions are likely to lead 
to changes in diseases sensitive to moisture. Heat 
stress reduces animals’ ability to cope with other 
stresses, such as diseases and parasites. Further-
more, changes in rainfall distributions could lead to 
changes in diseases sensitive to relative humidity.
Maintaining livestock production would require 
modifying facilities to reduce heat stress on ani-
mals, using the best understanding of the chronic 
and acute stresses that livestock will encounter to 
determine the optimal modification strategy.193
Changing livestock species as an adaptation strat-
egy is a much more extreme, high-risk, and, in 
most cases, high-cost option than changing crop 
varieties. Accurate predictions of climate trends 
and development of the infrastructure and market 
for the new livestock products are essential to mak-
ing this an effective response.
Ecosystems
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Key Messages:
Ecosystem processes, such as those that control growth and decomposition, • 
have been affected by climate change.
Large-scale shifts have occurred in the ranges of species and the timing of the • 
seasons and animal migration, and are very likely to continue. 
Fires, insect pests, disease pathogens, and invasive weed species have increased, • 
and these trends are likely to continue.
Deserts and drylands are likely to become hotter and drier, feeding a self-• 
reinforcing cycle of invasive plants, fire, and erosion.
Coastal and near-shore ecosystems are already under multiple stresses. • 
Climate change and ocean acidification will exacerbate these stresses.
Arctic sea ice ecosystems are already being adversely affected by the loss of • 
summer sea ice and further changes are expected.
The habitats of some mountain species and coldwater fish, such as salmon and • 
trout, are very likely to contract in response to warming.
Some of the benefits ecosystems provide to society will be threatened by • 
climate change, while others will be enhanced.
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The natural functioning of the environment pro-
vides both goods – such as food and other products 
that are bought and sold – and services, which our 
society depends upon. For example, ecosystems 
store large amounts of carbon in plants and soils; 
they regulate water flow and water quality; and 
they stabilize local climates. These services are 
not assigned a financial value, but society nonethe-
less depends on them. Ecosystem processes are the 
underpinning of these services: photosynthesis, 
the process by which plants capture carbon dioxide 
from the atmosphere and create new growth; the 
plant and soil processes that recycle nutrients from 
decomposing matter and maintain soil fertility; and 
the processes by which plants draw water from soils 
and return water to the atmosphere. These ecosys-
tem processes are affected by climate and by the 
concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.70
The diversity of living things (biodiversity) in 
ecosystems is itself an important resource that 
maintains the ability of these systems to provide the 
services upon which society depends. Many factors 
affect biodiversity including: climatic conditions; 
the influences of competitors, predators, parasites, 
and diseases; disturbances such as fire; and other 
physical factors. Human-induced climate change, 
in conjunction with other stresses, is exerting major 
influences on natural environments and biodiver-
sity, and these influences are generally expected to 
grow with increased warming.70
Ecosystem processes, such as those that 
control growth and decomposition, have 
been affected by climate change.
Climate has a strong influence on the processes 
that control growth and development in ecosystems. 
Temperature increases generally speed up plant 
growth, rates of decomposition, and how rapidly the 
cycling of nutrients occurs, though other factors, 
such as whether sufficient water is available, also 
influence these rates. The growing season is length-
ening as higher temperatures occur earlier in the 
spring. Forest growth has risen over the past several 
decades as a consequence of a number of factors – 
young forests reaching maturity, an increased con-
centration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, a 
longer growing season, and increased deposition of 
nitrogen from the atmosphere. Based on the current 
understanding of these processes, the individual 
effects are difficult to disentangle.243 
Key Sources
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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A higher atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration causes trees and other 
plants to capture more carbon from the atmosphere, but experiments show 
that trees put much of this extra carbon into producing fine roots and twigs, 
rather than new wood. The effect of carbon dioxide in increasing growth 
thus seems to be relatively modest, and generally is seen most strongly in 
young forests on fertile soils where there is also sufficient water to sustain 
this growth. In the future, as atmospheric carbon dioxide continues to rise, 
and as climate continues to change, forest growth in some regions is pro-
jected to increase, especially in relatively young forests on fertile soils.243 
Forest productivity is thus projected to increase in much of the East, while 
it is projected to decrease in much of the West where water is scarce and 
projected to become more so. Wherever droughts increase, forest produc-
tivity will decrease and tree death will increase. In addition to occurring in 
much of the West, these conditions are projected to occur in parts of Alaska 
and in the eastern part of the Southeast.243
Large-scale shifts have occurred in the ranges of species 
and the timing of the seasons and animal migration, and 
are very likely to continue. 
Climate change is already having impacts on animal and plant species 
throughout the United States. Some of the most obvious changes are related 
to the timing of the seasons: when plants bud in spring, when birds and 
other animals migrate, and so on. In the United States, spring now arrives 
an average of 10 days to two weeks earlier than it did 20 years ago. The 
growing season is lengthening over much of the continental United States. 
Many migratory bird species are arriving earlier. For example, a study of 
northeastern birds that migrate long distances found that birds wintering in 
the southern United States now arrive back in the Northeast an average of 
13 days earlier than they did during the first half of the last century. Birds 
wintering in South America arrive back in the Northeast an average of four 
days earlier.70 
Another major change is in the geographic distribution of species. The 
ranges of many species in the United States have shifted northward and 
upward in elevation. For example, the ranges of many butterfly species 
have expanded northward, contracted at the southern edge, and shifted to 
higher elevations as warming has continued. A study of Edith’s checker-
spot butterfly showed that 40 percent of the populations below 2,400 feet 
have gone extinct, despite the availability of otherwise suitable habitat and 
food supply. The checkerspot’s most southern populations also have gone 
extinct, while new populations have been established north of the previous 
northern boundary for the species.70 
For butterflies, birds, and other species, one of the concerns with such changes in geographic range and tim-
ing of migration is the potential for mismatches between species and the resources they need to survive. The 
rapidly changing landscape, such as new highways and expanding urban areas, can create barriers that limit 
habitat and increase species loss. Failure of synchronicity between butterflies and the resources they depend 
Butterfly Range  
Shifts Northward
As climate warms, many species in the United 
States are shifting their ranges northward 
and to higher elevations. The map shows the 
response of Edith’s checkerspot butterfly 
populations to a warming climate over the 
past 136 years in the American West. Over 
70 percent of the southernmost populations 
(shown in yellow) have gone extinct. The 
northernmost populations and those above 
8,000 feet elevation in the cooler climate 
of California’s Sierra Nevada (shown in 
green) are still thriving. These differences 
in numbers of population extinctions across 
the geographic range of the butterfly have 
resulted in the average location shifting 
northward and to higher elevations over 
the past century, illustrating how climate 
change is altering the ranges of many species. 
Because their change in range is slow, most 
species are not expected to be able to keep 
up with the rapid climate change projected 
in the coming decades.244
Parmesan244
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upon has led to local population extinctions of the 
checkerspot butterfly during extreme drought and 
low-snowpack years in California.70 
Tree species shifts
Forest tree species also are expected to shift their 
ranges northward and upslope in response to cli-
mate change, although specific quantitative predic-
tions are very difficult to make because of the com-
plexity of human land use and many other factors. 
This would result in major changes in the character 
of U.S. forests and the types of forests that will be 
most prevalent in different regions. In the United 
States, some common forests types are projected to 
expand, such as oak-hickory; others are projected 
to contract, such as maple-beech-birch. Still others, 
such as spruce-fir, are likely to disappear from the 
United States altogether.243 
In Alaska, vegetation changes are already under-
way due to warming. Tree line is shifting north-
ward into tundra, encroaching on the habitat for 
many migratory birds and land animals such as car-
ibou that depend on the open tundra landscape.245
Marine species shifts and effects on fisheries
The distribution of marine fish and plankton are 
predominantly determined by climate, so it is not 
surprising that marine species in U.S. waters are 
moving northward and that the timing of plankton 
blooms is shifting. Extensive shifts in the ranges 
and distributions of both warmwater 
and coldwater species of fish have been 
documented.70 For example, in the waters 
around Alaska, climate change already is 
causing significant alterations in marine 
ecosystems with important implications 
for fisheries and the people who depend 
on them (see Alaska region). 
In the Pacific, climate change is expected 
to cause an eastward shift in the location 
of tuna stocks.246 It is clear that such shifts 
are related to climate, including natural 
modes of climate variability such as the 
cycles of El Niño and La Niña. However, 
it is unclear how these modes of ocean 
variability will change as global climate 
continues to change, and therefore it is 
very difficult to predict quantitatively how 
marine fish and plankton species’ distributions 
might shift as a function of climate change.70
Breaking up of existing ecosystems
As warming drives changes in timing and geo-
graphic ranges for various species, it is important  
to note that entire communities of species do 
not shift intact. Rather, the range and timing of 
each species shifts in response to its sensitivity 
to climate change, its mobility, its lifespan, and 
the availability of the resources it needs (such as 
soil, moisture, food, and shelter). The speed with 
which species can shift their ranges is influenced 
by factors including their size, lifespan, and seed 
dispersal techniques in plants. In addition, migra-
tory pathways must be available, such as northward 
flowing rivers which serve as conduits for fish. 
Some migratory pathways may be blocked by de-
velopment and habitat fragmentation. All of these 
variations result in the breakup of existing  
ecosystems and formation of new ones, with un-
known consequences.220 
Extinctions and climate change
Interactions among impacts of climate change 
and other stressors can increase the risk of species 
extinction. Extinction rates of plants and animals 
have already risen considerably, with the vast 
majority of these extinctions attributed to loss of 
habitat or over-exploitation.247 Climate change has 
been identified as a serious risk factor for the fu-
Projected Shifts in Forest Types
The maps show current and projected forest types. Major changes are projected for 
many regions. For example, in the Northeast, under a mid-range warming scenario, 
the currently dominant maple-beech-birch forest type is projected to be completely 
displaced by other forest types in a warmer future.243
NAST219
U.S. Global Change Research Program
82 83
Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States Ecosystems
ture, however, since it is one of the environmental 
stresses on species and ecosystems that is continu-
ing to increase.247 The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change has estimated that if a warming of 
3.5 to 5.5°F occurs, 20 to 30 percent of species that 
have been studied would be in climate zones that 
are far outside of their current ranges, and would 
therefore likely be at risk of extinction.248 One rea-
son this percentage is so high is that climate change 
would be superimposed on other stresses including 
habitat loss and continued overharvesting of some 
species, resulting in considerable stress on popula-
tions and species.
Fires, insect pests, disease pathogens, 
and invasive weed species have 
increased, and these trends are likely   
to continue.
Forest fires
In the western United States, both the frequency 
of large wildfires and the length of the fire season 
have increased substantially in recent decades, due 
primarily to earlier spring snowmelt and higher 
spring and summer temperatures.294 These changes 
in climate have reduced the availability of moisture, 
drying out the vegetation that provides the fuel for 
fires. Alaska also has experienced large increases 
in fire, with the area burned more than doubling 
in recent decades. As in the western United States, 
higher air temperature is a key factor. In Alaska, 
for example, June air temperatures alone explained 
approximately 38 percent of the increase in the area 
burned annually from 1950 to 2003.243 
Insect pests
Insect pests are economically important stresses 
on forest ecosystems in the United States. Coupled 
with pathogens, they cost $1.5 billion in damage 
per year. Forest insect pests are sensitive to climatic 
variations in many stages of their lives. Changes 
in climate have contributed significantly to several 
major insect pest outbreaks in the United States 
and Canada over the past several decades. The 
mountain pine beetle has infested lodgepole pine in 
British Columbia. Over 33 million acres of forest 
have been affected, by far the largest such outbreak 
in recorded history. Another 1.5 million acres have 
been infested by pine beetle in Colorado. Spruce 
beetle has affected more than 2.5 million acres in 
Alaska (see Alaska region) and western Canada. 
The combination of drought and high temperatures 
also has led to serious insect infestations and death 
of piñon pine in the Southwest, and to various 
insect pest attacks throughout the forests of the 
eastern United States.243
Rising temperatures increase insect outbreaks in a 
number of ways. First, winter temperatures above 
a certain threshold allow more insects to survive 
the cold season that normally limits their num-
bers. Second, the longer warm season allows them 
to develop faster, sometimes completing two life 
cycles instead of one in a single growing season. 
Third, warmer conditions help expand their ranges 
northward. And fourth, drought stress reduces 
trees’ ability to resist insect attack (for example, by 
pushing back against boring insects with the pres-
sure of their sap). Spruce beetle, pine beetle, spruce 
budworm, and woolly adelgid (which attacks east-
ern hemlocks) are just some of the insects that are 
proliferating in the United States, devastating many 
forests. These outbreaks are projected to increase 
with ongoing warming. Trees killed by insects also 
provide more dry fuel for wildfires.70,243,250
Disease pathogens and their carriers
One consequence of a longer, warmer growing sea-
son and less extreme cold in winter is that opportu-
nities are created for many insect pests and disease 
pathogens to flourish. Accumulating evidence 
links the spread of disease pathogens to a warming 
climate. For example, a recent study showed that 
widespread amphibian extinctions in the mountains 
of Costa Rica are linked to changes in climatic 
Size of U.S. Wildfires, 1983 to 2008
Data on wildland fires in the United States show that the number of 
acres burned per fire has increased since the 1980s. 
National Interagency Fire Center249
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conditions which are thought to have enabled the 
proliferation of an amphibian disease.70,251
Diseases that affect wildlife and the living things 
that carry these diseases have been expanding their 
geographic ranges as climate heats up. Depending 
on their specific adaptations to current climate, 
many parasites, and the insects, spiders, and 
scorpions that carry and transmit diseases, die 
or fail to develop below threshold temperatures. 
Therefore, as temperatures rise, more of these 
disease-carrying creatures survive. For some 
species, rates of reproduction, population growth, 
and biting, tend to increase with increasing 
temperatures, up to a limit. Some parasites’ 
development rates and infectivity periods also 
increase with temperature.70 An analysis of diseases 
among marine species found that diseases were 
increasing for mammals, corals, turtles, and 
mollusks, while no trends were detected for sharks, 
rays, crabs, and shrimp.70
Invasive plants
Problems involving invasive plant species arise 
from a mix of human-induced changes, including 
disturbance of the land surface (such as through 
over grazing or clearing natural vegetation for 
development), deliberate or accidental transport of 
non-native species, the increase in available nitro-
gen through over-fertilization of crops, and the ris-
ing carbon dioxide concentration and the resulting 
climate change.243 Human-induced climate change 
is not generally the initiating factor, nor the 
most important one, but it is becoming a more 
important part of the mix. 
The increasing carbon dioxide concentration 
stimulates the growth of most plant species, 
and some invasive plants respond with greater 
growth rates than native plants. Beyond this, 
invasive plants appear to better tolerate a wider 
range of environmental conditions and may be 
more successful in a warming world because 
they can migrate and establish themselves in 
new sites more rapidly than native plants.70 
They are also not usually dependent on external 
pollinators or seed dispersers to reproduce. For 
all of these reasons, invasive plant species pres-
ent a growing problem that is extremely diffi-
cult to control once unleashed.70 
Deserts and drylands are likely to 
become hotter and drier, feeding a self-
reinforcing cycle of invasive plants, fire, 
and erosion. 
The arid Southwest is projected to become even 
drier in this century. There is emerging evidence 
that this is already underway.34 Deserts in the 
United States are also projected to expand to the 
north, east, and upward in elevation in response to 
projected warming and associated changes  
in climate. 
Increased drying in the region contributes to a 
variety of changes that exacerbate a cycle of de-
sertification. Increased drought conditions cause 
perennial plants to die due to water stress and 
increased susceptibility to plant diseases. At the 
same time, non-native grasses have invaded the re-
gion. As these grasses increase in abundance, they 
provide more fuel for fires, causing fire frequency 
to increase in a self-reinforcing cycle that leads to 
further losses of vegetation. When it does rain, the 
rain tends to come in heavy downpours, and since 
there is less vegetation to protect the soil, water 
erosion increases. Higher air temperatures and de-
creased soil moisture reduce soil stability, further 
exacerbating erosion. And with a growing popula-
tion needing water for urban uses, hydroelectric 
generation, and agriculture, there is increasing 
pressure on mountain water sources that would oth-
erwise flow to desert river areas.70,149 
The photo series shows the progression from arid grassland to desert 
(desertification) over a 100-year period. The change is the result of grazing 
management and reduced rainfall in the Southwest.250,252,253
CCSP SAP 4.3243
Desertification of Arid Grassland
near Tucson, Arizona, 1902 to 2003
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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The response of arid lands to climate change also 
depends on how other factors interact with climate 
at local scales. Large-scale, unregulated livestock 
grazing in the Southwest during the late 1800s and 
early 1900s is widely regarded as having contrib-
uted to widespread desertification. Grazing peaked 
around 1920 on public lands in the West. By the 
1970s, grazing had been reduced by about 70 
percent, but the arid lands have been very slow to 
recover from its impacts. Warmer and drier climate 
conditions are expected to slow recovery even 
more. In addition, the land resource in the South-
west is currently managed more for providing water 
for people than for protecting the productivity of the 
landscape. As a result, the land resource is likely to 
be further degraded and its recovery hampered.243
Coastal and near-shore ecosystems are 
already under multiple stresses. Climate 
change and ocean acidification will 
exacerbate these stresses.
Coastal and near-shore marine ecosystems are vul-
nerable to a host of climate change-related effects 
including increasing air and water temperatures, 
ocean acidification, changes in runoff from the 
land, sea-level rise, and altered currents. Some of 
these changes have already led to coral bleaching, 
shifts in species ranges, increased storm intensity in 
some regions, dramatic reductions in sea ice extent 
and thickness along the Alaskan coast,137 and other 
significant changes to the nation’s coastlines and 
marine ecosystems.70
The interface between land and sea is important, 
as many species, including many endangered spe-
cies, depend on it at some point in their life cycle. 
In addition, coastal areas buffer inland areas from 
the effects of wave action and storms.247 Coastal 
wetlands, intertidal areas, and other near-shore 
ecosystems are subject to a variety of environmen-
tal stresses.254,255 Sea-level rise, increased coastal 
storm intensity, and rising temperatures contrib-
ute to increased vulnerability of coastal wetland 
ecosystems. It has been estimated that 3 feet of 
sea-level rise (within the range of projections for 
this century) would inundate about 65 percent of the 
coastal marshlands and swamps in the contiguous 
United States.256 The combination of sea-level rise, 
local land sinking, and related factors already have 
resulted in substantially higher relative sea-level 
rise along the Gulf of Mexico and the mid-Atlantic 
coast, more so than on the Pacific Coast.43,254 In 
Louisiana alone, over one-third of the coastal plain 
that existed a century ago has since been lost,254 
which is mostly due to local land sinking.70 Barrier 
islands are also losing land at an increasing rate257 
(see Southeast region), and they are particularly im-
portant in protecting the coastline in some regions 
vulnerable to sea-level rise and storm surge.
Coral reefs
Coral reefs are very diverse ecosystems that sup-
port many other species by providing food and 
habitat. In addition to their ecological value, coral 
reefs provide billions of dollars in services includ-
ing tourism, fish breeding habitat, and protection of 
coastlines. Corals face a host of challenges associ-
ated with human activities such as poorly regulated 
tourism, destructive fishing, and pollution, in addi-
tion to climate change-related stresses.70 
Corals are marine animals that host symbiotic algae 
which help nourish the animals and give the corals 
their color. When corals are stressed by increases 
in water temperatures or ultraviolet light, they lose 
their algae and turn white, a process called coral 
bleaching. If the stress persists, the corals die. 
Intensities and frequencies of bleaching events, 
clearly driven by warming in surface water, have 
increased substantially over the past 30 years, lead-
ing to the death or severe damage of about one-
third of the world’s corals.70
The United States has extensive coral reef eco-
systems in the Caribbean, Atlantic, and Pacific 
oceans. In 2005, the Caribbean basin experienced 
unprecedented water temperatures that resulted 
in dramatic coral bleaching with some sites in the 
U.S. Virgin Islands seeing 90 percent of the coral 
bleached. Some corals began to recover when water 
temperatures decreased, but later that year disease 
appeared, striking the previously bleached and 
weakened coral. To date, 50 percent of the corals 
in Virgin Islands National Park have died from the 
bleaching and disease events. In the Florida Keys, 
summer bleaching in 2005 was also followed by 
disease in September.70 
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But rising temperature is not the only stress coral 
reefs face. As the carbon dioxide concentration in 
the air increases, more carbon dioxide is absorbed 
into the world’s oceans, leading to their acidifica-
tion. This makes less calcium carbonate available 
for corals and other sea life to build their skeletons 
and shells.258 If carbon dioxide concentrations 
continue to rise and the resulting acidification pro-
ceeds, eventually, corals and other ocean life that 
rely on calcium carbonate will not be able to build 
these skeletons and shells at all. The implications of 
such extreme changes in ocean ecosystems are not 
clear, but there is now evidence that in some ocean 
areas, such as along the Northwest coast, acidifica-
tion is already occurring70,259 (see Coasts region for 
more discussion of ocean acidification).
Arctic sea ice ecosystems are already 
being adversely affected by the loss of 
summer sea ice and further changes  
are expected.
Perhaps most vulnerable of all to the impacts of 
warming are Arctic ecosystems that rely on sea ice, 
which is vanishing rapidly and is projected to dis-
appear entirely in summertime within this century. 
Algae that bloom on the underside of the sea ice 
form the base of a food web linking microscopic 
animals and fish to seals, whales, polar bears, and 
people. As the sea ice disappears, so too do these 
algae. The ice also provides a vital platform for 
ice-dependent seals (such as the ringed seal) to give 
birth, nurse their pups, and rest. Polar bears use the 
ice as a platform from which to hunt their prey. The 
walrus rests on the ice near the continental shelf 
between its dives to eat clams and other shellfish. 
As the ice edge retreats away from the shelves to 
deeper areas, there will be no clams nearby.70,132,220
The Bering Sea, off the west coast of Alaska, 
produces our nation’s largest commercial fish 
harvests as well as providing food for many Native 
Alaskan peoples. Ultimately, the fish populations 
(and animals including seabirds, seals, walruses, 
and whales) depend on plankton blooms regulated 
by the extent and location of the ice edge in spring. 
As the sea ice continues to decline, the location, 
timing, and species composition of the blooms is 
changing. The spring melt of sea ice in the  
Bering Sea has long provided material that feeds 
the clams, shrimp, and other life forms on the 
ocean floor that, in turn, provide food for the 
walruses, gray whales, bearded seals, eider ducks, 
and many fish. The earlier ice melt resulting from 
warming, however, leads to later phytoplankton 
blooms that are largely consumed by microscopic 
animals near the sea surface, vastly decreasing the 
amount of food reaching the living things on the 
ocean floor. This will radically change the species 
composition of the fish and other creatures, with 
significant repercussions for both subsistence and 
commercial fishing.70 
Ringed seals give birth in snow caves on the sea 
ice, which protect their pups from extreme cold 
and predators. Warming leads to earlier snow melt, 
which causes the snow caves to collapse before the 
pups are weaned. The small, exposed pups may die 
of hypothermia or be vulnerable to predation by 
arctic foxes, polar bears, gulls, and ravens. Gulls 
and ravens are arriving in the Arctic earlier as 
springs become warmer, increasing the birds’  
opportunity to prey on the seal pups.70 
Polar bears are the top predators of the sea ice 
ecosystem. Because they prey primarily on ice-
associated seals, they are especially vulnerable to 
the disappearance of sea ice. The bears’ ability to 
catch seals depends on the presence of sea ice. In 
that habitat, polar bears take advantage of the fact 
that seals must surface to breathe in limited open-
ings in the ice cover. In the open ocean, bears lack 
a hunting platform, seals are not restricted in where 
they can surface, and successful hunting is very 
rare. On shore, polar bears feed little, if at all.
About two-thirds of the world’s polar bears are projected to be 
gone by the middle of this century. It is projected that there will 
be no wild polar bears in Alaska in 75 years.70
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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In addition, the rapid rate of warming in 
Alaska and the rest of the Arctic in recent 
decades is sharply reducing the snow cover 
in which polar bears build dens and the sea 
ice they use as foraging habitat. Female polar 
bears build snow dens in which they hiber-
nate for four to five months each year and 
in which they give birth to their cubs. Born 
weighing only about 1 pound, the tiny cubs 
depend on the snow den for warmth.
About two-thirds of the world’s polar bears 
are projected to be gone by the middle of this 
century. It is projected that there will be no 
wild polar bears left in Alaska in 75 years.70
Continued warming will inevitably entail 
major changes in the sea ice ecosystem, to 
the point that its viability is in jeopardy. 
Some species will become extinct, while oth-
ers might adapt to new habitats. The chances 
of species surviving the current changes may 
depend critically on the rate of change. The current 
rates of change in the sea ice ecosystem are very 
rapid relative to the life spans of animals including 
seals, walruses, and polar bears, and as such, are a 
major threat to their survival.70
The habitats of some 
mountain species and 
coldwater fish, such as 
salmon and trout, are 
very likely to contract in 
response to warming.
Animal and plant species that 
live in the mountains are among 
those particularly sensitive to 
rapid climate change. They 
include animal species such 
as the grizzly bear, bighorn 
sheep, pika, mountain goat, 
and wolverine. Major changes 
have already been observed in 
the pika as previously reported 
populations have disappeared 
entirely as climate has warmed 
over recent decades.70 One 
reason mountain species are so 
vulnerable is that their suitable habitats are be-
ing compressed as climatic zones shift upward in 
elevation. Some species try to shift uphill with the 
changing climate, but may face constraints related 
to food, other species present, and so on. In addi-
tion, as species move up the mountains, those near 
the top simply run out of habitat.70 
Fewer wildflowers are projected to grace the slopes 
of the Rocky Mountains as global warming causes 
earlier spring snowmelt. Larkspur, aspen fleabane, 
and aspen sunflower grow at an altitude of about 
9,500 feet where the winter snows are deep. Once 
the snow melts, the flowers form buds and prepare 
to bloom. But warmer springs mean that the snow 
melts earlier, leaving the buds exposed to frost. 
(The percentage of buds that were frosted has 
doubled over the past decade.) Frost does not kill 
the plants, but it does make them unable to seed 
and reproduce, meaning there will be no next gen-
eration. Insects and other animal species depend 
on the flowers for food, and other species depend 
on those species, so the loss is likely to propagate 
through the food chain.236
Shifts in tree species on mountains in New Eng-
land, where temperatures have risen 2 to 4°F in 
the last 40 years, offer another example. Some 
mountain tree species have shifted uphill by 350 
The pika, pictured above, is a 
small mammal whose habitat is 
limited to cold areas near the 
tops of mountains. As climate 
warms, little suitable habitat 
is left. Of 25 pika populations 
studied in the Great Basin be-
tween the Rocky Mountains and 
the Sierra Nevada, more than 
one-third have gone extinct in 
recent decades.261,262
Forest Species Shift Upslope
As climate warms, hardwood trees out-compete evergreen trees 
that are adapted to colder conditions. 
Beckage et al.260/Adapted from Boston Globe/Landov
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feet in the last 40 years. Tree communities were 
relatively unchanged at low and high elevations, but 
in the transition zone in between (at about 2,600 
feet elevation) the changes have been dramatic. 
Cold-loving tree species declined from 43 to 18 
percent, while warmer-loving trees increased from 
57 to 82 percent. Overall, the transition zone has  
shifted about 350 feet uphill in just a few decades, 
a surprisingly rapid rate since these are trees that 
live for hundreds of years. One possibility is that as 
trees were damaged or killed by air pollution, it left 
an opportunity for the warming-induced transition 
to occur more quickly. These results indicate that 
the composition of high elevation forests is chang-
ing rapidly.260 
Coldwater fish
Salmon and other coldwater fish species in the 
United States are at particular risk from warming. 
Salmon are under threat from a variety of human 
activities, but global warming is a growing source 
of stress. Rising temperatures affect salmon in sev-
eral important ways. As precipitation increasingly 
falls as rain rather than snow, it feeds floods that 
wash away salmon eggs incubating in the stream-
bed. Warmer water leads eggs to hatch earlier in 
the year, so the young are smaller and more vulner-
able to predators. Warmer conditions increase the 
fish’s metabolism, taking energy away from growth 
and forcing the fish to find more food, but earlier 
hatching of eggs could put them out of sync with 
the insects they eat. Earlier melting of snow leaves 
rivers and streams warmer and shallower in sum-
mer and fall. Diseases and parasites tend to flour-
ish in warmer water. Studies suggest that up to 40 
percent of Northwest salmon populations may be 
lost by 2050.263
Large declines in trout populations are also pro-
jected to occur around the United States. Over half 
of the wild trout populations are likely to disappear 
from the southern Appalachian Mountains because 
of the effects of rising stream temperatures. Losses 
of western trout populations may exceed 60 percent 
in certain regions. About 90 percent of bull trout, 
which live in western rivers in some of the coun-
try’s most wild places, are projected to be lost due 
to warming. Pennsylvania is predicted to lose 50 
percent of its trout habitat in the coming decades. 
Projected losses of trout habitat for some warmer 
states, such as North Carolina and Virginia, are up 
to 90 percent.264
Some of the benefits ecosystems 
provide to society will be threatened by 
climate change, while others will  
be enhanced.
Human well-being depends on the Earth’s ecosys-
tems and the services that they provide to sustain 
and fulfill human life.265 These services are impor-
tant to human well-being because they contribute 
to basic material needs, physical and psychological 
health, security, and economic activity. A recent 
assessment reported that of 24 vital ecosystem ser-
vices, 15 were being degraded by human activity.247 
Climate change is one of several human-induced 
stresses that threaten to intensify and extend these 
adverse impacts to biodiversity, ecosystems, and 
the services they provide. Two of many possible 
examples follow.
Forests and carbon storage
Forests provide many services important to the 
well-being of Americans: air and water quality 
maintenance, water flow regulation, and watershed 
protection; wildlife habitat and biodiversity conser-
vation; recreational opportunities and aesthetic and 
spiritual fulfillment; raw materials for wood and 
paper products; and climate regulation and carbon 
storage. A changing climate will alter forests and 
the services they provide. Most of these changes 
are likely to be detrimental.
In the United States, forest growth and long-lived 
forest products currently offset about 20 percent of 
U.S. fossil fuel carbon emissions.140,257 This carbon 
“sink” is an enormous service provided by forests 
and its persistence or growth will be important to 
limiting the atmospheric carbon dioxide concentra-
tion. The scale of the challenge of increasing this 
sink is very large. To offset an additional 10 percent 
of U.S. emissions through tree planting would re-
quire converting one-third of current croplands  
to forests.243
Recreational opportunities
Tourism is one of the largest economic sec-
tors in the world, and it is also one of the fastest 
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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growing;266 the jobs created by recreational tourism 
provide economic benefits not only to individu-
als but also to communities. Slightly more than 90 
percent of the U.S. population participates in some 
form of outdoor recreation, representing nearly 
270 million participants,267 and several billion days 
spent each year in a wide variety of outdoor recre-
ation activities.
Since much recreation and tourism occurs outside, 
increased temperature and precipitation have a 
direct effect on the enjoyment of these activities, 
and on the desired number of visitor days and as-
sociated level of visitor spending as well as tourism 
employment. Weather conditions are an important 
factor influencing tourism visits. In addition, out-
door recreation and tourism often depends on the 
availability and quality of natural resources,268 such 
as beaches, forests, wetlands, snow, and wildlife, all 
of which will be affected by climate change. 
Thus, climate change can have direct effects on the 
natural resources that people enjoy. The length of 
the season for, and desirability of, several of the 
most popular activities – walking; visiting a beach, 
lakeshore, or river; sightseeing; swimming; and 
picnicking267 – are likely to be enhanced by small 
near-term increases in temperature. Other activities 
are likely to be harmed by even small increases in 
warming, such as snow- and ice-dependent activi-
ties including skiing, snowmobiling, and  
ice fishing.
The net economic effect of near-term climate 
change on recreational activities is likely to be posi-
tive. In the longer term, however, as climate change 
effects on ecosystems and seasonality become more 
pronounced, the net economic effect on tourism 
and recreation is not known with certainty.172 
Adaptation:   Preserving Coastal Wetlands
Coastal wetlands are rich ecosystems 
that protect the shore from damage 
during storm surges and provide 
society with other services. One 
strategy designed to preserve coastal 
wetlands as sea level rises is the “rolling 
easement.” Rolling easements allow 
some development near the shore, but 
prohibit construction of seawalls or 
other armoring to protect buildings; 
they recognize nature’s right-of-way 
to advance inland as sea level rises. 
Massachusetts and Rhode Island prohibit 
shoreline armoring along the shores of 
some estuaries so that ecosystems can 
migrate inland, and several states limit 
armoring along ocean shores.269,270 
In the case shown here, the coastal marsh would reach the footprint of the house 40 years in the 
future. Because the house is on pilings, it could still be occupied if it is connected to a community 
sewage treatment system; a septic system would probably fail due to proximity to the water table. 
After 80 years, the marsh would have taken over the yard, and the footprint of the house would extend 
onto public property. The house could still be occupied but reinvestment in the property would be 
unlikely. After 100 years, this house would be removed, although some other houses in the area could 
still be occupied. Eventually, the entire area would return to nature. A home with a rolling easement 
would depreciate in value rather than appreciate like other coastal real estate. But if the loss were 
expected to occur 100 years from now, it would only reduce the current property value by 1 to 5 
percent, for which the owner could be compensated.271 
Modified from CCSP SAP 4.1271
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Key Messages:
Increases in the risk of illness and death related to extreme heat and heat • 
waves are very likely. Some reduction in the risk of death related to extreme 
cold is expected.
Warming is likely to make it more challenging to meet air quality standards • 
necessary to protect public health. 
Extreme weather events cause physical and mental health problems. Some of • 
these events are projected to increase. 
Some diseases transmitted by food, water, and insects are likely to increase. • 
Rising temperature and carbon dioxide concentration increase pollen • 
production and prolong the pollen season in a number of plants with highly 
allergenic pollen, presenting a health risk.
Certain groups, including children, the elderly, and the poor, are most • 
vulnerable to a range of climate-related health effects. 
Climate change poses unique challenges to human health. Unlike health threats caused by a particular toxin 
or disease pathogen, there are many ways that climate change can lead to potentially harmful health effects. 
There are direct health impacts from heat waves and severe storms, ailments caused or exacerbated by air 
pollution and airborne allergens, and many climate-sensitive infectious diseases.163 
Realistically assessing the potential health effects of 
climate change must include consideration of the capac-
ity to manage new and changing climate conditions.163 
Whether or not increased health risks due to climate 
change are realized will depend largely on societal re-
sponses and underlying vulnerability. The probability of 
exacerbated health risks due to climate change points to a 
need to maintain a strong public health infrastructure to 
help limit future impacts.163 
Increased risks associated with diseases originating 
outside the United States must also be considered be-
cause we live in an increasingly globalized world. Many 
poor nations are expected to suffer even greater health 
consequences from climate change.272 With global trade 
and travel, disease flare-ups in any part of the world can 
potentially reach the United States. In addition, weather 
and climate extremes such as severe storms and drought 
can undermine public health infrastructure, further stress 
environmental resources, destabilize economies, and 
potentially create security risks both within the United 
States and internationally.219 
Key Sources
The pie chart shows the distribution of deaths for 11 hazard 
categories as a percent of the total 19,958 deaths due to 
these hazards from 1970 to 2004. Heat/drought ranks 
highest, followed by severe weather, which includes events 
with multiple causes such as lightning, wind, and rain.273 This 
analysis ended prior to the 2005 hurricane season which 
resulted in approximately 2,000 deaths.229
Hazard-Related Deaths in the U.S.
Borden and Cutter273
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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Increases in the risk of illness and death 
related to extreme heat and heat waves 
are very likely. Some reduction in the 
risk of death related to extreme cold  
is expected.
Temperatures are rising and the probability of 
severe heat waves is increasing. Analyses sug-
gest that currently rare extreme heat waves will 
become much more common in the future (see 
National Climate Change).68 At the same time, the 
U.S. population is aging, and older people are more 
vulnerable to hot weather and heat waves. The per-
centage of the U.S. population over age 65 is cur-
rently 12 percent and is projected to be 21 percent 
by 2050 (over 86 million people).163,274 Diabetics are 
also at greater risk of heat-related death, and the 
prevalence of obesity and diabetes is increasing. 
Heat-related illnesses range from heat exhaustion 
to kidney stones.275,276 
Heat is already the leading cause of weather-related 
deaths in the United States. More than 3,400 deaths 
between 1999 and 2003 were reported as result-
ing from exposure to excessive heat.277 An analysis 
of nine U.S. cities shows that deaths due to heat 
increase with rising temperature and humidity.278 
From the 1970s to the 1990s, however, heat-related 
deaths declined.279 This likely resulted from a rapid 
increase in the use of air conditioning. In 1978, 44 
percent of households were without air condition-
ing, whereas in 2005, only 16 percent of the U.S. 
population lived without it (and only 3 percent did 
not have it in the South).280,281 With air conditioning 
reaching near saturation, a recent study found that 
the general decline in heat-related deaths seems to 
have leveled off since the mid-1990s.282 
Increases in heat-related deaths are projected in cities 
around the nation, especially under higher emissions 
scenarios.91 This analysis included some, but not all 
possible, adaptation measures. The graph shows the 
projected number of deaths per year, averaged over a 
three-decade period around 1975, 2055, and 2085 for the 
City of Chicago under lower and higher emissions.91 
Hayhoe et al.283
Projected Increase in  
Heat-Related Deaths in Chicago
Number of Days Over 100°F
The number of days in which the temperature exceeds 
100°F by late this century, compared to the 1960s and 
1970s, is projected to increase strongly across the 
United States. For example, parts of Texas that recently 
experienced about 10 to 20 days per year over 100°F are 
expected to experience more than 100 days per year in 
which the temperature exceeds 100°F by the end of the 
century under the higher emissions scenario.91
CMIP3-B117
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Adaptation:   Reducing Deaths During Heat Waves
In the mid-1990s, Philadelphia became the first U.S. city to implement a system for reducing the risk 
of death during heat waves. The city focuses its efforts on the elderly, homeless, and poor. During 
a heat wave, a heat alert is issued and news organizations are provided with tips on how vulnerable 
people can protect themselves. The health department and thousands of block captains use a buddy 
system to check on elderly residents in their homes; electric utilities voluntarily refrain from shutting 
off services for non-payment; and public cooling places extend their hours. The city operates a 
“Heatline” where nurses are standing by to assist callers experiencing health problems; if callers 
are deemed “at risk,” mobile units are dispatched to the residence. The city has also implemented 
a “Cool Homes Program” for elderly, low-income residents, which provides measures such as roof 
coatings and roof insulation that save energy and lower indoor temperatures. Philadelphia’s system is 
estimated to have saved 117 lives over its first 3 years of operation.287,288 
As human-induced warming is projected to raise 
average temperatures by about 6 to 11°F in this 
century under a higher emissions scenario,91 heat 
waves are expected to continue to increase in 
frequency, severity, and duration.68,112 For example, 
by the end of this century, the number of heat-wave 
days in Los Angeles is projected to double,284 and 
the number in Chicago to quadruple,285 if emissions 
are not reduced.
Projections for Chicago suggest that the average 
number of deaths due to heat waves would more 
than double by 2050 under a lower emissions 
scenario91 and quadruple under a high emissions 
scenario91 (see figure page 90).283 
A study of climate change impacts in California 
projects that, by the 2090s, annual heat-related 
deaths in Los Angeles would increase by two to 
three times under a lower emissions scenario and 
by five to seven times under a higher emissions 
scenario, compared to a 1990s baseline of about 
165 deaths. These estimates assume that people 
will have become somewhat more accustomed to 
higher temperatures. Without such acclimatization, 
these estimates are projected to be about 20 to 25 
percent higher.284
The full effect of global warming on heat-related 
illness and death involves a number of factors 
including actual changes in temperature (averages, 
highs, and lows); and human population character-
istics, such as age, wealth, and fitness. In addition, 
adaptation at the scale of a city includes options 
such as heat wave early warning systems, urban 
design to reduce heat loads, and enhanced services 
during heat waves.163
Reduced extreme cold
In a warmer world, the number of deaths caused 
by extremely low temperatures would be expected 
to drop, although in general, it is uncertain how 
climate change will affect net mortality.163 Never-
theless, a recent study that analyzed daily mortality 
and weather data with regard to 6,513,330 deaths 
in 50 U.S. cities between 1989 and 2000 shows a 
marked difference between deaths resulting from 
hot and cold temperatures. The researchers found 
that, on average, cold snaps increased death rates 
Urban Heat Island Effect
Large amounts of concrete and asphalt in cities absorb and hold heat. 
Tall buildings prevent heat from dissipating and reduce air flow. At 
the same time, there is generally little vegetation to provide shade 
and evaporative cooling. As a result, parts of cities can be up to 
10ºF warmer than the surrounding rural areas, compounding the 
temperature increases that people experience as a result of human-
induced warming.313
Lemmen and Warren286
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by 1.6 percent, while heat waves triggered a 5.7 per-
cent increase in death rates.289 The analysis found 
that the reduction in deaths as a result of relatively 
milder winters attributable to global warming will 
be substantially less than the increase in deaths due 
to summertime heat extremes.
Many factors contribute to winter deaths, includ-
ing highly seasonal diseases such as influenza and 
pneumonia. It is unclear how these diseases are 
affected by temperature.163
Warming is likely to make it more 
challenging to meet air quality standards 
necessary to protect public health. 
Poor air quality, especially in cities, is a serious 
concern across the United States. Half of all Ameri-
cans, 158 million people, live in counties where 
air pollution exceeds national health standards.290 
While the Clean Air Act has improved air qual-
ity, higher temperatures and associated stagnant 
air masses are expected to make it more challeng-
ing to meet air quality standards, particularly for 
ground-level ozone (a component of smog).13 It 
Projected Change in Ground-Level Ozone, 2090s
The maps show projected changes in ground-level ozone (a component of smog) for the 2090s, averaged over the sum-
mer months (June through August), relative to 1996-2000, under lower and higher emissions scenarios, which include 
both greenhouse gases and emissions that lead to ozone formation (some of which decrease under the lower emissions 
scenario).91 By themselves, higher temperatures and other projected climate changes would increase ozone levels under 
both scenarios. However, the maps indicate that future projections of ozone depend heavily on emissions, with the higher 
emissions scenario91 increasing ozone by large amounts, while the lower emissions scenario91 results in an overall decrease 
in ground-level ozone by the end of the century.291
Tao et al.291
Temperature and Ozone
The graphs illustrate the observed association between ground-level 
ozone (a component of smog) concentration in parts per billion (ppb) 
and temperature in Atlanta and New York City (May to October 1988 
to 1990).219 The projected higher temperatures across the United 
States in this century are likely to increase the occurrence of high 
ozone concentrations, although this will also depend on emissions of 
ozone precursors and meteorological factors. Ground-level ozone 
can exacerbate respiratory diseases and cause short-term reductions 
in lung function.
NAST219
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has been firmly established that breathing ozone 
results in short-term decreases in lung function and 
damages the cells lining the lungs. It also increases 
the incidence of asthma-related hospital visits and 
premature deaths.272 Vulnerability to ozone effects 
is greater for those who spend time outdoors, espe-
cially with physical exertion, because this results 
in a higher cumulative dose to their lungs. As a 
result, children, outdoor workers, and athletes are 
at higher risk for these ailments.163 
Ground-level ozone concentrations are affected by 
many factors including weather conditions, emis-
sions of gases from vehicles and industry that lead 
Adaptation:   Improving Urban Air Quality
Because ground-level ozone is related to temperature (see figure at top of previous page), air 
quality is projected to become worse with human-induced climate change. Many areas in the 
country already have plans in place for responding to air quality problems. For example, the Air 
Quality Alert program in Rhode Island encourages residents to reduce air pollutant emissions by 
limiting car travel and the use of small engines, lawn mowers, and charcoal lighter fluids on days 
when ground-level ozone is high. Television weather reports include alerts when ground-level 
ozone is high, warning especially susceptible people to limit their time outdoors. To help cut down 
on the use of cars, all regular bus routes are free on Air Quality Alert days.295
Pennsylvania offers the following suggestions for high ozone days:
Refuel vehicles after dark. Avoid spilling gasoline and stop fueling when the pump shuts off • 
automatically.
Conserve energy. Do not overcool homes. Turn off lights and appliances that are not in use. • 
Wash clothes and dishes only in full loads.
Limit daytime driving. Consider carpooling or taking public transportation. Properly maintain • 
vehicles, which also helps to save fuel.
Limit outdoor activities, such as mowing the lawn or playing sports, to the evening hours.• 
Avoid burning leaves, trash, and other materials.• 
Traffic restrictions imposed during the 1996 summer Olympics in Atlanta quantified the direct 
respiratory health benefits of reducing the number of cars and the amount of their tailpipe 
emissions from an urban environment. Peak morning traffic decreased by 23 percent, and peak 
ozone levels dropped by 28 percent. As a result, childhood asthma-related emergency room visits 
fell by 42 percent.296 
Californians currently experience the worst air 
quality in the nation. More than 90 percent of the 
population lives in areas that violate state air quality 
standards for ground-level ozone or small particles. These 
pollutants cause an estimated 8,800 deaths and over a billion 
dollars in health care costs every year in California.292 Higher 
temperatures are projected to increase the frequency, intensity, 
and duration of conditions conducive to air pollution formation, 
potentially increasing the number of days conducive to air pollution by 75 
to 85 percent in Los Angeles and the San Joaquin Valley, toward the end of this 
century, under a higher emissions scenario, and by 25 to 35 percent under a lower 
emissions scenario.293 Air quality could be further compromised by wildfires, which are 
already increasing as a result of warming.252,294
Spotlight on Air Quality  
in California
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to ozone formation (especially nitrogen oxides 
and volatile organic compounds [VOCs]), natu-
ral emissions of VOCs from plants, and pollution 
blown in from other places.290,297 A warmer climate 
is projected to increase the natural emissions of 
VOCs, accelerate ozone formation, and increase the 
frequency and duration of stagnant air masses that 
allow pollution to accumulate, which will exacer-
bate health symptoms.298 Increased temperatures 
and water vapor due to human-induced carbon di-
oxide emissions have been found to increase ozone 
more in areas with already elevated concentrations, 
meaning that global warming tends to exacerbate 
ozone pollution most in already polluted areas. Un-
der constant pollutant emissions, by the middle of 
this century, Red Ozone Alert Days (when the air 
is unhealthy for everyone) in the 50 largest cities in 
the eastern United States are projected to increase 
by 68 percent due to warming alone.298 Such condi-
tions would challenge the ability of communities 
to meet health-based air quality standards such as 
those in the Clean Air Act. 
Health risks from heat waves and air pollution 
are not necessarily independent. The formation of 
ground-level ozone occurs under hot and stagnant 
conditions – essentially the same weather condi-
tions accompanying heat waves (see box page 102). 
Such interactions among risk factors are likely to 
increase as climate change continues.
Extreme weather events cause physical 
and mental health problems. Some of 
these events are projected to increase.
Injury, illness, emotional trauma, and death are 
known to result from extreme weather events.68 
The number and intensity of some of these events 
are already increasing and are projected to increase 
further in the future.68,112 Human health impacts in 
the United States are generally expected to be less 
severe than in poorer countries where the emergen-
cy preparedness and public health infrastructure 
is less developed. For example, early warning and 
evacuation systems and effective sanitation lessen 
the health impacts of extreme events.68 
This assumes that medical and emergency relief 
systems in the United States will function well and 
that timely and effective adaptation measures will 
be developed and deployed. There have already 
been serious failures of these systems in the af-
termath of hurricanes Katrina and Rita, so coping 
with future impacts will require significant  
improvements.
Extreme storms
Over 2,000 Americans were killed in the 2005 
hurricane season, more than double the average 
number of lives lost to hurricanes in the United 
States over the previous 65 years.163 But the human 
health impacts of extreme storms go beyond direct 
injury and death to indirect effects such as carbon 
monoxide poisoning from portable electric genera-
tors in use following hurricanes, an increase in 
stomach and intestinal illness among evacuees, and 
mental health impacts such as depression and post-
traumatic stress disorder.163 Failure to fully account 
for both direct and indirect health impacts might 
result in inadequate preparation for and response to 
future extreme weather events.163 
Floods
Heavy downpours have increased in recent decades 
and are projected to increase further as the world 
continues to warm.68,112 In the United States, the 
amount of precipitation falling in the heaviest 1 
percent of rain events increased by 20 percent in 
the past century, while total precipitation increased 
by 7 percent. Over the last century, there was a 
50 percent increase in the frequency of days with 
precipitation over 4 inches in the upper Midwest.112 
Other regions, notably the South, have also seen 
strong increases in heavy downpours, with most of 
these coming in the warm season and almost all of 
the increase coming in the last few decades.
Heavy rains can lead to flooding, which can cause 
health impacts including direct injuries as well as 
increased incidence of waterborne diseases due to 
pathogens such as Cryptosporidium and Giardia.163 
Downpours can trigger sewage overflows, contami-
nating drinking water and endangering beachgoers. 
The consequences will be particularly severe in the 
roughly 770 U.S. cities and towns, including New 
York, Chicago, Washington DC, Milwaukee, and 
Philadelphia, that have “combined sewer systems;” 
an older design that carries storm water and sew-
age in the same pipes.299 During heavy rains, these 
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systems often cannot handle the volume, and  
raw sewage spills into lakes or waterways, includ-
ing drinking-water supplies and places where 
people swim.252
In 1994, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) established a policy that mandates that 
communities substantially reduce or eliminate 
their combined sewer overflow, but this mandate 
remains unfulfilled.300 In 2004, the EPA estimated 
it would cost $55 billion to correct combined sewer 
overflow problems in publicly owned wastewater 
treatment systems.301
Using 2.5 inches of precipitation in one day as the 
threshold for initiating a combined sewer overflow 
event, the frequency of these events in Chicago is 
expected to rise by 50 percent to 120 percent by the 
end of this century,302 posing further risks to drink-
ing and recreational water quality.
Wildfires
Wildfires in the United States are already increas-
ing due to warming. In the West, there has been 
a nearly fourfold increase in large wildfires in 
recent decades, with greater fire frequency, lon-
ger fire durations, and longer wildfire seasons. 
This increase is strongly associated with increased 
spring and summer temperatures and earlier spring 
snowmelt, which have caused drying of soils and 
vegetation.163,252,294 In addition to direct injuries and 
deaths due to burns, wildfires can cause eye  
and respiratory illnesses due to fire-related  
air pollution.163
Some diseases transmitted by food, 
water, and insects are likely to increase. 
A number of important disease-causing agents 
(pathogens) commonly transmitted by food, water, 
The first outbreak of West Nile virus in the United States occurred 
in the summer of 1999, likely a result of international air transport. 
Within five years, the disease had spread across the continental United 
States, transmitted by mosquitoes that acquire the virus from infected 
birds. While bird migrations were the primary mode of disease spread, 
during the epidemic summers of 2002 to 2004, epicenters of West Nile virus 
were linked to locations with either drought or above average temperatures. 
Since 1999, West Nile virus has caused over 28,000 reported cases, and over 1,100 
Americans have died from it.303 During 2002, a more virulent strain of West Nile virus 
emerged in the United States. Recent analyses indicate that this mutated strain responds strongly 
to higher temperatures, 
suggesting that greater risks 
from the disease may result 
from increases in the frequency 
of heatwaves,304 though the 
risk will also depend on the 
effectiveness of mosquito 
control programs.
While West Nile virus causes 
mild flu-like symptoms in 
most people, about one in 
150 infected people develop 
serious illness, including the 
brain inflammation diseases 
encephalitis and meningitis. 
U.S. Global Change Research Program
96 97
Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States Human Health
or animals are susceptible to changes in replication, 
survival, persistence, habitat range, and transmis-
sion as a result of changing climatic conditions 
such as increasing temperature, precipitation, and 
extreme weather events.163 
Cases of food poisoning due to • Salmonella and 
other bacteria peak within one to six weeks of 
the highest reported ambient temperatures.163
Cases of waterborne • Cryptosporidium and 
Giardia increase following heavy downpours. 
These parasites can be transmitted in drinking 
water and through recreational water use.163 
Climate change affects the life cycle and dis-• 
tribution of the mosquitoes, ticks, and rodents 
that carry West Nile virus, equine encephali-
tis, Lyme disease, and hantavirus. However, 
moderating factors such as housing quality, 
land use patterns, pest control programs, and a 
robust public health infrastructure are likely to 
prevent the large-scale spread of these diseases 
in the United States.163,305
Heavy rain and flooding can contaminate • 
certain food crops with feces from nearby 
livestock or wild animals, increasing the 
likelihood of food-borne disease associated 
with fresh produce.163
Vibrio•	  sp. (shellfish poisoning) accounts for 20 
percent of the illnesses and 95 percent of 
the deaths associated with eating infected 
shellfish, although the overall incidence 
of illness from Vibrio infection remains 
low. There is a close association between 
temperature, Vibrio sp. abundance, and 
clinical illness. The U.S. infection rate 
increased 41 percent from 1996 to 2006,163 
concurrent with rising temperatures. 
As temperatures rise, tick populations that • 
carry Rocky Mountain spotted fever are 
projected to shift from south to north.306 
The introduction of disease-causing agents • 
from other regions of the world is an 
additional threat.163 
While the United States has programs such as 
the Safe Drinking Water Act that help protect 
against some of these problems, climate change 
will present new challenges. 
Rising temperature and carbon 
dioxide concentration increase pollen 
production and prolong the pollen 
season in a number of plants with  
highly allergenic pollen, presenting a 
health risk.
Rising carbon dioxide levels have been observed to 
increase the growth and toxicity of some plants that 
cause health problems. Climate change has caused 
an earlier onset of the spring pollen season in the 
United States.272 It is reasonable to conclude that 
allergies caused by pollen have also experienced 
associated changes in seasonality.272 Several labora-
tory studies suggest that increasing carbon dixoide 
concentrations and temperatures increase ragweed 
pollen production and prolong the ragweed 
pollen season.163,272
Poison ivy growth and toxicity is also greatly 
increased by carbon dioxide, with plants growing 
larger and more allergenic. These increases exceed 
those of most beneficial plants. For example, poison 
ivy vines grow twice as much per year in air with 
a doubled preindustrial carbon dioxide concentra-
tion as they do in unaltered air; this is nearly five 
times the increase reported for tree species in 
Pollen Counts Rise with  
Increasing Carbon Dioxide
Pollen production from ragweed grown in chambers at the carbon 
dioxide concentration of a century ago (about 280 parts per million 
[ppm]) was about 5 grams per plant; at today’s approximate carbon 
dioxide level, it was about 10 grams; and at a level projected to 
occur about 2075 under the higher emissions scenario,91 it was 
about 20 grams.307
Ziska and Caulfield307
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other analyses.308 Recent and projected increases in 
carbon dioxide also have been shown to stimulate 
the growth of stinging nettle and leafy spurge, two 
weeds that cause rashes when they come into con-
tact with human skin.309,310
Certain groups, including children, 
the elderly, and the poor, are most 
vulnerable to a range of climate-related 
health effects. 
Infants and children, pregnant women, the elderly, 
people with chronic medical conditions, outdoor 
workers, and people living in poverty are especially 
at risk from a variety of climate related health ef-
fects. Examples of these effects include increasing 
heat stress, air pollution, extreme weather events, 
and diseases carried by food, water, and insects.163 
Children’s small ratio of body mass to surface area 
and other factors make them vulnerable to heat-
related illness and death. Their increased breathing 
rate relative to body size, additional time spent out-
doors, and developing respiratory tracts, heighten 
their sensitivity to air pollution. In addition, chil-
dren’s immature immune systems increase their 
risk of serious consequences from waterborne and 
food-borne diseases, while developmental factors 
make them more vulnerable to complications from 
severe infections such as E. coli or Salmonella.163
The greatest health burdens related to climate 
change are likely to fall on the poor, especially 
Poison ivy
those lacking adequate shelter and access to other 
resources such as air conditioning.163
Elderly people are more likely to have debilitating 
chronic diseases or limited mobility. The elderly 
are also generally more sensitive to extreme heat 
for several reasons. They have a reduced ability to 
regulate their own body temperature or sense when 
they are too hot. They are at greater risk of heart 
failure, which is further exacerbated when cardiac 
demand increases in order to cool the body during 
a heat wave.318 Also, people taking medications, 
such as diuretics for high blood pressure, have a 
higher risk of dehydration.163 
The multiple health risks associated with diabetes 
will increase the vulnerability of the U.S. popula-
tion to increasing temperatures. The number of 
Americans with diabetes has grown to about 24 
million people, or roughly 8 percent of the U.S. 
population. Almost 25 percent of the population 
60 years and older had diabetes in 2007.311 Fluid 
imbalance and dehydration create higher risks for 
diabetics during heat waves. People with diabetes-
related heart disease are at especially increased risk 
of dying in heat waves.318
High obesity rates in the United States are a con-
tributing factor in currently high levels of diabe-
tes. Similarly, a factor in rising obesity rates is a 
sedentary lifestyle and automobile dependence; 60 
percent of Americans do not meet minimum daily 
exercise requirements. Making cities more walk-
able and bikeable would thus have multiple ben-
efits: improved personal fitness and weight loss; 
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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reduced local air pollution and associated respirato-
ry illness; and reduced greenhouse gas emissions.312 
The United States has considerable capacity to 
adapt to climate change, but during recent extreme 
weather and climate events, actual practices have 
not always protected people and property. Vulner-
ability to extreme events is highly variable, with 
disadvantaged groups and communities (such as the 
poor, infirm, and elderly) experiencing consider-
able damage and disruptions to their lives. Adapta-
tion tends to be reactive, unevenly distributed, and 
focused on coping rather than preventing problems. 
Future reduction in vulnerability will require 
consideration of how best to incorporate planned 
adaptation into long-term municipal and public ser-
vice planning, including energy, water, and health 
services, in the face of changing climate-related 
risks combined with ongoing changes in population 
and development patterns.163,164 
Geographic Vulnerability of U.S. Residents to  
Selected Climate-Related Health Impacts
Maps indicating U.S. counties, or in some cases states, with existing vulnerability to climate-sensitive health out-
comes: a) location of hurricane landfalls; b) extreme heat events (defined by the Centers for Disease Control 
as temperatures 10 or more degrees F above the average high temperature for the region and lasting for sev-
eral weeks); c) percentage of population over age 65 (dark blue indicates that percentage is over 17.6 percent, light 
blue 14.4 to 17.5 percent); d) locations of West Nile virus cases reported in 2004. These examples demonstrate 
both the diversity of climate-sensitive health outcomes and the geographic variability of where they occur. Events 
over short time spans, in particular West Nile virus cases, are not necessarily predictive of future vulnerability.
CCSP SAP 4.6163
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Key Messages:
Population shifts and development choices are making more Americans • 
vulnerable to the expected impacts of climate change.
Vulnerability is greater for those who have few resources and few choices. • 
City residents and city infrastructure have unique vulnerabilities to • 
climate change.
Climate change affects communities through changes in climate-sensitive • 
resources that occur both locally and at great distances.
Insurance is one of the industries particularly vulnerable to increasing • 
extreme weather events such as severe storms, but it can also help 
society manage the risks.
The United States is connected to a world that is unevenly vulnerable to • 
climate change and thus will be affected by impacts in other parts of  
the world.
Climate change will affect society through impacts 
on the necessities and comforts of life: water, energy, 
housing, transportation, food, natural ecosystems, and 
health. This section focuses on some characteristics of 
society that make it vulnerable to the potential impacts 
of climate change and how the risks and costs may be 
distributed. Many impacts of climate change on society, 
for example, sea-level rise and increased water scarcity, 
are covered in other sections of this report. This section 
is not a comprehensive analysis of societal vulnerabili-
ties, but rather highlights key examples.
Because societies and their built environments have de-
veloped under a climate that has fluctuated within 
a relatively confined range of conditions, most 
impacts of a rapidly changing climate will pres-
ent challenges. Society is especially vulnerable to 
extremes, such as heat waves and floods, many of 
which are increasing as climate changes.313 And 
while there are likely to be some benefits and 
opportunities in the early stages of warming, as 
climate continues to change, negative impacts are 
projected to dominate.164
Climate change will affect different segments 
of society differently because of their varying 
exposures and adaptive capacities. The impacts 
of climate change also do not affect society in 
isolation. Rather, impacts can be exacerbated when 
climate change occurs in combination with the effects 
of an aging and growing population, pollution, poverty, 
and natural environmental fluctuations.164,172,274 Unequal 
adaptive capacity in the world as a whole also will pose 
challenges to the United States. Poorer countries are 
projected to be disproportionately affected by the im-
pacts of climate change and the United States is strongly 
connected to the world beyond its borders through 
markets, trade, investments, shared resources, migrat-
ing species, health, travel and tourism, environmental 
refugees (those fleeing deteriorating environmental 
conditions), and security.
Cedar Rapids, Iowa, June 12, 2008
Key Sources
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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Population shifts and development 
choices are making more Americans 
vulnerable to the expected impacts of 
climate change. 
Climate is one of the key factors in Americans’ 
choices of where to live. As the U.S. population 
grows, ages, and becomes further concentrated 
in cities and coastal areas, society is faced with 
additional challenges. Climate change is likely to 
exacerbate these challenges as changes in tempera-
ture, precipitation, sea levels, and extreme weather 
events increasingly affect homes, communities, 
water supplies, land resources, transportation, ur-
ban infrastructure, and regional characteristics that 
people have come to value and depend on. 
Population growth in the United States over the 
past century has been most rapid in the South, near 
the coasts, and in large urban areas (see figure on 
page 55 in the Energy sector). The four most popu-
lous states in 2000 – California, Texas, Florida, and 
New York – accounted for 38 percent of the total 
growth in U.S. population during that time, and 
share significant vulnerability to coastal storms, 
severe drought, sea-level rise, air pollution, and ur-
ban heat island effects.313 But migration patterns are 
now shifting: the population of the Mountain West 
(Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, Colo-
rado, Arizona, and New Mexico) is projected to in-
crease by 65 percent from 2000 to 2030, represent-
ing one-third of all U.S. population growth.274,314 
Southern coastal areas on both the Atlantic and 
the Gulf of Mexico are projected to continue to see 
population growth.313 
Overlaying projections of future climate change and 
its impacts on expected changes in U.S. population 
and development patterns reveals a critical insight: 
more Americans will be living in the areas that are 
most vulnerable to the effects of climate change.274
America’s coastlines have seen pronounced popu-
lation growth in regions most at risk of hurricane 
activity, sea-level rise, and storm surge – putting 
more people and property in harm’s way as the 
probability of harm increases.274 On the Atlantic 
and Gulf coasts where hurricane activity is preva-
lent, the coastal land in many areas is sinking while 
sea level is rising. Human activities are exacerbat-
ing the loss of coastal wetlands that once helped 
buffer the coastline from erosion due to storms. The 
devastation caused by recent hurricanes highlights 
the vulnerability of these areas.224 
The most rapidly growing area of the country is 
the Mountain West, a region projected to face more 
frequent and severe wildfires and have less water 
available, particularly during the high-demand 
period of summer. Continued population growth in 
these arid and semi-arid regions would stress water 
supplies. Because of high demand for irrigating ag-
riculture, overuse of rivers and streams is common 
in the arid West, particularly along the Front Range 
of the Rocky Mountains in Colorado, in Southern 
California, and in the Central Valley of California. 
Rapid population and economic growth in these 
arid and semi-arid regions has dramatically in-
creased vulnerability to water shortages (see Water 
Resources sector and Southwest region).274 
Many questions are raised by ongoing development 
patterns in the face of climate change. Will growth 
continue as projected in vulnerable areas, despite 
the risks? Will there be a retreat from the coastline 
as it becomes more difficult to insure vulnerable 
properties? Will there be pressure for the govern-
ment to insure properties that private insurers 
have rejected? How can the vulnerability of new 
development be minimized? How can we ensure 
that communities adopt measures to manage the 
significant changes that are projected in sea level, 
temperature, rainfall, and extreme weather events? 
Development choices are based on people’s needs 
and desires for places to live, economies that pro-
vide employment, ecosystems that provide services, 
and community-based social activities. Thus, the 
future vulnerability of society will be influenced 
by how and where people choose to live. Some 
choices, such as expanded development in coastal 
regions, can increase vulnerabilities to climate-
related events, even without any change in climate.
Vulnerability is greater for those who 
have few resources and few choices.  
Vulnerabilities to climate change depend not only 
on where people are but also on their circumstanc-
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es. In general, groups that are especially vul-
nerable include the very young, the very old, 
the sick, and the poor. These groups represent a 
more significant portion of the total population 
in some regions and localities than others. For 
example, the elderly more often cite a warm 
climate as motivating their choice of where 
to live and thus make up a larger share of the 
population in warmer areas.305
In the future (as in the past), the impacts of 
climate change are likely to fall disproportion-
ately on the disadvantaged.313  People with few 
resources often live in conditions that increase 
their vulnerability to the effects of climate 
change.172 For example, the experience with 
Hurricane Katrina showed that the poor and 
elderly were the most vulnerable because of 
where they lived and their limited ability to 
get out of harm’s way. Thus, those who had 
the least proportionately lost the most. And it is 
clear that people with access to financial resources, 
including insurance, have a greater capacity to 
adapt to, recover, or escape from adverse impacts 
of climate change than those who do not have such 
access.305, 316 The fate of the poor can be permanent 
dislocation, leading to the loss of social relation-
ships and community support networks provided 
by schools, churches, and neighborhoods. 
Native American communities have unique vul-
nerabilities. Native Americans who live on estab-
lished reservations are restricted to reservation 
boundaries and therefore have limited relocation 
options.219 In Alaska, over 100 villages on the coast 
and in low-lying areas along rivers are subject to 
increased flooding and erosion due to warming.315 
Warming also reduces the availability and acces-
sibility of many traditional food sources for Native 
Alaskans, such as seals that live on ice and caribou 
whose migration patterns depend on being able to 
cross frozen rivers and wetlands. These vulnerable 
people face losing their current livelihoods, their 
communities, and in some cases, their culture, 
which depends on traditional ways of collect-
ing and sharing food.132,220 Native cultures in the 
Southwest are particularly vulnerable to impacts of 
climate change on water quality and availability. 
City residents and city infrastructure 
have unique vulnerabilities to  
climate change.
Over 80 percent of the U.S. population resides in 
urban areas, which are among the most rapidly 
changing environments on Earth. In recent de-
cades, cities have become increasingly spread out, 
complex, and interconnected with regional and 
national economies and infrastructure.319 Cities 
also experience a host of social problems, includ-
ing neighborhood degradation, traffic congestion, 
crime, unemployment, poverty, and inequities in 
health and well-being.320 Climate-related changes 
such as increased heat, water shortages, and 
extreme weather events will add further stress to 
existing problems. The impacts of climate change 
on cities are compounded by aging infrastructure, 
buildings, and populations, as well as air pollu-
tion and population growth. Further, infrastructure 
designed to handle past variations in climate can 
instill a false confidence in its ability to handle 
future changes. However, urban areas also present 
opportunities for adaptation through technology, 
infrastructure, planning, and design.313 
As cities grow, they alter local climates through the 
urban heat island effect. This effect occurs because 
cities absorb, produce, and retain more heat than 
the surrounding countryside. The urban heat island 
Chalmette, Louisiana after Hurricane 
Katrina
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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effect has raised average urban air temperatures 
by 2 to 5°F more than surrounding areas over the 
past 100 years, and by up to 20°F more at night.321 
Such temperature increases, on top of the general 
increase caused by human-induced warming, affect 
urban dwellers in many ways, influencing health, 
comfort, energy costs, air quality, water quality 
and availability, and even violent crime (which 
increases at high temperatures) (see Human Health, 
Energy, and Water Resources sectors).172,313,322,323
More frequent heavy downpours and floods in 
urban areas will cause greater property damage, a 
heavier burden on emergency management, in-
creased clean-up and rebuilding costs, and a grow-
ing financial toll on businesses and homeowners. 
The Midwest floods of 2008 provide a recent vivid 
example of such tolls. Heavy downpours and urban 
floods can also overwhelm combined sewer and 
storm-water systems and release pollutants to wa-
terways.313 Unfortunately, for many cities, current 
planning and existing infrastructure are designed 
for the historical one-in-100 year event, whereas 
cities are likely to experience this same flood level 
much more frequently as a result of the climate 
change projected over this century.146,164,324 
Cities are also likely to be affected by climate 
change in unforeseen ways, necessitating diversion 
of city funds for emergency responses to extreme 
weather.313 There is the potential for increased sum-
mer electricity blackouts owing to greater demand 
for air conditioning.325 For example, there were 
widespread power outages in Chicago during the 
1995 heat wave and in some parts of New York City 
during the 1999 heat wave. In southern California’s 
cities, additional summer electricity demand will 
intensify conflicts between hydropower and flood-
control objectives.164 Increased costs of repairs 
and maintenance are projected for transportation 
systems, including roads, railways, and airports, as 
they are negatively affected by heavy downpours 
Heat, Drought, and Stagnant Air Degrade Air Quality and Quality of Life
Heat waves and poor air quality already threaten the lives of thousands of people each year.292 Experience 
and research have shown that these events are interrelated as the atmospheric conditions that produce 
heat waves are often accompanied by stagnant air and poor air quality.326 The simultaneous occurrence of 
heat waves, drought, and stagnant air negatively affects quality of life, especially in cities. 
One such event occurred in the United States during the summer of 1988, causing 5,000 to 10,000 deaths 
and economic losses of more than $70 billion (in 2002 dollars).229,327 Half of the nation was affected by 
drought, and 5,994 all-time daily high temperature 
records were set around the country in July alone 
(more than three times the most recent 10-year 
average).328,329 Poor air quality resulting from the lack 
of rainfall, high temperatures, and stagnant conditions 
led to an unprecedented number of unhealthy air 
quality days throughout large parts of the country.327,329 
Continued climate change is projected to increase the 
likelihood of such episodes.68,330 
Interactions such as those between heat wave and 
drought will affect adaptation planning. For example, 
electricity use increases during heat waves due to 
increased air conditioning demand.330,331 During 
droughts, cooling water availability is at its lowest. 
Thus, during a simultaneous heat wave and drought, 
electricity demand for cooling will be high when power 
plant cooling water availability is at its lowest.340
The map shows the frequency of occurrence of stagnant 
air conditions when heat wave conditions were also 
present. Since 1950, across the Southeast, southern Great 
Plains, and most of the West, the air was stagnant more 
than 25 percent of the time during heat waves.
NOAA/NCDC333
Stagnation When Heat Waves Exist 
Summer, 1950 to 2007
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and extreme heat190 (see Transportation sector). 
Coping with increased flooding will require re-
placement or improvements in storm drains, flood 
channels, levees, and dams.
In addition, coastal cities are also vulnerable to 
sea-level rise, storm surge, and increased hurricane 
intensity. Cities such as New Orleans, Miami, and 
New York are particularly at risk, and would have 
difficulty coping with the sea-level rise projected 
by the end of the century under a higher emissions 
scenario.91,164 Remnants of hurricanes moving in-
land also threaten cities of the Appalachian Moun-
tains, which are vulnerable if hurricane frequency 
or intensity increases. Since most large U.S. cities 
are on coasts, rivers, or both, climate change will 
lead to increased potential flood damage. The larg-
est impacts are expected when sea-level rise, heavy 
runoff, high tides, and storms coincide.313 Analyses 
of New York and Boston indicate that the potential 
impacts of climate change are likely to be negative, 
but that vulnerability can be reduced by behavioral 
and policy changes.313,334-336 
Urban areas concentrate the human activities that 
are largely responsible for heat-trapping emissions. 
The demands of urban residents are also associated 
with a much larger footprint on areas far removed 
from these population centers.337 On the other hand, 
concentrating activities such as transportation can 
make them more efficient. Cities have a large role 
to play in reducing heat-trapping emissions, and 
many are pursuing such actions. For example, over 
900 cities have committed to the U.S. Mayors’ Cli-
mate Protection Agreement to advance emissions 
reduction goals.317 
Cities also have considerable potential to adapt to 
climate change through technological, institutional, 
structural, and behavioral changes. For example, a 
number of cities have warning programs in place 
to reduce heat-related illness and death (see Human 
Health sector). Relocating development away from 
low-lying areas, building new infrastructure with 
future sea-level rise in mind, and promoting water 
conservation are examples of structural and institu-
tional strategies. Choosing road materials that can 
handle higher temperatures is an adaptation option 
that relies on new technology (see Transportation 
sector). Cities can reduce heat loads by increasing 
reflective surfaces and green spaces. Some actions 
have multiple benefits. For example, increased 
planting of trees and other vegetation in cities has 
been shown to be associated with a reduction in 
crime,338 in addition to reducing local temperatures, 
and thus energy demand for air conditioning.
Human well-being is influenced by economic 
conditions, natural resources and amenities, public 
health and safety, infrastructure, government, and 
social and cultural resources. Climate change will 
influence all of these, but an understanding of the 
many interacting impacts, as well as the ways soci-
ety can adapt to them, remains in its infancy.305,339 
Climate change affects communities 
through changes in climate-sensitive 
resources that occur both locally and  
at great distances.
Human communities are intimately connected to 
resources beyond their geographical boundaries. 
Thus, communities will be vulnerable to the poten-
tial impacts of climate change on sometimes-distant 
resources. For example, communities that have de-
veloped near areas of agricultural production, such 
as the Midwest corn belt or the wine-producing 
regions of California and the Northwest, depend on 
the continued productivity of those regions, which 
would be compromised by increased temperature 
or severe weather.313 Some agricultural production 
that is linked to cold climates is likely to disappear 
entirely: recent warming has altered the required 
temperature patterns for maple syrup production, 
Rising Heat Index in Phoenix
The average number of hours per summer day in Phoenix 
that the temperature was over 100°F has doubled over the 
past 50 years, in part as a result of the urban heat island 
effect. Hot days take a toll on both quality of life and loss 
of life. Arizona’s heat-related deaths are the highest of any 
state, at three to seven times the national average.340,341
Baker et al.340
U.S. Global Change Research Program
104 105
Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States Society
shifting production northward from New England 
into Canada. Similarly, cranberries require a long 
winter chill period, which is shrinking as climate 
warms234 (see Northeast region). Most cities de-
pend on water supplies from distant watersheds, 
and those depending on diminishing supplies (such 
as the Sierra Nevada snowpack) are vulnerable. 
Northwest communities also depend upon forest 
resources for their economic base, and many  
island, coastal, and “sunbelt” communities depend 
on tourism. 
Recreation and tourism play important roles in the 
economy and quality of life of many Americans. 
In some regions tourism and recreation are major 
job creators, bringing billions of dollars to regional 
economies. Across the nation, fishing, hunting, 
skiing, snowmobiling, diving, beach-going, and 
other outdoor activities make important economic 
contributions and are a part of family traditions 
that have value that goes beyond financial returns. 
A changing climate will mean reduced opportuni-
ties for some activities and locations and expanded 
opportunities for others.305,342 Hunting and fish-
ing will change as animals’ habitats shift and as 
relationships among species in natural communities 
are disrupted by their different responses to rapid 
climate change. Water-dependent recreation in 
areas projected to get drier, such as the Southwest, 
and beach recreation in areas that are expected to 
see rising sea levels, will suffer. Some regions will 
see an expansion of the season for warm weather 
recreation such as hiking and bicycle riding.
Insurance is one of the industries 
particularly vulnerable to increasing 
extreme weather events such as severe 
storms, but it can also help society 
manage the risks. 
Insurance – the world’s largest industry – is one of 
the primary mechanisms through which the costs of 
climate change are distributed across society.344,351
Most of the climate change impacts described in 
this report have economic consequences. A signifi-
cant portion of these flow through public and pri-
vate insurance markets, which essentially aggregate 
and distribute society’s risk. Insurance thus pro-
vides a window into the myriad ways in which the 
costs of climate change will manifest, and serves as 
a form of economic adaptation and a messenger of 
these impacts through the terms and price signals it 
sends its customers.344
In an average year, about 90 percent of insured ca-
tastrophe losses worldwide are weather-related. In 
the United States, about half of all these losses are 
insured, which amounted to $320 billion between 
1980 and 2005 (inflation-adjusted to 2005 dollars). 
While major events such as hurricanes grab head-
lines, the aggregate effect of smaller events  
accounts for at least 60 percent of total insured 
losses on average.344 Many of the smallest scale 
property losses and weather-related life/health 
losses are unquantified.345
Escalating exposures to cata-
strophic weather events, coupled 
with private insurers’ withdraw-
al from various markets, are 
placing the federal government 
at increased financial risk as 
insurer of last resort. The Na-
tional Flood Insurance Program 
would have gone bankrupt after 
the storms of 2005 had they not 
been given the ability to borrow 
about $20 billion from the U.S. 
Treasury.172 For public and pri-
vate insurance programs alike, 
rising losses require a combina-
tion of risk-based premiums and 
improved loss prevention.
Recreational 
Activity 
Potential Impacts 
of Climate Change 
Estimated 
Economic Impacts
Skiing, Northeast 20 percent reduction in ski season length
$800 million loss per year, 
potential resort closures234
Snowmobiling, 
Northeast
Reduction of season 
length under higher 
emissions scenario91 
Complete loss of opportunities 
in New York and Pennsylvania 
within a few decades, 80 
percent reduction in season 
length for region by end of 
century234,342
Beaches, North  
Carolina
Many beaches are 
eroded, and some lost  
by 2080343
Reduced opportunities for 
beach and fishing trips,343 
without additional costs for 
adaptation measures
Examples of Impacts On Recreation
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While economic and demographic factors have no doubt 
contributed to observed increases in losses,346 these factors 
do not fully explain the upward trend in costs or numbers of 
events.344,347 For example, during the time period covered in the 
figure to the right, population increased by a factor of 1.3 while 
losses increased by a factor of 15 to 20 in inflation-corrected 
dollars. Analyses asserting little or no role of climate change in 
increasing the risk of losses tend to focus on a highly limited 
set of hazards and locations. They also often fail to account for 
the vagaries of natural cycles and inflation adjustments, or to 
normalize for countervailing factors such as improved pre- and 
post-event loss prevention (such as dikes, building codes, and 
early warning systems).348,349 
What is known with far greater certainty is that future increases 
in losses will be attributable to climate change as it increases 
the frequency and intensity of many types of extreme weather, 
such as severe thunderstorms and heat waves.131,350 
Insurance is emblematic of the increasing globalization of cli-
mate risks. Because large U.S.-based companies operate around 
the world, their customers and assets are exposed to climate 
impacts wherever they occur. Most of the growth in the insur-
ance industry is in emerging markets, which will structurally 
increase U.S. insurers’ exposure to climate risk because those 
regions are more vulnerable and are experiencing particularly 
high rates of population growth and development.351
The movement of populations into harm’s way creates a rising 
baseline of insured losses upon which the consequences of 
climate change will be superimposed. These observations re-
inforce a recurring theme in this report: the past can no longer 
be used as the basis for planning for the future. 
It is a challenge to design insurance systems that properly 
price risks, reward loss prevention, and do not foster risk 
taking (for example by repeatedly rebuilding flooded homes). 
This challenge is particularly acute in light of insurance mar-
ket distortions such as prices that inhibit insurers’ ability to 
recover rising losses, combined with information gaps on the 
impacts of climate change and adaptation strategies. Rising 
losses252 are already affecting the availability and affordability 
of insurance. Several million customers in the United States, 
no longer able to purchase private insurance coverage, are tak-
ing refuge in state-mandated insurance pools, or going with-
out insurance altogether. Offsetting rising insurance costs is 
one benefit of mitigation and adaptation investments to reduce 
the impacts of climate change.
Insured Losses from Catastrophes,  
1980 to 2005
Weather-related insurance losses in the United States 
are increasing. Typical weather-related losses today are 
similar to those that resulted from the 9/11 attack (shown 
in gray at 2001 in the graph). About half of all economic 
losses are insured, so actual losses are roughly twice those 
shown on the graph. Data on smaller-scale losses (many 
of which are weather-related) are significant but are not 
included in this graph as they are not comprehensively 
reported by the U.S. insurance industry.
US GAO352
There is a strong observed correlation be-
tween higher temperatures and the frequen-
cy of lightning-induced insured losses in the 
United States. Each marker represents ag-
gregate monthly U.S. lightning-related insur-
ance claims paid by one large national insurer 
over a five-year period, 1991-1995. All else 
being equal, these claims are expected to in-
crease with temperature.344,353,354
Mills344
Lightning-Related  
Insurance Claims
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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Virtually all segments of the insurance industry 
are vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. 
Examples include damage to property, crops, for-
est products, livestock, and transportation infra-
structure; business and supply-chain interruptions 
caused by weather extremes, water shortages, and 
electricity outages; legal consequences;355 and 
compromised health or loss of life. Increasing risks 
to insurers and their customers are driven by many 
factors including reduced periods of time between 
loss events, increasing variability, shifting  
types and location of events, and widespread  
simultaneous losses. 
In light of these challenges, insurers are emerging 
as partners in climate science and the formulation 
of public policy and adaptation strategies.356 Some 
have promoted adaptation by providing premium 
incentives for customers who fortify their proper-
ties, engaging in the process of determining build-
ing codes and land-use plans, and participating in 
the development and financing of new technologies 
and practices. For example, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) Community Rating 
System is a point system that rewards communities 
that undertake floodplain management activities 
to reduce flood risk beyond the minimum require-
ment set by the National Flood Insurance Pro-
gram. Everyone in these communities is rewarded 
with lower flood insurance premiums (−5 to −45 
percent).357 Others have recognized that mitigation 
and adaptation can work hand in hand in a coor-
dinated climate risk-management strategy and are 
offering “green” insurance products designed to 
capture these dual benefits.90,351
The United States is connected to a 
world that is unevenly vulnerable to 
climate change and thus will be affected 
by impacts in other parts of the world.
American society will not experience the potential 
impacts of climate change in isolation. In an in-
creasingly connected world, impacts elsewhere will 
have political, social, economic, and environmen-
tal ramifications for the United States. As in the 
United States, vulnerability to the potential impacts 
of climate change worldwide varies by location, 
population characteristics, and economic status. 
The rising concentration of people in cities is 
occurring globally, but is most prevalent in lower-
income countries. Many large cities are located in 
vulnerable areas such as floodplains and coasts.  
In most of these cities, the poor often live  
in the most marginal of these environments, in  
areas that are susceptible to extreme events, and 
their ability to adapt is limited by their lack of 
financial resources.172
In addition, over half of the world’s population – in-
cluding most of the world’s major cities – depends 
on glacier melt or snowmelt to supply water for 
drinking and municipal uses. Today, some locations 
are experiencing abundant water supplies and even 
frequent floods due to increases in glacier melt 
rates due to increased temperatures worldwide. 
Soon, however, this trend is projected to reverse as 
even greater temperature increases reduce glacier 
mass and cause more winter precipitation to fall as 
rain and less as snow.90 
As conditions worsen elsewhere, the number of 
people wanting to immigrate to the United States 
will increase. The direct cause of potential in-
creased migration, such as extreme climatic events, 
will be difficult to separate from other forces that 
drive people to migrate. Climate change also has 
the potential to alter trade relationships by chang-
ing the comparative trade advantages of regions or 
nations. As with migration, shifts in trade can have 
multiple causes.
Accelerating emissions in economies that are 
rapidly expanding, such as China and India, pose 
future threats to the climate system and already are 
associated with air pollution episodes that reach the 
United States.297 
Meeting the challenge of improving conditions for 
the world’s poor has economic implications for the 
United States, as does intervention and resolution 
of intra- and intergroup conflicts. Where climate 
change exacerbates such challenges, for example by 
limiting access to scarce resources or increasing in-
cidence of damaging weather events, consequences 
are likely for the U.S. economy and security.358 
Northeast
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The Northeast has significant geographic and climatic diversity 
within its relatively small area. The character and economy of the 
Northeast have been shaped by many aspects of its climate including 
its snowy winters, colorful autumns, and variety of extreme events 
such as nor’easters, ice storms, and heat waves. This familiar climate 
has already begun changing in noticeable ways. 
Since 1970, the annual average temperature in the Northeast has 
increased by 2°F, with winter temperatures rising twice this much.150 
Warming has resulted in many other climate-related changes,  
including:
More frequent days with temperatures above 90°F • 
A longer growing season• 
Increased heavy precipitation • 
Less winter precipitation falling as snow and more as rain • 
Reduced snowpack • 
Earlier breakup of winter ice on lakes and rivers • 
Earlier spring snowmelt resulting in earlier peak river flows • 
Rising sea surface temperatures and sea level• 
Each of these observed changes is consistent with the changes expect-
ed in this region from global warming. The Northeast is projected to 
face continued warming and more extensive climate-related changes, 
some of which could dramatically alter the region’s economy, land-
scape, character, and quality of life. 
Over the next several decades, temperatures in the Northeast are 
projected to rise an additional 2.5 to 4°F in winter and 1.5 to 3.5°F 
in summer. By mid-century and beyond, however, today’s emissions 
choices would generate starkly different climate futures; the lower the emissions, the smaller the climatic 
changes and resulting impacts.150,359 By late this century, under a higher emissions scenario91: 
Winters in the Northeast are projected to be much shorter with fewer cold days and more precipitation. • 
The length of the winter snow season would be cut in half across northern New York, Vermont, New • 
Hampshire, and Maine, and reduced to a week or two in southern parts of the region. 
Cities that today experience few days above 100°F each summer would average 20 such days per sum-• 
mer, while certain cities, such as Hartford and Philadelphia, would average nearly 30 days over 100°F. 
Short-term (one- to three-month) droughts are projected to occur as frequently as once each summer in • 
the Catskill and Adirondack Mountains, and across the New England states.
Hot summer conditions would arrive three weeks earlier and last three weeks longer into the fall. • 
Sea level in this region is projected to rise more than the global average, see • Global and National Cli-
mate Change and Coasts sections for more information on sea-level rise (pages 25, 37, 150). 
Climate on the Move:
Changing Summers in New Hampshire
Yellow arrows track what summers are 
projected to feel like under a lower emis-
sions scenario,91 while red arrows track 
projections for a higher emissions scenario91 
(referred to as “even higher” on page 23). 
For example, under the higher emission 
scenario,91 by late this century residents of 
New Hampshire would experience a sum-
mer climate more like what occurs today in 
North Carolina.359 
Hayhoe et al.359  Fig. from Frumhoff et al.234
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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Extreme heat and declining air 
quality are likely to pose increasing 
problems for human health, 
especially in urban areas.
Heat waves, which are currently rare in the 
region, are projected to become much more 
commonplace in a warmer future, with 
major implications for human health (see 
Human Health sector).163,68 
In addition to the physiological stresses as-
sociated with hotter days and nights,360 for 
cities that now experience ozone pollution 
problems, the number of days that fail to 
meet federal air quality standards is pro-
jected to increase with rising temperatures 
if there are no additional controls on ozone-
causing pollutants163,361 (see Human Health 
sector). Sharp reductions in emissions  
will be needed to keep ozone within  
existing standards.
Projected changes in summer heat (see figure 
below) provide a clear sense of how different the 
climate of the Northeast is projected to be under 
lower versus higher emissions scenarios. Changes 
of this kind will require greater use of air condi-
tioning (see Energy sector). 
Agricultural production, including dairy, 
fruit, and maple syrup, are likely to  
be adversely affected as favorable 
climates shift.
Large portions of the Northeast are likely to be-
come unsuitable for growing popular varieties of 
apples, blueberries, and cranberries under a higher 
emissions scenario.91,362,363 Climate conditions suit-
able for maple/beech/birch forests are projected to 
shift dramatically northward (see figure above), 
eventually leaving only a small portion of the 
Northeast with a maple sugar business.364
The dairy industry is the most important agricul-
tural sector in this region, with annual production 
worth $3.6 billion.365 Heat stress in dairy cows 
depresses both milk production and birth rates 
for periods of weeks to months.193,366 By late this 
century, all but the northern parts of Maine, New 
Hampshire, New York, and Vermont are projected 
to suffer declines in July milk production under the 
higher emissions scenario. In parts of Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Penn-
sylvania, a large decline in milk production, up to 
20 percent or greater, is projected. Under the lower 
emissions scenario, however, reductions in milk 
production of up to 10 percent remain confined 
primarily to the southern parts of the region. 
Projected Days per Year over 90°F in Boston 
The graph shows model projections of the number of summer days 
with temperatures over 90°F in Boston, Massachusetts, under lower 
and higher (referred to as “even higher” on page 23) emissions sce-
narios.91 The inset shows projected days over 100°F.359
Hayhoe et al.359
Projected Shifts in Tree Species
Much of the Northeast’s forest is composed of the hardwoods maple, 
beech, and birch, while mountain areas and more northern parts of the 
region are dominated by spruce/fir forests. As climate changes over 
this century, suitable habitat for spruce and fir is expected to contract 
dramatically. Suitable maple/beech/birch habitat is projected to shift 
significantly northward under a higher emissions scenario (referred 
to as “even higher” on page 23),91 but to shift far less under a lower 
emissions scenario.91,363 Other studies of tree species shifts suggest even 
more dramatic changes than those shown here (see page 81).
Adapted from Iverson et al.364
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This analysis used average 
monthly temperature and hu-
midity data that do not capture 
daily variations in heat stress 
and projected increases in ex-
treme heat. Nor did the analy-
sis directly consider farmer 
responses, such as installation 
of potentially costly cooling sys-
tems. On balance, these projec-
tions are likely to underestimate 
impacts on the dairy industry.150
Severe flooding due to 
sea-level rise and heavy 
downpours is likely to 
occur more frequently.
The densely populated coasts 
of the Northeast face substan-
tial increases in the extent 
and frequency of storm surge, 
coastal flooding, erosion, 
property damage, and loss of 
wetlands.367,369 New York state alone has more than $2.3 trillion in insured coastal property.368 Much of this 
coastline is exceptionally vulnerable to sea-level rise and related impacts. Some major insurers have with-
drawn coverage from thousands of homeowners in coastal areas of the Northeast, including New York City.
Rising sea level is projected to increase the frequency and severity of damaging storm surges and flooding. 
Under a higher emissions scenario,91 what is now considered a once-in-a-century coastal flood in New York 
City is projected to occur at least twice as often by mid-century, and 10 times as often (or once per decade 
Increased Flood Risk in New York City
The light blue area above depicts today’s FEMA 100-year flood zone for the city (the area of the 
city that is expected to be flooded once every 100 years). With rising sea levels, a 100-year flood 
at the end of this century (not mapped here) is projected to inundate a far larger area of New 
York City, especially under the higher emissions scenario.91 Critical transportation infrastructure 
located in the Battery area of lower Manhattan could be flooded far more frequently unless 
protected. The increased likelihood of flooding is causing planners to look into building storm-
surge barriers in New York Harbor to protect downtown New York City. 234,370,371 
Kirshen et al.369; Fig. from Frumhoff et al.234
Adaptation:   Raising a Sewage Treatment Plant in Boston
Boston’s Deer Island sewage treatment plant was designed and 
built taking future sea-level rise into consideration. Because 
the level of the plant relative to the level of the ocean at the 
outfall is critical to the amount of rainwater and sewage that 
can be treated, the plant was built 1.9 feet higher than it would 
otherwise have been to accommodate the amount of sea-level 
rise projected to occur by 2050, the planned life of the facility. 
The planners recognized that the future would be different from 
the past and they decided to plan for the future based on the 
best available information. They assessed what could be easily and 
inexpensively changed at a later date versus those things that would be more difficult and expensive 
to change later. For example, increasing the plant’s height would be less costly to incorporate in the 
original design, while protective barriers could be added at a later date, as needed, at a relatively 
small cost.
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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on average) by late this century. With a lower emis-
sions scenario,91 today’s 100-year flood is projected 
to occur once every 22 years on average by late  
this century.369 
The projected reduction in snow cover 
will adversely affect winter recreation 
and the industries that rely upon it. 
Winter snow and ice sports, which contribute some 
$7.6 billion annually to the regional economy, 
will be particularly affected by warming.342 Of 
this total, alpine skiing and other snow sports (not 
including snowmobiling) account for $4.6 billion 
annually. Snowmobiling, which now rivals skiing 
as the largest winter recreation industry in the na-
tion, accounts for the remaining $3 billion.372 Other 
winter traditions, ranging from skating and ice 
fishing on frozen ponds and lakes, to cross-country 
(Nordic) skiing, snowshoeing, and dog sledding, 
are integral to the character of the Northeast, and 
for many residents and visitors, its desirable quality 
of life.
Warmer winters will shorten the average ski and 
snowboard seasons, increase artificial snowmak-
ing requirements, and drive up operating costs. 
While snowmaking can enhance the prospects for 
ski resort success, it requires a great deal of water 
and energy, as well as very cold nights, which are 
becoming less frequent. Without the opportunity 
to benefit from snowmaking, the prospects for the 
snowmobiling industry are even worse. Most of the 
region is likely to have a marginal or non-existent 
snowmobile season by mid-century. 
The center of lobster fisheries is 
projected to continue its northward 
shift and the cod fishery on Georges 
Bank is likely to be diminished. 
Lobster catch has increased dramatically in the 
Northeast as a whole over the past three decades, 
though not uniformly.374,375 Catches in the south-
ern part of the region peaked in the mid-1990s, 
and have since declined sharply, beginning with 
a 1997 die-off in Rhode Island and Buzzards 
Bay (Massachusetts) associated with the onset of 
a temperature-sensitive bacterial shell disease, 
and accelerated by a 1999 lobster die-off in Long 
Island Sound. Currently, the southern extent of the 
commercial lobster harvest appears to be limited 
by this temperature-sensitive shell disease, and 
these effects are expected to increase as near-shore 
water temperatures rise above the threshold for 
this disease. Analyses also suggest that lobster 
survival and settlement in northern regions of the 
Gulf of Maine could be increased by warming 
water, a longer growing season, more rapid growth, 
an earlier hatching season, an increase in nursery 
grounds suitable for larvae, and faster development 
of plankton.376
Cod populations throughout the North Atlantic 
are adapted to a wide range of seasonal ocean 
temperatures, including average annual tem-
peratures near the seafloor ranging from 36 to 
54°F. Large populations of cod are generally 
not found above the 54°F threshold.377 Tem-
perature also influences both the location and 
timing of spawning, which in turn affects the 
subsequent growth and survival of young cod. 
Increases in average annual bottom tempera-
tures above 47°F lead to a decline in growth 
and survival.378,379 Projections of warming indi-
cate that both the 47°F and the 54°F thresholds 
will be met or exceeded in this century under 
a higher emissions scenario.234 Climate change 
will thus introduce an additional stress to an 
already-stressed fishery.377
Ski Areas at Risk 
under Higher Emissions Scenario91
The ski resorts in the Northeast have three climate-related criteria that 
need to be met for them to remain viable: the average length of the ski 
season must be at least 100 days; there must be a good probability of being 
open during the lucrative winter holiday week between Christmas and the 
New Year; and there must be enough nights that are sufficiently cold to 
enable snowmaking operations. By these standards, only one area in the 
region (not surprisingly, the one located farthest north) is projected to be 
able to support viable ski resorts by the end of this century under a higher 
emissions scenario (referred to as “even higher” on page 23).91,373
Scott et al.342; Fig. from Frumhoff et al.234
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Southeast
The climate of the Southeast is uniquely warm 
and wet, with mild winters and high humidity, 
compared with the rest of the continental United 
States. The average annual temperature of the 
Southeast did not change significantly over the 
past century as a whole. Since 1970, however, 
annual average temperature has risen about 2°F, 
with the greatest seasonal increase in tempera-
ture occurring during the winter months. The 
number of freezing days in the Southeast has 
declined by four to seven days per year for most 
of the region since the mid-1970s. 
Average autumn precipitation has increased 
by 30 percent for the region since 1901. The 
decline in fall precipitation in South Florida 
contrasts strongly with the regional average. 
There has been an increase in heavy downpours 
in many parts of the region,380,381 while the 
percentage of the region experiencing moder-
ate to severe drought increased over the past 
three decades. The area of moderate to severe 
spring and summer drought has increased by 12 
percent and 14 percent, respectively, since the mid-
1970s. Even in the fall months, when precipitation 
tended to increase in most of the region, the extent 
of drought increased by 9 percent.
Climate models project continued warming in all 
seasons across the Southeast and an increase in 
the rate of warming through the end of this cen-
tury. The projected rates 
of warming are more than 
double those experienced 
in the Southeast since 1975, 
with the greatest tempera-
ture increases projected 
to occur in the summer 
months. The number of very 
hot days is projected to rise 
at a greater rate than the av-
erage temperature. Under a 
lower emissions scenario,91 
average temperatures in the region are projected 
to rise by about 4.5°F by the 2080s, while a higher 
emissions scenario91 yields about 9°F of average 
warming (with about a 10.5°F increase in summer, 
and a much higher heat index). Spring and sum-
mer rainfall is projected to decline in South Florida 
during this century. Except for indications that 
the amount of rainfall from individual hurricanes 
will increase,68 climate models provide divergent 
Average Change in Temperature and Precipitation in the Southeast
Temperature Change in °F Precipitation change in %
1901-2008 1970-2008 1901-2008 1970-2008
Annual 0.3 1.6 Annual 6.0 -7.7
Winter 0.2 2.7 Winter 1.2 -9.6
Spring 0.4 1.2 Spring 1.7 -29.2
Summer 0.4 1.6 Summer -4.0 3.6
Fall 0.2 1.1 Fall 27.4 0.1
Observed temperature and precipitation changes in the Southeast are summarized above for two 
different periods.383 Southeast average temperature declined from 1901 to 1970 and then increased 
strongly since 1970.
Observed Changes in Precipitation  
1901 to 2007
While average fall precipitation in the Southeast increased by 30 percent since 
the early 1900s, summer and winter precipitation declined by nearly 10 percent 
in the eastern part of the region. Southern Florida has experienced a nearly 
10 percent drop in precipitation in spring, summer, and fall. The percentage 
of the Southeast region in drought has increased over recent decades.
NOAA/NCDC382
Spring 
Winter 
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results for future precipitation for the remainder of 
the Southeast. Models project that Gulf Coast states 
will tend to have less rainfall in winter and spring, 
compared with the more northern states in the region 
(see map on page 31 in the National Climate Change 
section). Because higher temperatures lead to more 
evaporation of moisture from soils and water loss 
from plants, the frequency, duration, and intensity of 
droughts are likely to continue to increase. 
The destructive potential of Atlantic hurricanes has 
increased since 1970, correlated with an increase in 
sea surface temperature. A similar relationship with 
the frequency of landfalling hurricanes has not been 
established98,384-387 (see National Climate Change sec-
tion for a discussion of past trends and future projec-
tions). An increase in average summer wave heights 
along the U.S. Atlantic coastline since 1975 has been 
attributed to a progressive increase in hurricane 
power.112,388 The intensity of Atlantic hurricanes is 
likely to increase during this century with higher 
peak wind speeds, rainfall intensity, and storm surge 
height and strength.90,112 Even with no increase in 
hurricane intensity, coastal inundation and shoreline 
retreat would increase as sea-level rise accelerates, 
which is one of the most certain and most costly con-
sequences of a warming climate.164
Change in Freezing Days per Year
1976 to 2007
Since the mid-1970s, the number of days per year in which the 
temperature falls below freezing has declined by four to seven days over 
much of the Southeast. Some areas, such as western Louisiana, have 
experienced more than 20 fewer freezing days. Climate models project 
continued warming across the region, with the greatest increases in 
temperature expected in summer, and the number of very hot days 
increasing at a greater rate than the average temperature. 
NOAA/NCDC389
Number of Days per Year with Peak Temperature over 90°F
The number of days per year with peak temperature over 90ºF is expected to rise significantly, especially under a higher 
emissions scenario91 as shown in the map above. By the end of the century, projections indicate that North Florida will 
have more than 165 days (nearly six months) per year over 90ºF, up from roughly 60 days in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
increase in very hot days will have consequences for human health, drought, and wildfires.
CMIP3-B117
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Projected increases in air and water 
temperatures will cause heat-related 
stresses for people, plants, and animals.
The warming projected for the Southeast during 
the next 50 to 100 years will create heat-related 
stress for people, agricultural crops, livestock, 
trees, transportation and other infrastructure, fish, 
and wildlife. The average temperature change is 
not as important for all of these sectors and natu-
ral systems as the projected increase in maximum 
and minimum temperatures. Examples of potential 
impacts include:
Increased illness and death due to greater • 
summer heat stress, unless effective adaptation 
measures are implemented.164
Decline in forest growth and agricultural crop • 
production due to the combined effects of ther-
mal stress and declining soil moisture.390
Increased buckling of pavement and • 
railways.217,222
Decline in dissolved oxygen in stream, lakes, • 
and shallow aquatic habitats leading to fish 
kills and loss of aquatic species diversity.
Decline in production of cattle and other • 
rangeland livestock.391 Significant impacts on 
beef cattle occur at continuous temperatures 
in the 90 to 100°F range, increasing in danger 
as the humidity level increases (see Agricul-
ture sector).391 Poultry and swine are primarily 
raised in indoor operations, so warming would 
increase energy requirements.193 
 
A reduction in very cold days is likely to reduce 
the loss of human life due to cold-related stress, 
while heat stress and related deaths in the sum-
mer months are likely to increase. The reduction 
in cold-related deaths is not expected to offset the 
increase in heat-related deaths (see Human Health 
sector). Other effects of the projected increases in 
temperature include more frequent outbreaks of 
shellfish-borne diseases in coastal waters, altered 
distribution of native plants and animals, local 
loss of many threatened and endangered species, 
displacement of native species by invasive species, 
and more frequent and intense wildfires.
Decreased water availability is very 
likely to affect the region’s economy as 
well as its natural systems.
Decreased water availability due to increased 
temperature and longer periods of time between 
rainfall events, coupled with an increase in societal 
demand is very likely to affect many sectors of the 
Southeast’s economy. The amount and timing of 
water available to natural systems is also affected 
by climate change, as well as by human response 
strategies such as increasing storage capacity 
(dams)142 and increasing acreage of irrigated crop-
land.392 The 2007 water shortage in the Atlanta re-
gion created serious conflicts between three states, 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (which operates 
the dam at Lake Lanier), and the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service, which is charged with protecting 
endangered species. As humans seek to adapt to 
climate change by manipulating water resources, 
streamflow and biological diversity are likely to be 
reduced.142 During droughts, recharge of ground-
water will decline as the temperature and spacing 
between rainfall events increase. Responding by 
increasing groundwater pumping will further stress 
or deplete aquifers and place increasing strain on 
surface water resources. Increasing evaporation 
and plant water loss rates alter the balance of runoff 
and groundwater recharge, which is likely to lead 
to saltwater intrusion into shallow aquifers in many 
parts of the Southeast.142
In Atlanta and Athens, Georgia, 2007 was the second driest year on 
record. Among the numerous effects of the rainfall shortage were 
restrictions on water use in some cities and low water levels in area 
lakes. In the photo, a dock lies on dry land near Aqualand Marina on 
Lake Lanier (located northeast of Atlanta) in December 2007.
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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soil moisture and runoff to the coast are likely to 
be more variable. The salinity of estuaries, coastal 
wetlands, and tidal rivers is likely to increase in the 
southeastern coastal zone, thereby altering coastal 
ecosystems and displacing them farther inland if no 
barriers exist. More frequent storm surge flooding 
and permanent inundation of coastal ecosystems 
and communities is likely in some low-lying areas, 
particularly along the central Gulf Coast where the 
land surface is sinking.393,394 Rapid acceleration in 
the rate of increase in sea-level rise could threaten 
a large portion of the Southeast coastal zone. The 
likelihood of a catastrophic increase in the rate of 
sea-level rise is dependent upon ice sheet response 
to warming, which is the subject of much scientific 
uncertainty (see Global Climate Change section).90 
Such rapid rise in sea level is likely to result in the 
destruction of barrier islands and wetlands.257,390
Land Lost During 2005 Hurricanes
In 2005, 217 square miles of land and wetlands were lost to open water during hurricanes Rita and Katrina. The photos and 
maps show the Chandeleur Islands, east of New Orleans, before and after the 2005 hurricanes; 85 percent of the islands’ 
above-water land mass was eliminated.
USGS
USGS395
Sea-level rise and the likely increase in 
hurricane intensity and associated storm 
surge will be among the most serious 
consequences of climate change.
An increase in average sea level of up to 2 feet or 
more and the likelihood of increased hurricane 
intensity and associated storm surge are likely to 
be among the most costly consequences of cli-
mate change for this region (see National Climate 
Change section). As sea level rises, coastal shore-
lines will retreat. Wetlands will be inundated and 
eroded away, and low-lying areas including some 
communities will be inundated more frequently – 
some permanently – by the advancing sea. Current 
buildings and infrastructure were not designed 
to withstand the intensity of the projected storm 
surge, which would cause catastrophic damage. As 
temperature increases and rainfall patterns change, 
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Compared to the present coastal situation, for 
which vulnerability is quite high, an increase in 
hurricane intensity will further affect low-lying 
coastal ecosystems and coastal communi-
ties along the Gulf and South Atlantic coastal 
margin. An increase in intensity is very likely 
to increase inland and coastal flooding, coastal 
erosion rates, wind damage to coastal forests, 
and wetland loss. Major hurricanes also pose 
a severe risk to people, personal property, and 
public infrastructure in the Southeast, and this 
risk is likely to be exacerbated.393,394 Hurricanes 
have their greatest impact at the coastal mar-
gin where they make landfall, causing storm 
surge, severe beach erosion, inland flooding, 
and wind-related casualties for both cultural 
and natural resources. Some of these impacts 
extend farther inland, affecting larger areas. 
Recent examples of societal vulnerability to 
severe hurricanes include Katrina and Rita in 
2005, which were responsible for the loss of 
more than 1,800 lives and the net loss of 217 
square miles of low-lying coastal marshes and 
barrier islands in southern Louisiana.390,396
Ecological thresholds are expected to be crossed 
throughout the region, causing major disruptions 
to ecosystems and to the benefits they provide  
to people.
Ecological systems provide numerous important services 
that have high economic and cultural value in the Southeast. 
Ecological effects cascade among both living and physical 
systems, as illustrated in the following examples of ecologi-
cal disturbances that result in abrupt responses, as opposed to 
gradual and proportional responses to warming:
The sudden loss of coastal landforms that serve as a storm-• 
surge barrier for natural resources and as a homeland for 
coastal communities (such as in a major hurricane).254,390
An increase in sea level can have no apparent effect until • 
an elevation is reached that allows widespread, rapid salt-
water intrusion into coastal forests and freshwater aqui-
fers.398
Lower soil moisture and higher temperatures leading to in-• 
tense wildfires or pest outbreaks (such as the southern pine 
beetle) in southeastern forests;399 intense droughts leading 
to the drying of lakes, ponds, and wetlands; and the local 
or global extinction of riparian and aquatic species.142 Flooding damage in Louisiana due to Hurricane Katrina
Ocean surface temperature during the peak hurricane season, August through 
October, in the main development region for Atlantic hurricanes.397 Higher 
sea surface temperatures in this region of the ocean have been associated 
with more intense hurricanes. As ocean temperatures continue to increase 
in the future, it is likely that hurricane rainfall and wind speeds will increase in 
response to human-caused warming (see National Climate Change section).68
Sea Surface Temperature 
Atlantic Hurricane Main Development Region
August through October, 1900 to 2008
NOAA/NCDC397
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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population of Florida more than doubled during 
the past three decades, and growth rates in most 
other southeastern states were in the range of 45 to 
75 percent (see population map, page 55). Future 
population growth and the quality of life for exist-
ing residents is likely to be affected by the many 
challenges associated with climate change, such as 
reduced insurance availability, increased insurance 
cost, and increases in water scarcity, sea-level rise, 
extreme weather events, and heat stress. Some of 
these problems, such as increasing heat and declin-
ing air quality, will be especially acute in cities.
Three different types of adaptation to sea-level rise are available for low-lying coastal areas.173,269 One 
is to move buildings and infrastructure farther inland to get out of the way of the rising sea. Another 
is to accommodate rising water through changes in building design and construction, such as elevating 
buildings on stilts. Flood insurance programs even require this in some areas with high probabilities 
of floods. The third adaptation option is to try to protect existing development by building levees 
and river flood control structures. This option is being pursued in some highly vulnerable areas of the 
Gulf and South Atlantic coasts. Flood control structures can be designed to be effective in the face 
of higher sea level and storm surge. 
Some hurricane levees and floodwalls 
were not just replaced after Hurricane 
Katrina, they were redesigned to 
withstand higher storm surge and  
wave action.401 
The costs and environmental impacts 
of building such structures can be 
significant. Furthermore, building 
levees can actually increase future 
risks.269 This is sometimes referred 
to as the levee effect or the safe-
development paradox. Levees that 
provide protection from, for example, 
the storm surge from a Category 
3 hurricane, increase real and 
perceived safety and thereby lead to 
increased development. This increased 
development means there will be greater damage if and when the storm surge from a Category 5 
hurricane tops the levee than there would have been if no levee had been constructed.252
In addition to levees, enhancement of key highways used as hurricane evacuation routes and 
improved hurricane evacuation planning is a common adaptation underway in all Gulf Coast states.217 
Other protection options that are being practiced along low-lying coasts include the enhancement 
and protection of natural features such as forested wetlands, saltmarshes, and barrier islands.390
Recent upgrades that raised the height of this earthen levee increased 
protection against storm surge in the New Orleans area.
Adaptation:   Reducing Exposure to Flooding and Storm Surge
A precipitous decline of wetland-dependent • 
coastal fish and shellfish populations due to the 
rapid loss of coastal marsh.400
Quality of life will be affected by 
increasing heat stress, water scarcity, 
severe weather events, and reduced 
availability of insurance for  
at-risk properties.
Over the past century, the southeastern “sunbelt” 
has attracted people, industry, and investment. The 
Midwest
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id est
The Midwest’s climate is shaped by the presence of the 
Great Lakes and the region’s location in the middle of the 
North American continent. This location, far from the 
temperature-moderating effects of the oceans, contributes 
to large seasonal swings in air temperature from hot, humid 
summers to cold winters. In recent decades, a noticeable in-
crease in average temperatures in the Midwest has been ob-
served, despite the strong year-to-year variations. The largest 
increase has been measured in winter, extending the length 
of the frost-free or growing season by more than one week, 
mainly due to earlier dates for the last spring frost. Heavy 
downpours are now twice as frequent as they were a century 
ago. Both summer and winter precipitation have been above 
average for the last three decades, the wettest period in a 
century. The Midwest has experienced two record-breaking 
floods in the past 15 years.213 There has also been a decrease 
in lake ice, including on the Great Lakes. Since the 1980s, 
large heat waves have been more frequent in the Midwest 
than any time in the last century, other than the Dust Bowl 
years of the 1930s.112,283,402-404
During the summer, public health and quality 
of life, especially in cities, will be negatively 
affected by increasing heat waves, reduced air 
quality, and insect and waterborne diseases. In 
the winter, warming will have mixed impacts. 
Heat waves that are more frequent, more severe, and longer 
lasting are projected. The frequency of hot days and the 
length of the heat-wave season both will be more than twice 
as great under the higher emissions scenario91 compared to 
the lower emissions scenario.91,283, 402,403,405 Events such as 
the Chicago heat wave of 1995, which resulted in over 700 
deaths, will become more common. Under the lower emis-
sions scenario,91 such a heat wave is projected to occur every 
other year in Chicago by the end of the century, while under 
the higher emissions scenario,91 there would be about three 
such heat waves per year. Even more severe heat waves, such 
as the one that claimed tens of thousands of lives in Europe in 2003, are projected to become 
more frequent in a warmer world, occurring as often as every other year in the Midwest by the 
end of this century under the higher emissions scenario.91,283,403,406 Some health impacts can be 
reduced by better preparation for such events.288
Climate on the Move:
Changing Summers in the Midwest
Model projections of summer average temperature and 
precipitation changes in Illinois and Michigan for mid-
century (2040-2059), and end-of-century (2080-2099), 
indicate that summers in these states are expected to feel 
progressively more like summers currently experienced 
in states south and west. Both states are projected to get 
considerably warmer and have less summer precipitation.
Hayhoe et al.283
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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During heat waves, high electricity demand combines with 
climate-related limitations on energy production capabili-
ties (see Energy Supply and Use sector), increasing the like-
lihood of electricity shortages and resulting in brownouts or 
even blackouts. This combination can leave people without 
air conditioning and ventilation when they need it most, as 
occurred during the 1995 Chicago/Milwaukee heat wave. In 
general, electricity demand for air conditioning is projected 
to significantly increase in summer. Improved energy plan-
ning could reduce electricity disruptions.
The urban heat island effect can further add to high local 
daytime and nighttime temperatures (see Human Health 
sector). Heat waves take a greater toll in illness and death 
when there is little relief from the heat at night. 
Another health-related issue arises from the fact that 
climate change can affect air quality. A warmer climate 
generally means more ground-level ozone (a component of 
smog), which can cause respiratory problems, especially for 
those who are young, old, or have asthma or allergies. Un-
less the emissions of pollutants that lead to ozone formation 
are reduced significantly, there will be more ground-level 
ozone as a result of the projected climate changes in the 
Midwest due to increased air temperatures, more stagnant 
air, and increased emissions from vegetation.283,291,402,403,408-410
Insects such as ticks and mosquitoes that carry diseases will survive winters more easily and produce larger  
populations in a warmer Midwest.283,402,403 One potential risk is an increasing incidence of diseases such as West Nile 
Number of 1995-like Chicago Heat Waves
Over the last three decades of this century, heat waves 
like the one that occurred in Chicago in 1995 are projected 
to occur about once every three years under the lower 
emissions scenario.91 Under the even higher emissions 
scenario, such events are projected to occur an average of 
nearly three times a year. In this analysis, heat waves were 
defined as at least one week of daily maximum temperatures 
greater than 90°F and nighttime minimum temperatures 
greater than 70°F, with at least two consecutive days 
with daily temperatures greater than 100°F and nighttime 
temperatures greater than 80°F.
 Hayhoe et al.407
Efforts to reduce urban heat island effects become even more important 
in a warming climate. The City of Chicago has produced a map of urban 
hotspots to use as a planning tool to target areas that could most benefit 
from heat-island reduction initiatives such as 
reflective or green roofing, and tree planting. 
Created using satellite images of daytime 
and nighttime temperatures, the map 
shows the hottest 10 percent of both day 
and night temperatures in red, and the 
hottest 10 percent of either day or night 
in orange.
The City is working to reduce urban 
heat buildup and the need for air 
conditioning by using reflective roofing materials. This thermal 
image shows that the radiating temperature of the City Hall’s 
“green roof” – covered with soil and vegetation – is up to 77°F 
cooler than the nearby conventional roofs.411
Adaptation:  Chicago Tries to Cool the Urban Heat Island
“Green roofs” are cooler than the 
surrounding conventional roofs. 
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evaporation in winter, contributing to the decline. 
Under a lower emissions scenario,91 water levels 
in the Great Lakes are projected to fall no more 
than 1 foot by the end of the century, but under a 
higher emissions scenario,91 they are projected to 
fall between 1 and 2 feet.283 The greater the tem-
perature rise, the higher the likelihood 
of a larger decrease in lake levels.412 
Even a decrease of 1 foot, combined 
with normal fluctuations, can result in 
significant lengthening of the distance 
to the lakeshore in many places. There 
are also potential impacts on beaches, 
coastal ecosystems, dredging require-
ments, infrastructure, and shipping. 
For example, lower lake levels reduce 
“draft,” or the distance between the 
waterline and the bottom of a ship, 
which lessens a ship’s ability to carry 
freight. Large vessels, sized for pas-
sage through the St. Lawrence Sea-
way, lose up to 240 tons of capacity 
for each inch of draft lost.283,402,403,413 
These impacts will have costs, includ-
ing increased shipping, repair and 
maintenance costs, and lost recreation 
and tourism dollars.
virus. Waterborne diseases will present an increas-
ing risk to public health because many pathogens 
thrive in warmer conditions.163
In winter, oil and gas demand for heating will 
decline. Warming will also decrease the number of 
days with snow on the ground, which is expected 
to improve traffic safety.222 On the other hand, 
warming will decrease outdoor winter recreational 
opportunities such as skiing, snowmobiling, ice 
skating, and ice fishing.
Significant reductions in Great Lakes 
water levels, which are projected under 
higher emissions scenarios, lead to 
impacts on shipping, infrastructure, 
beaches, and ecosystems.
The Great Lakes are a natural resource of tre-
mendous significance, containing 20 percent of 
the planet’s fresh surface water and serving as the 
dominant feature of the industrial heartland of the 
nation. Higher temperatures will mean more evapo-
ration and hence a likely reduction in the Great 
Lakes water levels. Reduced lake ice increases 
Projected Changes in Great Lakes Levels
under Higher Emissions Scenario91
Average Great Lakes levels depend on the balance between precipitation (and 
corresponding runoff) in the Great Lakes Basin on one hand, and evaporation 
and outflow on the other. As a result, lower emissions scenarios91 with less 
warming show less reduction in lake levels than higher emissions scenarios.91 
Projected changes in lake levels are based on simulations by the NOAA Great 
Lakes model for projected climate changes under a higher emissions scenario.91
Hayhoe et al.283
Observed Changes in Great Lakes Ice Cover
Seasonal Maximum Coverage, 1973 to 2008
Reductions in winter ice cover lead to more evaporation, causing 
lake levels to drop even farther. While the graph indicates large year-
to-year variations, there is a clear decrease in the extent of Great 
Lakes ice coverage, as shown by the black trend line. 
 Updated from Assel414
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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The likely increase in precipitation 
in winter and spring, more heavy 
downpours, and greater evaporation 
in summer would lead to more 
periods of both floods and  
water deficits.
Precipitation is projected to increase in win-
ter and spring, and to become more intense 
throughout the year. This pattern is expected 
to lead to more frequent flooding, increasing 
infrastructure damage, and impacts on human 
health. Such heavy downpours can overload 
drainage systems and water treatment facili-
ties, increasing the risk of waterborne diseases. 
Such an incident occurred in Milwaukee in 
1993 when the water supply was contaminated 
with the parasite Cryptosporidium, causing 
403,000 reported cases of gastrointestinal ill-
ness and 54 deaths. 
In Chicago, rainfall of more than 2.5 inches 
per day is an approximate threshold beyond 
which combined water and sewer systems 
overflow into Lake Michigan (such events 
occurred 2.5 times per decade from 1961 to 
1990). This generally results in beach closures 
to reduce the risk of disease transmission. 
Rainfall above this threshold is projected to 
occur twice as often by the end of this century 
under the lower emissions scenario91 and three 
times as often under the higher emissions 
scenario.91,283,403 Similar increases are ex-
pected across the Midwest. 
More intense rainfall can lead to floods 
that cause significant impacts regionally 
and even nationally. For example, the Great 
Flood of 1993 caused catastrophic flood-
ing along 500 miles of the Mississippi and 
Missouri river systems, affecting one-
quarter of all U.S. freight (see Transporta-
tion sector).222,415-417 Another example was a 
record-breaking 24-hour rainstorm in July 
1996, which resulted in flash flooding in 
Chicago and its suburbs, causing extensive 
damage and disruptions, with some com-
muters not being able to reach Chicago for 
The Great Flood of 1993 caused flooding along 500 miles of the Mississippi 
and Missouri river systems. The photo shows the flood’s effects on U.S. 
Highway 54, just north of Jefferson City, Missouri.
Lower Water Levels in the Great Lakes
Reduced water levels in the Great Lakes will have interconnected 
impacts across many sectors, creating mismatches between water 
supply and demand, and necessitating trade-offs. Regions outside the 
Midwest will also be affected. For example, a reduction in hydropower 
potential would affect the Northeast, and a reduction in irrigation 
water would affect regions that depend on agricultural produce from 
the Midwest. 
Adapted from Field et al.164
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three days (see Transportation sector).222 There 
was also a record-breaking storm in August 2007. 
Increases in such events are likely to cause greater 
property damage, higher insurance rates, a heavier 
burden on emergency management, increased 
clean-up and rebuilding costs, and a growing finan-
cial toll on businesses, homeowners, and insurers.
In the summer, with increasing evaporation rates 
and longer periods between rainfalls, the likelihood 
of drought will increase and water levels in rivers, 
streams, and wetlands are likely to decline. Lower 
water levels also could create problems for river 
traffic, reminiscent of the stranding of more than 
4,000 barges on the Mississippi River during the 
1988 drought. Reduced summer water levels are 
also likely to reduce the recharge of groundwater, 
cause small streams to dry up (reducing native fish 
populations), and reduce the area of wetlands in  
the Midwest.
While the longer growing season 
provides the potential for increased crop 
yields, increases in heat waves, floods, 
droughts, insects, and weeds will present 
increasing challenges to managing crops, 
livestock, and forests.
The projected increase in winter and spring precipi-
tation and flooding is likely to delay planting and 
crop establishment. Longer growing seasons and 
increased carbon dioxide have positive effects on 
some crop yields, but this is likely to be counterbal-
anced in part by the negative effects of additional 
disease-causing pathogens, insect pests, and weeds 
(including invasive weeds).193 Livestock produc-
tion is expected to become more costly as higher 
temperatures stress livestock, decreasing productiv-
ity and increasing costs associated with the needed 
ventilation and cooling equipment.193
Plant winter hardiness zones (each zone represents 
a 10°F change in minimum temperature) in the 
Midwest are likely to shift one-half to one full zone 
Observed and Projected Changes in Plant Hardiness Zones
Plant winter hardiness zones in the Midwest have already changed significantly 
as shown above, and are projected to shift one-half to one full zone every 30 
years, affecting crop yields and where plant species can grow. By the end of this 
century, plants now associated with the Southeast are likely to become established 
throughout the Midwest. In the graphic, each zone represents a 10°F range in the 
lowest temperature of the year, with zone 3 representing –40 to –30°F and zone 
8 representing 10 to 20°F. © 2006 by Arbor Day Foundation ®
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about every 30 years. By the end of the century, 
plants now associated with the Southeast are likely 
to become established throughout the Midwest. 
Impacts on forests are likely to be mixed, with the 
positive effects of higher carbon dioxide and nitro-
gen levels acting as fertilizers potentially negated 
by the negative effects of decreasing air quality.243 
In addition, more frequent droughts, and hence fire 
hazards, and an increase in destructive insect pests, 
such as gypsy moths, hinder plant growth. Insects, 
historically controlled by cold winters, more easily 
survive milder winters and produce larger popu-
lations in a warmer climate (see Agriculture and 
Ecosystems sectors).
Native species are very likely to face 
increasing threats from rapidly changing 
climate conditions, pests, diseases,  
and invasive species moving in from 
warmer regions.
As air temperatures increase, so will water tem-
peratures. In some lakes, this will lead to an earlier 
and longer period in summer during which mixing 
of the relatively warm surface lake water with the 
colder water below is reduced.564 In such cases, this 
stratification can cut off oxygen from bottom layers, 
increasing the risk of oxygen-poor or oxygen-free 
“dead zones” that kill fish and other living things. 
In lakes with contaminated sediment, warmer 
water and low-oxygen conditions can more readily 
mobilize mercury and other persistent pollutants.565 
In such cases, where these increasing quantities 
of contaminants are taken up in the aquatic food 
chain, there will be additional potential for health 
hazards for species that eat fish from the lakes, 
including people.566
Populations of coldwater fish, such as brook trout, 
lake trout, and whitefish, are expected to decline 
dramatically, while populations of coolwater fish 
such as muskie, and warmwater species such as 
smallmouth bass and bluegill, will take their place. 
Aquatic ecosystem disruptions are likely to be 
compounded by invasions by non-native species, 
which tend to thrive under a wide range of environ-
mental conditions. Native species, adapted to a nar-
rower range of conditions, are expected to decline. 
All major groups of animals, including birds, 
mammals, amphibians, reptiles, and insects, will 
be affected by impacts on local populations, and 
by competition from other species moving into the 
Midwest region.70 The potential for animals to shift 
their ranges to keep pace with the changing climate 
will be inhibited by major urban areas and the pres-
ence of the Great Lakes.
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Great Plains
The Great Plains is characterized by strong 
seasonal climate variations. Over thousands 
of years, records preserved in tree rings, 
sediments, and sand deposits provide 
evidence of recurring periods of extended 
drought (such as the Dust Bowl of the 1930s) 
alternating with wetter conditions.97,419 
Today, semi-arid conditions in the western 
Great Plains gradually transition to a moister 
climate in the eastern parts of the region. 
To the north, winter days in North Dakota 
average 25°F, while it is not unusual to have 
a West Texas winter day over 75°F. In West 
Texas, there are between 70 and 100 days per 
year over 90°F, whereas North Dakota has 
only 10 to 20 such days on average.
Significant trends in regional climate are 
apparent over the last few decades. Average 
temperatures have increased throughout the region, with the largest changes occurring in winter months and 
over the northern states. Relatively cold days are becoming less frequent and relatively hot days more frequent.420 
Precipitation has also increased over most of the area.149,421
Temperatures are projected to continue to increase over 
this century, with larger changes expected under scenarios 
of higher heat-trapping emissions as compared to lower 
heat-trapping emissions. Summer changes are projected to 
be larger than those in winter in the southern and central 
Great Plains.108 Precipitation is also projected to change, 
particularly in winter and spring. Conditions are anticipated 
to become wetter in the north and drier in the south.
Projected changes in long-term climate and more frequent 
extreme events such as heat waves, droughts, and heavy 
rainfall will affect many aspects of life in the Great Plains. 
These include the region’s already threatened water 
resources, essential agricultural and ranching activities, 
unique natural and protected areas, and the health and 
prosperity of its inhabitants.
Summer Temperature Change 
by 2080-2099
Temperatures in the Great Plains are projected to increase 
significantly by the end of this century, with the northern 
part of the region experiencing the greatest projected 
increase in temperature.
CMIP3-B117
Observed and Projected Temperature Rise
The average temperature in the Great Plains already has increased roughly 1.5°F 
relative to a 1960s and 1970s baseline. By the end of the century, temperatures 
are projected to continue to increase by 2.5°F to more than 13°F compared 
with the 1960 to 1979 baseline, depending on future emissions of heat-trapping 
gases. The brackets on the thermometers represent the likely range of model 
projections, though lower or higher outcomes are possible.
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Projected increases in temperature, 
evaporation, and drought frequency add 
to concerns about the region’s declining 
water resources.
Water is the most important factor affecting activi-
ties on the Great Plains. Most of the water used 
in the Great Plains comes from the High Plains 
aquifer (sometimes referred to by the name of its 
largest formation, the Ogallala aquifer), which 
stretches from South Dakota to Texas. The aquifer 
holds both current recharge from precipitation and 
so-called “ancient” water, water trapped by silt and 
soil washed down from the Rocky Mountains dur-
ing the last ice age.
As population increased in the Great Plains and 
irrigation became widespread, annual water 
withdrawals began to outpace natural recharge.422 
Today, an average of 19 billion gallons of 
groundwater are pumped from the aquifer each 
day. This water irrigates 13 million acres of land 
and provides drinking water to over 80 percent 
of the region’s population.423 Since 1950, aquifer 
water levels have dropped an average of 13 feet, 
equivalent to a 9 percent decrease in aquifer 
storage. In heavily irrigated parts of Texas, 
Oklahoma, and Kansas, reductions are much larger, 
from 100 feet to over 250 feet.
Projections of increasing temperatures, faster 
evaporation rates, and more sustained droughts 
brought on by climate change will only add more 
stress to overtaxed water sources.149,253,424,425 Current 
water use on the Great Plains is unsustainable, 
as the High Plains aquifer continues to be tapped 
faster than the rate of recharge.
Groundwater Withdrawals for Irrigation
1950 to 2005
Water Level Changes in the High Plains Aquifer
1950 to 2005
McGuire422
Irrigation is one of the main factors stressing water resources in the Great Plains. In parts of the region, more than 81 trillion gallons 
of water (pink areas on the left hand map) were withdrawn for irrigation in Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas from 1950 to 2005. During 
the same time period, water levels in parts of the High Plains aquifer in those states decreased by more than 150 feet (red areas on 
the right hand map).
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The Dust Bowl: Combined Effects of Land Use and Climate
Over the past century, large-scale conversion of 
grasslands to crops and ranchland has altered the 
natural environment of the Great Plains.149 Irrigated 
fields have increased evaporation rates, reducing 
summer temperatures, and increasing local 
precipitation.427,428
The Dust Bowl of the 1930s epitomizes what can 
happen as a result of interactions between climate 
and human activity. In the 1920s, increasing demand 
for food encouraged poor agricultural practices. 
Small-scale producers ploughed under native 
grasses to plant wheat, removing the protective 
cover the land required to retain its moisture. 
Variations in ocean temperature contributed to a slight increase in air temperatures, just enough to disrupt 
the winds that typically draw moisture from the south into the Great Plains. As the intensively tilled soils 
dried up, topsoil from an estimated 100 million acres of the Great Plains blew across the continent. 
The Dust Bowl dramatically demonstrated the potentially devastating effects of poor land-use practices 
combined with climate variability and change.429  Today, climate change is interacting with a different set of 
poor land-use practices. Water is being pumped from the Ogallala aquifer faster than it can recharge. In 
many areas, playa lakes are poorly managed (see page 127). Existing stresses on water resources in the Great 
Plains due to unsustainable water usage are likely to be exacerbated by future changes in temperature and 
precipitation, this time largely due to human-induced climate change.
Dust Bowl of 1935 in Stratford, Texas 
Northern areas of the Great Plains are projected to experience a 
wetter climate by the end of this century, while southern areas are 
projected to experience a drier climate. The change in precipitation 
is compared with a 1960-1979 baseline. Confidence in the projected 
changes is highest in the hatched areas.
Projected Spring Precipitation Change  
by 2080s-2090s
CMIP3-B117The Great Plains currently experiences a sharp 
precipitation gradient from east to west, from 
more than 50 inches of precipitation per year 
in eastern Oklahoma and Texas to less than 
10 inches in some of the western parts of 
the region.
Average Annual 
Observed Precipitation
1971-2000
PRISM426
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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Agriculture, ranching, and natural 
lands, already under pressure due to an 
increasingly limited water supply, are 
very likely to also be stressed by  
rising temperatures.
Agricultural, range, and croplands cover more than 
70 percent of the Great Plains, producing wheat, 
hay, corn, barley, cattle, and cotton. Agriculture is 
fundamentally sensitive to climate. Heat and water 
stress from droughts and heat waves can decrease 
yields and wither crops.430,431 The influence of long-
term trends in temperature and precipitation can be 
just as great.431 
As temperatures increase over this century, optimal 
zones for growing particular crops will shift. Pests 
that were historically unable to survive in the 
Great Plains’ cooler areas are expected to spread 
northward. Milder winters and earlier springs 
also will encourage greater numbers and earlier 
emergence of insects.149 Rising carbon dioxide 
levels in the atmosphere can increase crop growth, 
but also make some types of weeds grow even 
faster (see Agriculture sector).432
Projected increases in precipitation are unlikely 
to be sufficient to offset decreasing soil moisture 
and water availability in the Great Plains due to 
rising temperatures and aquifer depletion. In some 
areas, there is not expected to be enough water for 
agriculture to sustain even current usage.
With limited water supply comes increased 
vulnerability of agriculture to climate change. 
Further stresses on water supply for agriculture and 
ranching are likely as the region’s cities continue 
to grow, increasing competition between urban and 
rural users.433 The largest impacts are expected in 
heavily irrigated areas in the southern Great Plains, 
already plagued by unsustainable water use and 
greater frequency of extreme heat.149
Successful adaptation will require diversification of 
crops and livestock, as well as transitions from ir-
rigated to rain-fed agriculture.434-436 Producers who 
can adapt to changing climate conditions are likely 
to see their businesses survive; some might even 
thrive. Others, without resources or ability to adapt 
effectively, will lose out.
Climate change is likely to affect native 
plant and animal species by altering key 
habitats such as the wetland ecosystems 
known as prairie potholes or playa lakes.
Ten percent of the Great Plains is protected lands, 
home to unique ecosystems and wildlife. The 
region is a haven for hunters and anglers, with its 
ample supplies of wild game such as moose, elk, 
and deer; birds such as goose, quail, and duck; and 
fish such as walleye and bass. 
Climate-driven changes are likely to combine 
with other human-induced stresses to further 
increase the vulnerability of natural ecosystems to 
pests, invasive species, and loss of native species. 
Changes in temperature and precipitation affect 
the composition and diversity of native animals 
and plants through altering their breeding patterns, 
water and food supply, and habitat availability.149 
In a changing climate, populations of some pests 
such as red fire ants and rodents, better adapted to 
a warmer climate, are projected to increase.437,438 
Grassland and plains birds, already besieged by 
habitat fragmentation, could experience significant 
shifts and reductions in their ranges.439 
Urban sprawl, agriculture, and ranching practices 
already threaten the Great Plains’ distinctive 
wetlands. Many 
of these are home 
to endangered and 
iconic species. 
In particular, 
prairie wetland 
ecosystems provide 
crucial habitat 
for migratory 
waterfowl and 
shorebirds.
Ongoing shifts in the region’s population 
from rural areas to urban centers 
will interact with a changing climate, 
resulting in a variety of consequences.
Inhabitants of the Great Plains include a rising 
number of urban dwellers, a long tradition of rural 
communities, and extensive Native American 
Mallard ducks are one of the many 
species that inhabit the playa lakes, 
also known as prairie potholes.
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Shallow ephemeral lakes dot the Great Plains, 
anomalies of water in the arid landscape. In the 
north they are known as prairie potholes; in the 
south, playa lakes. These lakes create unique 
microclimates that support diverse wildlife and 
plant communities. A playa can lie with little or 
no water for long periods, or have several wet/
dry cycles each year. When it rains, what ap-
peared to be only a few clumps of short,  
dry grasses just a few days earlier suddenly 
teems with frogs, toads, clam shrimp, and 
aquatic plants. 
The playas provide a perfect home for migrat-
ing birds to feed, mate, and raise their young. 
Millions of shorebirds and waterfowl, including Canada geese, mallard ducks, and Sandhill cranes, 
depend on the playas for their breeding grounds. From the prairie potholes of North Dakota to the 
playa lakes of West Texas, the abundance and diversity of native bird species directly depends on 
these lakes.440,441 
Despite their small size, playa lakes and prairie potholes also play a critical role in supplying water 
to the Great Plains. The contribution of the playa lakes to this sensitively balanced ecosystem needs 
to be monitored 
and maintained in 
order to avoid un-
foreseen impacts 
on our natural 
resources. Before 
cultivation, water 
from these lakes 
was the primary 
source of recharge 
to the High Plains 
aquifer.442 But 
many playas are 
disappearing and 
others are threat-
ened by growing 
urban populations, 
extensive agricul-
ture, and other 
filling and tilling 
practices.443 In 
recent years, agricultural demands have drawn down the playas to irrigate crops. Agricultural waste 
and fertilizer residues drain into playas, decreasing the quality of the water, or clogging them so the 
water cannot trickle down to refill the aquifer. Climate change is expected to add to these stresses, 
with increasing temperatures and changing rainfall patterns altering rates of evaporation, recharge, 
and runoff to the playa lake systems.444
Adapted from PLJV445
Playa lakes in west Texas fill up after a heavy spring rain.
Playa Lakes and Prairie Potholes
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populations. Although farming and ranching remain 
primary uses of the land – taking up much of the 
region’s geographical area – growing cities provide 
housing and jobs for more than two-thirds of the 
population. For everyone on the Great Plains, though, a 
changing climate and a limited water supply are likely 
to challenge their ability to thrive, leading to conflicting 
interests in the allocation of increasingly scarce water 
resources.313,433
Native American communities
The Great Plains region is home to 65 Native American 
tribes. Native populations on rural tribal lands have 
limited capacities to respond to climate change.313 Many 
reservations already face severe problems with water 
quantity and quality – problems likely to be exacerbated 
by climate change and other human-induced stresses. 
Rural communities
As young adults move out of small, rural communities, 
the towns are increasingly populated by a vulnerable 
demographic of very old and very young people, 
placing them more at risk for health issues than 
urban communities. Combined effects of changing 
demographics and climate are likely to make it more 
difficult to supply adequate and efficient public health 
services and educational opportunities to rural areas. 
Climate-driven shifts in optimal crop types and 
increased risk of drought, pests, and extreme events 
will add more economic stress and tension to traditional 
communities.430,433
Urban populations
Although the Great Plains is not yet known for large 
cities, many mid-sized towns throughout the region 
are growing rapidly. One in four of the most rapidly 
growing cities in the nation is located in the Great 
Plains446 (see Society sector). Most of these growing 
centers can be found in the southern parts of the 
region, where water resources are already seriously 
constrained. Urban populations, particularly the young, 
elderly, and economically disadvantaged, may also be 
disproportionately affected by heat.447
New opportunities
There is growing recognition that the enormous wind 
power potential of the Great Plains could provide new 
avenues for future employment and land use. Texas 
already produces the most wind power of any state. Wind 
energy production is also prominent in Oklahoma. North 
and South Dakota have rich wind potential.191 
As climate change creates new environmental conditions, 
effective adaptation strategies become increasingly es-
sential to ecological and socioeconomic survival. A great 
deal of the Great Plains’ adaptation potential might be 
realized through agriculture. For example, plant species 
that mature earlier and are more resistant to disease and 
pests are more likely to thrive under warmer conditions. 
Other emerging adaptation strategies include dynamic 
cropping systems and increased crop diversity. In partic-
ular, mixed cropping-livestock systems maximize avail-
able resources while minimizing the need for external 
inputs such as irrigation that draws down precious water 
supplies.436 In many parts of the region, diverse cropping 
systems and improved water use efficiency will be key to 
sustaining crop and rangeland systems.448 Reduced water 
supplies might cause some farmers to alter the intensive 
cropping systems currently in use.193,219 
Adaptation:  Agricultural Practices to Reduce Water Loss and Soil Erosion
Conservation of water is critical to efficient crop production in areas where water can be scarce. 
Following the Dust Bowl in the 1930s, Great Plains farmers implemented a number of improved 
farming practices to increase the effectiveness of rainfall capture and retention in the soil and 
protect the soil against water and wind erosion. Examples include rotating crops, retaining crop 
residues, increasing vegetative cover, and altering plowing techniques.
With observed and projected increases in summer temperatures and in the frequency and intensity of heavy downpours, 
it will become even more important to protect against increasing loss of water and soil. Across the upper Great Plains, 
where strong storms are projected to occur more frequently, producers are being encouraged to increase the amount of 
crop residue left on the soil or to plant cover crops in the fall to protect the soil in the spring before crops are planted.
Across the southern Great Plains, some farmers are returning to dryland farming rather than relying on irrigation for their 
crops. Preserving crop residue helps the soil absorb more moisture from rain and eases the burden on already-stressed 
groundwater. These efforts have been promoted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture through research and extension 
efforts such as Kansas State University’s Center for Sustainable Agriculture and Alternative Crops.
Midwest
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The Southwest region stretches from the southern 
Rocky Mountains to the Pacific Coast. Elevations 
range from the lowest in the country to among the 
highest, with climates ranging from the driest to 
some of the wettest. Past climate records based 
on changes in Colorado River flows indicate that 
drought is a frequent feature of the Southwest, with 
some of the longest documented “megadroughts” 
on Earth. Since the 1940s, the region has experi-
enced its most rapid population and urban growth. 
During this time, there were both unusually wet 
periods (including much of 1980s and 1990s) and 
dry periods (including much of 1950s and 1960s).449 
The prospect of future droughts becoming more 
severe as a result of global warming is a significant 
concern, especially because the Southwest contin-
ues to lead the nation in population growth.
Human-induced climate change appears to be well 
underway in the Southwest. Recent warming is 
among the most rapid in the nation, significantly 
more than the global average in some areas. This is 
driving declines in spring snowpack and Colorado 
River flow.34,160,161 Projections suggest continued 
strong warming, with much larger increases under 
higher emissions scenarios91 compared to lower 
emissions scenarios. Projected summertime tem-
perature increases are greater than the annual aver-
age increases in some parts of the region, and are 
likely to be exacerbated locally by expanding urban 
heat island effects.450 Further water cycle changes 
are projected, which, combined with increasing 
temperatures, signal a serious water supply chal-
lenge in the decades and centuries ahead.34,159
Water supplies are projected to become 
increasingly scarce, calling for trade-offs 
among competing uses, and potentially 
leading to conflict.
Water is, quite literally, the lifeblood of the South-
west. The largest use of water in the region is 
associated with agriculture, including some of the 
nation’s most important crop-producing areas in 
California. Water is also an important source of 
hydroelectric power, and water is required for the 
large population growth in the region, particu-
larly that of major cities such as Phoenix and Las 
Vegas. Water also plays a critical role in supporting 
healthy ecosystems across the region, both on land 
and in rivers and lakes. 
Water supplies in some areas of the Southwest are 
already becoming limited, and this trend toward 
scarcity is likely to be a harbinger of future water 
shortages.34,451 Groundwater pumping is lower-
ing water tables, while rising temperatures reduce 
river flows in vital rivers including the Colorado.34 
Limitations imposed on water supply by projected 
temperature increases are likely to be made worse 
by substantial reductions in rain and snowfall in the 
spring months, when precipitation is most needed 
to fill reservoirs to meet summer demand.151
A warmer and drier future means extra care will 
be needed in planning the allocation of water for 
Observed and Projected Temperature Rise
The average temperature in the Southwest has already 
increased roughly 1.5°F compared to a 1960-1979 baseline 
period. By the end of the century, average annual temperature 
is projected to rise approximately 4°F to 10°F above the 
historical baseline, averaged over the Southwest region. The 
brackets on the thermometers represent the likely range 
of model projections, though lower or higher outcomes 
are possible.
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the coming decades. The Colorado Compact, negotiated in the 1920s, allocated the Colorado River’s water 
among the seven basin states. It was based, however, on unrealistic assumptions about how much water was 
available because the observations of runoff during the early 1900s turned out to be part of the greatest and 
longest high-flow period of the last five cen-
turies.452 Today, even in normal decades, the 
Colorado River does not have enough water 
to meet the agreed-upon allocations. During 
droughts and under projected future condi-
tions, the situation looks even bleaker. 
During droughts, water designated for agricul-
ture could provide a temporary back-up sup-
ply for urban water needs. Similarly, non-re-
newable groundwater could be tapped during 
especially dry periods. Both of these options, 
however, come at the cost of either current or 
future agricultural production. 
Water is already a subject of contention in 
the Southwest, and climate change – coupled 
with rapid population growth – promises 
to increase the likelihood of water-related 
Droughts are a long-standing feature of the Southwest’s climate. The droughts of the last 110 years 
pale in comparison to some of the decades-long “megadroughts” that the region has experienced over 
the last 2000 years.419 During the closing decades of the 1500s, for example, major droughts gripped 
parts of the Southwest.189 These droughts sharply reduced the flow of the Colorado River452,453 and 
the all-important Sierra Nevada headwaters for California,454 and dried out the region as a whole. As 
of 2009, much of the Southwest remains in a drought that began around 1999. This event is the most 
severe western drought of the last 110 years, and is being exacerbated by record warming.455 
Over this century, projections point to an increasing probability of drought for the region.90,115 Many 
aspects of these projections, including a northward shift in winter and spring storm tracks, are 
consistent with observed trends over recent decades.96,456,457 Thus, the most likely future for the 
Southwest is a substantially drier one (although there is presently no consensus on how the region's 
summer monsoon [rainy season] might change in the future). Combined with the historical record of 
severe droughts and the current 
uncertainty regarding the exact 
causes and drivers of these past 
events, the Southwest must 
be prepared for droughts that 
could potentially result from 
multiple causes. The combined 
effects of natural climate 
variability and human-induced 
climate change could turn out 
to be a devastating “one-two 
punch” for the region.
After Meko et al.453
Colorado River flow has been reconstructed back over 1200 years based primarily on 
tree-ring data. These data reveal that some droughts in the past have been more severe 
and longer lasting than any experienced in the last 100 years. The red line indicates 
actual measurements of river flow during the last 100 years. Models indicate that, in 
the future, droughts will continue to occur, but will become hotter, and thus more 
severe, over time.90 
Future of Drought in the Southwest
Percentage change in March-April-May precipitation for 2080-2099 compared to 
1961-1979 for a lower emissions scenario91 (left) and a higher emissions scenario91 
(right). Confidence in the projected changes is highest in the hatched areas. 
Projected Change in Spring Precipitation, 2080-2099
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conflict. Projected temperature increases, com-
bined with river-flow reductions, will increase the 
risk of water conflicts between sectors, states, and 
even nations. In recent years, negotiations regard-
ing existing water supplies have taken place among 
the seven states sharing the Colorado River and 
the two states (New Mexico and Texas) sharing the 
Rio Grande. Mexico and the United States already 
disagree on meeting their treaty allocations of Rio 
Grande and Colorado River water. 
In addition, many water settlements between the 
U.S. Government and Native American tribes have 
yet to be fully worked out. The Southwest is home 
to dozens of Native communities whose status as 
sovereign nations means they hold rights to the 
water for use on their land. However, the amount 
of water actually available to each nation is deter-
mined through negotiations and litigation. Increas-
ing water demand in the Southwest is driving 
current negotiations and litigation of tribal water 
rights. While several nations have legally settled 
their water rights, many other tribal negotiations 
are either currently underway or pending. Compet-
ing demands from treaty rights, rapid development, 
and changes in agriculture in the region, exacer-
bated by years of drought and climate change, have 
the potential to spark significant conflict over an 
already over-allocated and dwindling resource.
Increasing temperature, drought, 
wildfire, and invasive species will 
accelerate transformation of  
the landscape.
Climate change already appears to be influenc-
ing both natural and managed ecosystems of the 
Southwest.455,458 Future landscape impacts are likely 
to be substantial, threatening biodiversity, pro-
tected areas, and ranching and agricultural lands. 
These changes are often driven by multiple factors, 
including changes in temperature and drought pat-
terns, wildfire, invasive species, and pests.
Conditions observed in recent years can serve as 
indicators for future change. For example, tempera-
ture increases have made the current drought in 
the region more severe than the natural droughts of 
the last several centuries. As a result, about 4,600 
square miles of piñon-juniper woodland in the Four 
Corners region of the Southwest have experienced 
substantial die-off of piñon pine trees.455 Record 
wildfires are also being driven by rising tempera-
tures and related reductions in spring snowpack 
and soil moisture.458 
How climate change will affect fire in the South-
west varies according to location. In general, total 
area burned is projected to increase.459 How this 
plays out at individual locations, however, depends 
on regional changes in temperature and precipita-
tion, as well as on whether fire in the area is cur-
rently limited by fuel availability or by rainfall.460 
For example, fires in wetter, forested areas are 
expected to increase in frequency, while areas 
where fire is limited by the availability of fine fuels 
experience decreases.460 Climate changes could 
also create subtle shifts in fire behavior, allowing 
more “runaway fires” – fires that are thought to 
have been brought under control, but then rekin-
dle.461 The magnitude of fire damages, in terms of 
economic impacts as well as direct endangerment, 
also increases as urban development increasingly 
impinges on forested areas.460,462 
Climate-fire dynamics will also be affected by 
changes in the distribution of ecosystems across the 
Southwest. Increasing temperatures and shifting 
precipitation patterns will drive declines in high-
elevation ecosystems such as alpine forests and 
tundra.459,463 Under higher emissions scenarios,91 
high-elevation forests in California, for example, 
are projected to decline by 60 to 90 percent be-
fore the end of the century.284,459 At the same time, 
grasslands are projected to expand, another factor 
likely to increase fire risk. 
As temperatures rise, some iconic landscapes of 
the Southwest will be greatly altered as species 
shift their ranges northward and upward to cooler 
climates, and fires attack unaccustomed ecosys-
tems which lack natural defenses. The Sonoran 
Desert, for example, famous for the saguaro cactus, 
would look very different if more woody species 
spread northward from Mexico into areas currently 
dominated by succulents (such as cacti) or native 
grasses.464 The desert is already being invaded 
by red brome and buffle grasses that do well in 
high temperatures and are native to Africa and the 
U.S. Global Change Research Program
132 133
Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States Regional Climate Impacts: Southwest
Mediterranean. Not only do these noxious weeds 
out-compete some native species in the Sonoran 
Desert, they also fuel hot, cactus-killing fires. With 
these invasive plant species and climate change, 
the Saguaro and Joshua Tree national parks could 
end up with far fewer of their namesake plants.465 
In California, two-thirds of the more than 5,500 na-
tive plant species are projected to experience range 
reductions up to 80 percent before the end of this 
century under projected warming.466 In their search 
for optimal conditions, some species will move 
uphill, others northward, breaking up present-day 
ecosystems; those species moving southward to 
higher elevations might cut off future migration op-
tions as temperatures continue to increase.
The potential for successful plant and animal 
adaptation to coming change is further hampered 
by existing regional threats such as human-caused 
fragmentation of the landscape, invasive species, 
river-flow reductions, and pollution. Given the 
mountainous nature of the Southwest, and the asso-
ciated impediments to species shifting their ranges, 
climate change likely places other species at risk. 
Some areas have already been identified as possible 
refuges where species at risk could continue to live 
if these areas were preserved for this purpose.466 
Other rapidly changing landscapes will require 
major adjustments, not only from plant and animal 
species, but also by the region’s ranchers, foresters, 
and other inhabitants.
Increased frequency and altered timing 
of flooding will increase risks to people, 
ecosystems, and infrastructure. 
Paradoxically, a warmer atmosphere and an in-
tensified water cycle are likely to mean not only 
a greater likelihood of drought for the Southwest, 
but also an increased risk of flooding. Winter 
precipitation in Arizona, for example, is already 
A Biodiversity Hotspot
The Southwest is home to two of the world’s 34 designated “biodiversity hotspots.” These at-risk 
regions have two special qualities: they hold unusually large numbers of plant and animal species 
that are endemic (found nowhere else), and they have already lost over 70 percent of their native 
vegetation.467,468 About half the world’s species of plants and land animals occur only in these 34 
locations, though they cover just 2.3 percent of the Earth’s land surface. 
One of these biodiversity hotspots is the Madrean Pine-Oak Woodlands. Once covering 178 square 
miles, only isolated patches remain in the United States, mainly on mountaintops in southern Arizona, 
New Mexico, and West Texas. The greatest diversity of pine species in the world grows in this area: 
44 of the 110 varieties,469 as well as more than 150 species of oak.470 Some 5,300 to 6,700 flowering 
plant species inhabit the ecosystem, and over 500 bird species, 23 of which are endemic. More 
hummingbirds are found here than anywhere else in the United States. There are 384 species of 
reptiles, 37 of which are endemic, and 328 species of mammals, six of which are endemic. There are 
84 fish species, 18 of which are endemic. Some 200 species of butterfly thrive here, of which 45 are 
endemic, including the Monarch that migrates 2,500 miles north to Canada each year.471 Ecotourism 
has become the economic driver in many parts of this region, but logging, land clearing for agriculture, 
urban development, and now climate change threaten the region’s viability.
Change in Population 
from 1970 to 2008
The map above of percentage changes in county population 
between 1970 and 2008 shows that the Southwest has 
experienced very rapid growth in recent decades (indicated 
in orange, red, and maroon).
U.S. Census207
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not sustainable under current practices; efforts are 
underway to identify and implement adaptation 
strategies aimed at reducing these risks.476 
Unique tourism and recreation 
opportunities are likely to suffer. 
Tourism and recreation are important aspects of 
the region’s economy. Increasing temperatures will 
affect important winter activities such as down-
hill and cross-country skiing, snowshoeing, and 
snowmobiling, which require snow on the ground. 
Projections indicate later snow and less snow cov-
erage in ski resort areas, particularly those at lower 
elevations and in the southern part of the region.284 
Decreases from 40 to almost 90 percent are likely 
in end-of-season snowpack under a higher emis-
sions scenario91 in counties with major ski resorts 
from New Mexico to California.477 In addition 
to shorter seasons, earlier wet snow avalanches 
– more than six weeks earlier by the end of this 
century under a higher emissions scenario91 – could 
force ski areas to shut down affected runs before 
the season would otherwise end.478 Resorts require 
a certain number of days just to break even; cutting 
the season short by even a few weeks, particularly 
if those occur during the lucrative holiday season, 
could easily render a resort unprofitable.
Even in non-winter months, ecosystem degradation 
will affect the quality of the experience for hikers, 
bikers, birders, and others who enjoy the South-
west’s natural beauty. Water sports that depend on 
the flows of rivers and sufficient water in lakes and 
reservoirs are already being affected, and much 
larger changes are expected. 
Cities and agriculture face increasing 
risks from a changing climate.
Resource use in the Southwest is involved in a 
constant three-way tug-of-war among preserving 
natural ecosystems, supplying the needs of rapidly 
expanding urban areas, and protecting the lucrative 
agricultural sector, which, particularly in Califor-
nia, is largely based on highly temperature- and 
water-sensitive specialty crops. Urban areas are 
also sensitive to temperature-related impacts on air 
becoming more variable, with a trend toward both 
more frequent extremely dry and extremely wet 
winters.472 Some water systems rely on smaller 
reservoirs being filled up each year. More frequent 
dry winters suggest an increased risk of these 
systems running short of water. However, a greater 
potential for flooding also means reservoirs cannot 
be filled to capacity as safely in years where that 
is possible. Flooding also causes reservoirs to fill 
with sediment at a faster rate, thus reducing their 
water-storage capacities. 
On the global and national scales, precipitation 
patterns are already observed to be shifting, with 
more rain falling in heavy downpours that can lead 
to flooding.90,473 Rapid landscape transformation 
due to vegetation die-off and wildfire as well as 
loss of wetlands along rivers is also likely to reduce 
flood-buffering capacity. Moreover, increased 
flood risk in the Southwest is likely to result from a 
combination of decreased snow cover on the lower 
slopes of high mountains, and an increased fraction 
of winter precipitation falling as rain and therefore 
running off more rapidly.154 The increase in rain 
on snow events will also result in rapid runoff and 
flooding.474
The most obvious impact of more frequent flooding 
is a greater risk to human beings and their infra-
structure. This applies to locations along major riv-
ers, but also to much broader and highly vulnerable 
areas such as the Sacramento–San Joaquin River 
Delta system. Stretching from the San Francisco 
Bay nearly to the state capital of Sacramento, the 
Sacramento–San Joaquin River Delta and Suisun 
Marsh make up the largest estuary on the West 
Coast of North America. With its rich soils and 
rapid subsidence rates – in some locations as high 
as 2 or more feet per decade – the entire Delta re-
gion is now below sea level, protected by more than 
a thousand miles of levees and dams.475 Projected 
changes in the timing and amount of river flow, 
particularly in winter and spring, is estimated to 
more than double the risk of Delta flooding events 
by mid-century, and result in an eight-fold increase 
before the end of the century.476 Taking into account 
the additional risk of a major seismic event and 
increases in sea level due to climate change over 
this century, the California Bay–Delta Authority 
has concluded that the Delta and Suisun Marsh are 
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quality, electricity demand, and the health of  
their inhabitants.
The magnitude of projected temperature increases 
for the Southwest, particularly when combined 
with urban heat island effects for major cities such 
as Phoenix, Albuquerque, Las Vegas, and many 
California cities, represent significant stresses 
to health, electricity, and water supply in a re-
gion that already experiences very high summer 
temperatures.284,325,450 
If present-day levels of ozone-producing emis-
sions are maintained, rising temperatures also 
imply declining air quality in urban areas such as 
those in California which already experience some 
of the worst air quality in the nation (see Society 
sector).479 Continued rapid population growth is 
expected to exacerbate these concerns.
With more intense, longer-lasting heat wave events 
projected to occur over this century, demands for 
air conditioning are expected to deplete electricity 
supplies, increasing risks of brownouts and black-
outs.325 Electricity supplies will also be affected 
by changes in the timing of river flows and where 
hydroelectric systems have limited storage capacity 
and reservoirs (see Energy sector).480,481 
Much of the region's agriculture will experi-
ence detrimental impacts in a warmer future, 
particularly specialty crops in California such as 
apricots, almonds, artichokes, figs, kiwis, olives, 
and walnuts.482,483 These and other specialty crops 
require a minimum number of hours at a chill-
ing temperature threshold in the winter to become 
dormant and set fruit for the following year.482 
Accumulated winter chilling hours have already 
decreased across central California and its coastal 
valleys. This trend is projected to continue to the 
point where chilling thresholds for many key crops 
would no longer be met. A steady reduction in win-
ter chilling could have serious economic impacts on 
fruit and nut production in the region. California’s 
losses due to future climate change are estimated 
between zero and 40 percent for wine and table 
grapes, almonds, oranges, walnuts, and avocadoes, 
varying significantly by location.483 
Adaptation strategies for agriculture in Califor-
nia include more efficient irrigation and shifts 
in cropping patterns, which have the potential to 
help compensate for climate-driven increases in 
water demand for agriculture due to rising tem-
peratures.484 The ability to use groundwater and/or 
water designated for agriculture as backup sup-
plies for urban uses in times of severe drought is 
expected to become more important in the future as 
climate change dries out the Southwest; however, 
these supplies are at risk of being depleted as urban 
populations swell (see Water sector).
Adaptation:  Strategies for Fire
Living with present-day levels of fire risk, along with projected increases in risk, involves actions by 
residents along the urban-forest interface as well as fire and land management officials. Some basic 
strategies for reducing damage to structures due to fires are being encouraged by groups like National 
Firewise Communities, an interagency program that encourages wildfire preparedness measures 
such as creating defensible space around residential structures by thinning trees and brush, choosing 
fire-resistant plants, selecting ignition-resistant building materials and design features, positioning 
structures away from slopes, and working with firefighters to develop emergency plans.
Additional strategies for responding to the increased risk of fire as climate continues to change could 
include adding firefighting resources461 and improving evacuation procedures and communications 
infrastructure. Also important would be regularly updated insights into what the latest climate science 
implies for changes in types, locations, timing, and potential severity of fire risks over seasons to 
decades and beyond; implications for related political, legal, economic, and social institutions; and 
improving predictions for regeneration of burnt-over areas and the implications for subsequent fire 
risks. Reconsideration of policies that encourage growth of residential developments in or near forests 
is another potential avenue for adaptive strategies.462
Midwest
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Northwest
The Northwest’s rapidly growing population, as 
well as its forests, mountains, rivers, and coastlines, 
are already experiencing human-induced climate 
change and its impacts.34 Regionally averaged 
temperature rose about 1.5°F over the past cen-
tury485 (with some areas experiencing increases 
up to 4°F) and is projected to increase another 3 
to 10°F during this century.486 Higher emissions 
scenarios would result in warming in the upper end 
of the projected range. Increases in winter precipi-
tation and decreases in summer precipitation are 
projected by many climate models,487 though these 
projections are less certain than those for tem-
perature. Impacts related to changes in snowpack, 
streamflows, sea level, forests, and other important 
aspects of life in the Northwest are already un-
derway, with more severe impacts expected over 
coming decades in response to continued and more 
rapid warming.
Declining springtime snowpack leads to 
reduced summer streamflows, straining 
water supplies.
The Northwest is highly dependent on temperature-
sensitive springtime snowpack to meet growing, 
and often competing, water demands such as mu-
nicipal and industrial uses, agricultural irrigation, 
hydropower production, navigation, recreation, and 
in-stream flows that protect aquatic ecosystems in-
cluding threatened and endangered species. Higher 
cool season (October through March) temperatures 
cause more precipitation to fall as rain rather than 
snow and contribute to earlier snowmelt. April 1 
snowpack, a key indicator of natural water storage 
available for the warm season, has already declined 
substantially throughout the region. The average 
decline in the Cascade Mountains, for example, 
was about 25 percent over the past 40 to 70 years, 
with most of this due to the 2.5°F increase in cool 
season temperatures over that period.108,488 Further 
declines in Northwest snowpack are projected to 
result from additional warming over this century, 
varying with latitude, elevation, and proximity to 
the coast. April 1 snowpack is projected to de-
cline as much as 40 percent in the Cascades by the 
2040s.489 Throughout the region, earlier snowmelt 
will cause a reduction in the amount of water avail-
able during the warm season.68
In areas where it snows, a warmer climate means 
major changes in the timing of runoff: streamflow 
increases in winter and early spring, and then 
decreases in late spring, summer, and fall. This shift 
in streamflow timing has already been observed over 
the past 50 years,252 with the peak of spring runoff 
shifting from a few days earlier in some places to as 
much as 25 to 30 days earlier in others.157 
This trend is projected to continue, with runoff 
shifting 20 to 40 days earlier within this centu-
ry.157 Reductions in summer water availability will 
vary with the temperatures experienced in differ-
ent parts of the region. In relatively warm areas on 
the western slopes of the Cascade Mountains, for 
example, reductions in warm season (April through 
September) runoff of 30 percent or more are pro-
jected by mid-century, whereas colder areas in the 
Rocky Mountains are expected to see reductions of 
about 10 percent. Areas dominated by rain rather 
than snow are not expected to see major shifts in the 
timing of runoff.492 
Trends in April 1 Snow Water Equivalent
1950 to 2002
April 1 snowpack (a key indicator of natural water storage 
available for the warm season) has declined throughout the 
Northwest. In the Cascade Mountains, April 1 snowpack de-
clined by an average of 25 percent, with some areas expe-
riencing up to 60 percent declines. On the map, decreasing 
trends are in red and increasing trends are in blue.491
University of
 Washington490
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Extreme high and low streamflows also are ex-
pected to change with warming. Increasing winter 
rainfall (as opposed to snowfall) is expected to lead 
to more winter flooding in relatively warm water-
sheds on the west side of the Cascades. The already 
low flows of late summer are projected to decrease 
further due to both earlier snowmelt and increased 
evaporation and water loss from vegetation. Pro-
jected decreases in summer precipitation would 
exacerbate these effects. Some sensitive watersheds 
are projected to experience both increased flood 
risk in winter and increased drought risk in sum-
mer due to warming.
The region’s water supply infrastructure was built 
based on the assumption that most of the water 
needed for summer uses would be stored naturally 
in snowpack. For example, the storage capacity in 
Columbia Basin reservoirs is only 30 percent of the 
annual runoff, and many small urban water sup-
ply systems on the west side of the Cascades store 
less than 10 percent of their annual flow.493 Besides 
providing water supply and managing flows for 
hydropower, the region’s reservoirs are operated for 
flood-protection purposes and, as such, might have 
to release (rather than store) large amounts of run-
off during the winter and early spring to maintain 
enough space for flood protection. Earlier flows 
would thus place more of the year’s runoff into the 
category of hazard rather than resource. An ad-
vance in the timing of snowmelt runoff would also 
increase the length of the summer dry period, with 
important consequences for water supply, ecosys-
tems, and wildfire management.157
One of the largest demands on water resources in 
the region is hydroelectric power production. About 
70 percent of the Northwest’s electricity is provided 
by hydropower, a far greater percentage than in 
any other region. Warmer summers will increase 
electricity demands for air conditioning and refrig-
eration at the same time of year that lower stream-
flows will lead to reduced hydropower generation. 
At the same time, water is needed for irrigated agri-
culture, protecting fish species, reservoir and river 
recreation, and urban uses. Conflicts between all of 
these water uses are expected to increase, forcing 
complex trade-offs between competing objectives 
(see Energy and Water sectors).487,494
Increased insect outbreaks, wildfires, 
and changing species composition in for-
ests will pose challenges for ecosystems 
and the forest products industry.
Higher summer temperatures and earlier spring 
snowmelt are expected to increase the risk of forest 
fires in the Northwest by increasing summer mois-
ture deficits; this pattern has already been observed 
in recent decades. Drought stress and higher tem-
peratures will decrease tree growth in most low- 
and mid-elevation forests. They will also increase 
the frequency and intensity of mountain pine beetle 
and other insect attacks,243 further increasing fire 
risk and reducing timber production, an important 
part of the regional economy. The mountain pine 
beetle outbreak in British Columbia has destroyed 
33 million acres of trees so far, about 40 percent of 
the marketable pine trees in the province. By 2018, 
it is projected that the infestation will have run 
its course and over 78 percent of the mature pines 
will have been killed; this will affect more than 
one-third of the total area of British Columbia’s 
forests495 (see Ecosystems sector). Forest and fire 
management practices are also factors in these in-
sect outbreaks.252 Idaho’s Sawtooth Mountains are 
also now threatened by pine beetle infestation.
In the short term, high elevation forests on the west 
side of the Cascade Mountains are expected to 
Shift to Earlier Peak Streamflow
Quinault River (Olympic Peninsula, northern Washington)
As precipitation continues to shift from snow to rain, by the 2040s, 
peak flow on the Quinault River is projected to occur in December, 
and flows in June are projected to be reduced to about half of what 
they were over the past century. On the graph, the blue swath 
represents the range of projected streamflows based on an increase 
in temperature of 3.6 to 5.4°F. The other lines represent streamflows 
in the early and late 1900s.487,494
University of Washington490
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see increased growth. In the longer term, forest 
growth is expected to decrease as summertime 
soil moisture deficits limit forest productivity, 
with low-elevation forests experiencing these 
changes first. The extent and species composi-
tion of forests are also expected to change as tree 
species respond to climate change. There is also 
the potential for extinction of local populations 
and loss of biological diversity if environmental 
changes outpace species’ ability to shift their 
ranges and form successful new ecosystems. 
Agriculture, especially production of tree fruit 
such as apples, is also an important part of the 
regional economy. Decreasing irrigation supplies, 
increasing pests and disease, and increased com-
petition from weeds are likely to have negative 
effects on agricultural production.
Salmon and other coldwater species 
will experience additional stresses as a 
result of rising water temperatures and 
declining summer streamflows.
Northwest salmon populations are at historically 
low levels due to stresses imposed by a variety of 
human activities including dam building, logging, 
pollution, and over-fishing. Climate change affects 
salmon throughout their life stages and poses an 
additional stress. As more winter precipitation falls 
as rain rather than snow, higher winter stream-
flows scour streambeds, damaging spawning nests 
and washing away incubating eggs. Earlier peak 
streamflows flush young salmon from rivers to 
estuaries before they are physically mature enough 
for the transition, increasing a variety of stresses 
including the risk of being eaten by predators. 
Lower summer streamflows and warmer water 
temperatures create less favorable summer stream 
conditions for salmon and other coldwater fish 
species in many parts of the Northwest. In addition, 
diseases and parasites that infect salmon tend to 
flourish in warmer water. Climate change also im-
pacts the ocean environment, where salmon spend 
several years of their lives. Historically, warm 
periods in the coastal ocean have coincided with 
relatively low abundances of salmon, while cooler 
ocean periods have coincided with relatively high 
salmon numbers.70, 563
Most wild Pacific salmon populations are extinct 
or imperiled in 56 percent of their historical range 
in the Northwest and California,496 and populations 
are down more than 90 percent in the Columbia 
River system. Many species are listed as either 
threatened or endangered under the Federal En-
dangered Species Act. Studies suggest that about 
one-third of the current habitat for the Northwest’s 
salmon and other coldwater fish will no longer be 
suitable for them by the end of this century as key 
temperature thresholds are exceeded. Because cli-
mate change impacts on their habitat are projected 
to be negative, climate change is expected to ham-
per efforts to restore depleted salmon populations.
Sea-level rise along vulnerable coastlines 
will result in increased erosion and the 
loss of land.
Climate change is projected to exacerbate many 
of the stresses and hazards currently facing the 
coastal zone. Sea-level rise will increase erosion of 
the Northwest coast and cause the loss of beaches 
and significant coastal land areas. Among the most 
vulnerable parts of the coast is the heavily popu-
lated south Puget Sound region, which includes 
the cities of Olympia, Tacoma, and Seattle, Wash-
ington. Some climate models project changes in 
atmospheric pressure patterns that suggest a more 
southwesterly direction of future winter winds. 
Combined with higher sea levels, this would accel-
erate coastal erosion all along the Pacific Coast.
Sea-level rise in the Northwest (as elsewhere) is 
Decreasing Habitat for Coldwater Fish 
Increasing air temperatures lead to rising water temperatures, which in-
crease stress on coldwater fish such as trout, salmon, and steelhead. August 
average air temperature above 70°F is a threshold above which these fish are 
severely stressed. Projected temperatures for the 2020s and 2040s under 
a higher emissions scenario suggest that the habitat for these fish is likely 
to decrease dramatically.486,497,568,569
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determined by global rates of 
sea-level rise, changes in coastal 
elevation associated with local 
vertical movement of the land, 
and atmospheric circulation 
patterns that influence wind-
driven “pile-up” of water along 
the coast. A mid-range estimate 
of relative sea-level rise for the 
Puget Sound basin is about 13 
inches by 2100. However, higher 
levels of up to 50 inches by 
2100 in more rapidly subsiding 
(sinking) portions of the basin 
are also possible given the large 
uncertainties about accelerating 
rates of ice melt from Greenland 
and Antarctica in recent years 
(see Global and National Cli-
mate Change sections).498
An additional concern is landslides on coastal bluffs. The projected heavier winter rainfall suggests an 
increase in saturated soils and, therefore, an increased number of landslides. Increased frequency and/
or severity of landslides is expected to be especially problematic in areas where there has been intensive 
development on unstable slopes. Within Puget Sound, the cycle of beach erosion and bluff landslides will be 
exacerbated by sea-level rise, increasing beach erosion, and decreasing slope stability.
Adaptation:   Improved Planning to Cope with Future Changes
States, counties, and cities in the Northwest are beginning to develop strategies to adapt to climate 
change. In 2007, Washington state convened stakeholders to develop adaptation strategies for water, 
agriculture, forests, coasts, infrastructure, and human health. Recommendations included improved 
drought planning, improved monitoring of diseases and pests, incorporating sea-level rise in coastal 
planning, and public education. An implementation strategy is under development.
In response to concerns about increasing flood risk, King County, Washington, approved plans in 2007 to 
fund repairs to the county’s aging levee system. The county also will replace more than 57 “short-span” 
bridges with wider span structures that allow more debris and floodwater to pass underneath rather 
than backing up and causing the river to flood. The county has begun incorporating porous concrete and 
rain gardens into road projects to manage the effects of stormwater runoff during heavy rains, which are 
increasing as climate changes. King County has also published an adaptation guidebook that is becoming 
a model that other local governments can refer to in order to organize adaptation actions within their 
municipal planning processes.500
Concern about sea-level rise in Olympia, Washington, contributed to the city’s decision to relocate its 
primary drinking water source from a low-lying surface water source to wells on higher ground. The city 
adjusted its plans for construction of a new City Hall to locate the building in an area less vulnerable to 
sea-level rise than the original proposed location. The building’s foundation also was raised by 1 foot.
Northwest Cities at Risk to Sea-Level Rise
Highly populated coastal areas throughout Puget Sound, Washington, are vulnerable 
to sea-level rise. The maps show regions of Olympia and Harbor Island (both located 
in Puget Sound) that are likely to be lost to sea-level rise by the end of this century 
based on moderate and high estimates.
Petersen499
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Over the past 50 years, Alaska has warmed at 
more than twice the rate of the rest of the United 
States’ average. Its annual average temperature 
has increased 3.4°F, while winters have warmed 
even more, by 6.3°F.501 As a result, climate change 
impacts are much more pronounced than in other 
regions of the United States. The higher tempera-
tures are already contributing to earlier spring 
snowmelt, reduced sea ice, widespread glacier 
retreat, and permafrost warming.220,501 These ob-
served changes are consistent with climate model 
projections of greater warming over Alaska, 
especially in winter, as compared to the rest of  
the country. 
Climate models also project increases in pre-
cipitation over Alaska. Simultaneous increases 
in evaporation due to higher air temperatures, 
however, are expected to lead to drier condi-
tions overall, with reduced soil moisture.90 In the 
future, therefore, model projections suggest a 
longer summer growing season combined with an 
increased likelihood of summer drought  
and wildfires. 
Average annual temperatures in Alaska are 
projected to rise about 3.5 to 7°F by the middle 
of this century. How much temperatures rise later 
in the century depends strongly on global emis-
sions choices, with increases of 5 to 8°F projected 
with lower emissions, and increases of 8 to 13°F 
with higher emissions.91 Higher temperatures 
are expected to continue to reduce Arctic sea ice 
coverage. Reduced sea ice provides opportunities 
for increased shipping and resource extraction. At 
the same time, it increases coastal erosion522 and 
flooding associated with coastal storms. Reduced 
sea ice also alters the timing and location of 
plankton blooms, which is expected to drive major 
shifts of marine species such as pollock and other 
commercial fish stocks.527
Observed and Projected Temperature Rise
Alaska’s annual average temperature has increased 3.4ºF over the past 
50 years. The observed increase shown above compares the average 
temperature of 1993-2007 with a 1960s-1970s baseline, an increase of 
over 2ºF. The brackets on the thermometers represent the likely range 
of model projections, though lower or higher outcomes are possible. By 
the end of this century, the average temperature is projected to rise by 
5 to 13ºF above the 1960s-1970s baseline. 
CMIP3-A93
Fairbanks Frost-Free Season, 1904 to 2008
Over the past 100 years, the length of the frost-free season 
in Fairbanks, Alaska, has increased by 50 percent. The trend 
toward a longer frost-free season is projected to produce 
benefits in some sectors and detriments in others.
University of Alaska502
U.S. Global Change Research Program
140 141
Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States Regional Climate Impacts: Alaska
Longer summers and higher 
temperatures are causing drier 
conditions, even in the absence of 
strong trends in precipitation.
Between 1970 and 2000, the snow-free season 
increased by approximately 10 days across 
Alaska, primarily due to earlier snowmelt in the 
spring.503,504 A longer growing season has potential 
economic benefits, providing a longer period of 
outdoor and commercial activity such as tourism. 
However, there are also downsides. For example, 
white spruce forests in Alaska’s interior are expe-
riencing declining growth due to drought stress505 
and continued warming could lead to widespread 
death of trees.506 The decreased soil moisture in 
Alaska also suggests that agriculture in Alaska 
might not benefit from the longer growing season.
Insect outbreaks and wildfires are 
increasing with warming. 
Climate plays a key role in determining the extent 
and severity of insect outbreaks and wildfires.506,507 
During the 1990s, for example, south-central 
Alaska experienced the largest outbreak of spruce 
beetles in the world.243,506 This outbreak occurred 
because rising temperatures allowed the spruce 
beetle to survive over the winter and to complete its 
life cycle in just one year instead of the normal two 
years. Healthy trees ordinarily defend themselves 
by pushing back against burrowing beetles with 
their pitch. From 1989 to 1997, however, the region 
experienced an extended drought, leaving the trees 
too stressed to fight off the infestation. 
Alaska Spruce Beetle Infestation 
Kenai Peninsula, 1972 to 1998
Warming in Alaska has caused insect outbreaks to increase. Red areas indicate spruce beetle infestations on the Kenai Peninsula. 
Over 5 million acres of Alaska spruce forests were destroyed.  
Berman et al.508
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also important to Native peoples who hunt and fish 
for their food in interior Alaska. Many villages 
are located adjacent to wetlands that support an 
abundance of wildlife resources. The sustainability 
of these traditional lifestyles is thus threatened by a 
loss of wetlands.
Thawing permafrost damages roads, 
runways, water and sewer systems, and 
other infrastructure.
Permafrost temperatures have increased throughout 
Alaska since the late 1970s.149 The largest increases 
have been measured in the northern part of the 
state.515 While permafrost in interior Alaska so far 
has experienced less warming than permafrost in 
northern Alaska, it is more vulnerable to thawing 
during this century because it is generally just 
below the freezing point, while permafrost in 
northern Alaska is colder. 
Land subsidence (sinking) associated with the 
thawing of permafrost presents substantial chal-
lenges to engineers attempting to preserve infra-
structure in Alaska.516 Public infrastructure at risk 
for damage includes roads, runways, and water 
and sewer systems. It is estimated that thawing 
Prior to 1990, the spruce budworm was not able to 
reproduce in interior Alaska.506 Hotter, drier sum-
mers, however, now mean that the forests there are 
threatened by an outbreak of spruce budworms.509 
This trend is expected to increase in the future 
if summers in Alaska become hotter and drier.506 
Large areas of dead trees, such as those left behind 
by pest infestations, are highly flammable and thus 
much more vulnerable to wildfire than living trees.
The area burned in North America’s northern forest 
that spans Alaska and Canada tripled from the 
1960s to the 1990s. Two of the three most exten-
sive wildfire seasons in Alaska’s 56-year record 
occurred in 2004 and 2005, and half of the most 
severe fire years on record have occurred since 
1990.510 Under changing climate conditions, the av-
erage area burned per year in Alaska is projected to 
double by the middle of this century.507 By the end 
of this century, area burned by fire is projected to 
triple under a moderate greenhouse gas emissions 
scenario and to quadruple under a higher emissions 
scenario.91 Such increases in area burned would 
result in numerous impacts, including hazardous 
air quality conditions such as those suffered by 
residents of Fairbanks during the summers of 2004 
and 2005, as well as increased risks to rural Native 
Alaskan communities because of reduced avail-
ability of the fish and game that make up their diet. 
This would cause them to adopt a more “Western” 
diet,511 known to be associated with increased risk 
of cancers, diabetes, and cardiovascular disease.512
Lakes are declining in area.
Across the southern two-thirds of Alaska, the 
area of closed-basin lakes (lakes without stream 
inputs and outputs) has decreased over the past 50 
years. This is likely due to the greater evapora-
tion and thawing of permafrost that result from 
warming.513,514 A continued decline in the area of 
surface water would present challenges for the 
management of natural resources and ecosystems 
on National Wildlife Refuges in Alaska. These 
refuges, which cover over 77 million acres (21 per-
cent of Alaska) and comprise 81 percent of the U.S. 
National Wildlife Refuge System, provide breeding 
habitat for millions of waterfowl and shorebirds 
that winter in the lower 48 states. Wetlands are 
Ponds in Alaska are Shrinking (1951 to 2000)
Yukon Flats National Wildlife Refuge
Ponds across Alaska, including those shown above in the northeastern 
interior of the state, have shrunk as a result of increased evaporation 
and permafrost thawing. The pond in the top pair of images shrunk 
from 180 to 10 acres; the larger pond in the bottom pair of images 
shrunk from 90 to 4 acres.
Riordan et al.514
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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permafrost would add between $3.6 billion and $6.1 billion (10 to 
20 percent) to future costs for publicly owned infrastructure by 
2030 and between $5.6 billion and $7.6 billion (10 to 12 percent) 
by 2080.230 Analyses of the additional costs of permafrost thaw-
ing to private property have not yet been conducted.
Thawing ground also has implications for oil and gas drilling. As 
one example, the number of days per year in which travel on the 
tundra is allowed under Alaska Department of Natural Re-
sources standards has dropped from more than 200 to about 100 
days in the past 30 years. This results in a 50 percent reduction 
in days that oil and gas exploration and extraction equipment can 
be used.220,245 
Thawing permafrost can push natural ecosystems across thresh-
olds. Some forests in Alaska are literally toppling over as the 
permafrost beneath them thaws, undermining the 
root systems of trees (see photo next page).
Coastal storms increase risks to villages 
and fishing fleets.
Alaska has more coastline than the other 49 states 
combined. Frequent storms in the Gulf of Alaska 
and the Bering, Chukchi, and Beaufort Seas already 
affect the coasts during much of the year. Alaska’s 
coastlines, many of which are low in elevation, are 
increasingly threatened by a combination of the loss 
of their protective sea ice buffer, increasing storm 
activity, and thawing coastal permafrost.
Increasing storm activity in autumn in recent 
years520 has delayed or prevented barge operations 
Permafrost Temperature, 
1978 to 2008
Deadhorse, northern Alaska
Permafrost temperatures have risen throughout Alaska, 
with the largest increases in the northern part of the 
state. 
Brown and Romanovsky517
Changing Permafrost Distribution
Moderate Warming Scenario
The maps show projected thawing on the Seward Peninsula by the end 
of this century under a moderate warming scenario approximately half-
way between the lower and higher emissions scenarios91 described on 
page 23.
Busey et al.518
Adaptation:  Keeping Soil Around the Pipeline Cool
When permafrost thaws, it can cause the soil to sink or 
settle, damaging structures built upon or within that soil. 
A warming climate and burial of supports for the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline System both contribute to thawing of 
the permafrost around the pipeline. In locations on the 
pipeline route where soils were ice-rich, a unique above-
ground system was developed to keep the ground cool. 
Thermal siphons were designed to disperse heat to the 
air that would otherwise be transferred to the soil, and 
these siphons were placed on the pilings that support the 
pipeline. While this unique technology added significant 
expense to the pipeline construction, it helps to greatly 
increase the useful lifetime of this structure.519
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that supply coastal communities with fuel. 
Commercial fishing fleets and other marine 
traffic are also strongly affected by Bering Sea storms. High-wind events have become more frequent along 
the western and northern coasts. The same regions are experiencing increasingly long sea-ice-free seasons and 
hence longer periods during which coastal areas are especially vulnerable to wind and wave damage. Downtown 
streets in Nome, Alaska, have flooded in recent years. Coastal erosion is causing the shorelines of some areas 
to retreat at average rates of tens of feet per year. The ground beneath several native communities is literally 
crumbling into the sea, forcing residents to confront difficult and expensive choices between relocation and 
engineering strategies that require continuing investments despite their uncertain effectiveness (see Society 
sector). The rate of erosion 
along Alaska’s northeastern 
coastline has doubled over the 
past 50 years.522 
Over this century, an increase 
of sea surface temperatures 
and a reduction of ice cover 
are likely to lead to northward 
shifts in the Pacific storm 
track and increased impacts 
on coastal Alaska.523,524 
Climate models project the 
Bering Sea to experience the 
largest decreases in atmo-
spheric pressure in the North-
ern Hemisphere, suggesting 
an increase in storm activity 
in the region.90 In addition, the 
longer ice-free season is likely 
to make more heat and mois-
ture available for storms in the 
Arctic Ocean, increasing their 
frequency and/or intensity.
Annual Number of Storms at Barrow, Alaska, 1950-2004
(northernmost town in the United States)
The number of coastal storms has generally increased as the amount of ice along the 
coast has decreased. This increase threatens commercial activity and communities 
in Alaska. The blue line indicates the annual number of open-water storms, those 
occurring in primarily ice-free water (July to December). The purple line indicates the 
number of storms occurring when thick sea ice is present (January to June). The black 
and green lines are smoothed using 5-year averages. 
Barrow
University of Alaska525
Projected Coastal Erosion, 2007 to 2027  
Newtok, western Alaska
Many of Alaska’s coastlines are eroding rapidly; the disappearance of coastal 
land is forcing communities to relocate. The 2007 line on the image indicates 
where Newtok, Alaska’s shoreline had eroded to by 2007. The other lines 
are projected assuming a conservative erosion rate of 36 to 83 feet per year; 
however, Newtok residents reported a July 2003 erosion rate of 110 feet 
per year. 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers521
Leaning trees in this Alaska forest tilt because the 
ground beneath them, which used to be perma-
nently frozen, has thawed. Forests like this are named 
“drunken forests.”
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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the extent and location of the ice edge in spring. As 
the sea ice retreats, the location, timing, and spe-
cies composition of the plankton blooms changes, 
reducing the amount of food reaching the living 
things on the ocean floor. This radically changes 
the species composition and populations of fish and 
other marine life forms, with significant repercus-
sions for fisheries527 (see Ecosystems sector).
Over the course of this century, changes already 
observed on the shallow shelf of the northern 
Bering Sea are likely to affect a much broader por-
tion of the Pacific-influenced sector of the Arctic 
Ocean. As such changes occur, the most productive 
commercial fisheries are likely to become more 
distant from existing fishing ports and processing 
infrastructure, requiring either relocation or greater 
investment in transportation time and fuel costs. 
These changes will also affect the ability of Native 
Peoples to successfully hunt and fish for the food 
they need to survive. Coastal communities are 
already noticing a displacement of walrus and seal 
populations. Bottom-feeding walrus populations 
are threatened when their sea ice platform retreats 
from the shallow coastal feeding grounds on which 
they depend.528
Displacement of marine species will 
affect key fisheries.
Alaska leads the United States in the value of its 
commercial fishing catch. Most of the nation’s 
salmon, crab, halibut, and herring come from 
Alaska. In addition, many Native communities 
depend on local harvests of fish, walruses, seals, 
whales, seabirds, and other marine species for  
their food supply. Climate change causes signifi-
cant alterations in marine ecosystems with impor-
tant implications for fisheries. Ocean acidification 
associated with a rising carbon dioxide concentra-
tion represents an additional threat to coldwater 
marine ecosystems23,526 (see Ecosystems sector and 
Coasts region).
One of the most productive areas for Alaska 
fisheries is the northern Bering Sea off Alaska’s 
west coast. The world’s largest single fishery is the 
Bering Sea pollock fishery, which has undergone 
major declines in recent years. Over much of the 
past decade, as air and water temperatures rose, 
sea ice in this region declined sharply. Populations 
of fish, seabirds, seals, walruses, and other species 
depend on plankton blooms that are regulated by 
Marine Species Shifting Northward
1982 to 2006
As air and water temperatures rise, marine species are moving northward, affecting fisheries, ecosystems, and 
coastal communities that depend on the food source. On average, by 2006, the center of the range for the 
examined species moved 19 miles north of their 1982 locations.
Mueter and Litzow529
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Islands
Climate change presents the Pacific and Caribbean 
islands with unique challenges. The U.S. affili-
ated Pacific Islands are home to approximately 
1.7 million people in the Hawaiian Islands; Palau; 
the Samoan Islands of Tutuila, Manua, Rose, and 
Swains; and islands in the Micronesian archi-
pelago, the Carolines, Marshalls, and Marianas.530 
These include volcanic, continental, and limestone 
islands, atolls, and islands of mixed geologies.530 
The degree to which climate change and variability 
will affect each of the roughly 30,000 islands in the 
Pacific depends upon a variety of factors, including 
the island’s geology, area, height above sea level, 
extent of reef formation, and the size of its freshwa-
ter aquifer.531 
In addition to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands, there are 40 island nations in the Caribbean 
that are home to approximately 38 million people.532 
Population growth, often concentrated in coastal 
areas, escalates the vulnerability of both Pacific 
and Caribbean island communities to the effects of 
climate change, as do weakened traditional sup-
port systems. Tourism and fisheries, both of which 
are climate-sensitive, play a large economic role in 
these communities.530
Small islands are considered among the most vul-
nerable to climate change because extreme events 
have major impacts on them. Changes in weather 
patterns and the frequency and intensity of extreme 
events, sea-level rise, coastal erosion, coral reef 
bleaching, ocean acidification, and contamination 
of freshwater resources by salt water are among the 
impacts small islands face.533 
Islands have experienced rising temperatures and 
sea levels in recent decades. Projections for the rest 
of this century suggest:
Increases in air and ocean surface temperatures • 
in both the Pacific and Caribbean;90
An overall decrease in rainfall in the Carib-• 
bean; and
An increased frequency of heavy downpours • 
and increased rainfall during summer months 
(rather than the normal rainy season in winter 
months) for the Pacific (although the range of 
projections regarding rainfall in the Pacific is 
still quite large).
The number of heavy rain events is very likely to 
increase.90 Hurricane (typhoon) wind speeds and 
rainfall rates are likely to increase with continued 
Air temperatures have increased over the last 100 years in both the Pacific Island and Caribbean regions. Larger in-
creases are projected in the future, with higher emissions scenarios91 producing considerably greater increases. The 
shaded areas show the likely ranges while the lines show the central projections from a set of climate models.
Air Temperature Change, Observed and Projected, 1900 to 2100  
relative to 1960-1979 average
Pacific Islands Caribbean
Smith et al.72; CMIP3-A93
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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warming.68 Islands and other low-lying coastal 
areas will be at increased risk from coastal inun-
dation due to sea-level rise and storm surge, with 
major implications for coastal communities, infra-
structure, natural habitats, and resources.
The availability of freshwater is likely to 
be reduced, with significant implications 
for island communities, economies,  
and resources. 
Most island communities in the Pacific and the 
Caribbean have limited sources of the freshwater 
needed to support unique ecosystems and biodiver-
sity, public health, agriculture, and tourism. Con-
ventional freshwater resources include rainwater 
collection, groundwater, and surface water.534 For 
drinking and bathing, smaller Pacific islands pri-
marily rely on individual rainwater catchment sys-
tems, while groundwater from the freshwater lens 
is used for irrigation. The size of freshwater lenses 
in atolls is influenced by factors such as rates of 
recharge (through precipitation), rates of use, and 
extent of tidal inundation.531 Since rainfall trig-
gers the formation of the freshwater lens, changes 
in precipitation, such as the significant decreases 
projected for the Caribbean, can significantly affect 
the availability of water. Because tropical storms 
replenish water supplies, potential changes in these 
storms are a great concern.
While it might initially be seen as a benefit, in-
creased rainfall in the Pacific Islands during the 
summer months is likely to result in increased 
flooding, which would reduce drinking water quali-
ty and crop yields.534 In addition, many islands have 
weak distribution systems and old infrastructure, 
which result in significant water leakage, decreas-
ing their ability to use freshwater efficiently. Water 
pollution (such as from agriculture or sewage), 
exacerbated by storms and floods, can contaminate 
the freshwater supply, affecting public health. Sea-
level rise also affects island water supplies by caus-
ing salt water to contaminate the freshwater lens 
and by causing an increased frequency of flooding 
due to storm high tides.531 Finally, a rapidly rising 
population is straining the limited water resources, 
as would an increased incidence and/or intensity of 
storms534 or periods of prolonged drought.
Island communities, infrastructure, and 
ecosystems are vulnerable to coastal 
inundation due to sea-level rise and 
coastal storms.
Sea-level rise will have enormous effects on many 
island nations. Flooding will become more frequent 
due to higher storm tides, and coastal land will be 
permanently lost as the sea inundates low- 
lying areas and the shorelines erode. Loss of land 
Freshwater Lens
Many island communities depend on freshwater 
lenses, which are recharged by precipitation. The 
amount of water a freshwater lens contains is 
determined by the size of the island, the amount of 
rainfall, rates of water withdrawal, the permeability 
of the rock beneath the island, and salt mixing due 
to storm- or tide-induced pressure. Freshwater 
lenses can be as shallow as 4 to 8 inches or as deep 
as 65 feet.534
Adapted from Burns534
Caribbean Precipitation Change 
1900 to 2100
Total annual precipitation has declined in the Caribbean 
and climate models project stronger declines in the fu-
ture, particularly under higher emission scenarios.91 Such 
decreases threaten island communities that rely on rainfall 
for replenishing their freshwater supplies. The shaded areas 
show the likely ranges while the lines show the central 
projections from a set of climate models.
CMIP3-A93
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will reduce freshwater supplies531 and affect living 
things in coastal ecosystems. For example, the 
Northwestern Hawaiian Islands, which are low-
lying and therefore at great risk from increasing sea 
level, have a high concentration of endangered and 
threatened species, some of which exist nowhere 
else.535 The loss of nesting and nursing habitat is 
expected to threaten the survival of already vulner-
able species.535
In addition to gradual sea-level rise, extreme high 
water level events can result from a combination 
of coastal processes.271 For example, the harbor 
in Honolulu, Hawaii, experienced the highest 
daily average sea level ever recorded in Septem-
ber 2003. This resulted from the combination of 
long-term sea-level rise, normal seasonal heating 
(which causes the volume of water to expand and 
thus the level of the sea to rise), seasonal high tide, 
and an ocean circulation event which temporarily 
raised local sea level.536 The interval between such 
extreme events has decreased from more than 20 
years to approximately 5 years as average sea level 
has risen.536
Hurricanes, typhoons, and other storm events, with 
their intense precipitation and storm surge, cause 
major impacts to Pacific and Caribbean island com-
munities, including loss of life, damage to infrastruc-
ture and property, and contamination of freshwater 
supplies.537 As the climate continues to warm, the 
peak wind intensities and near-storm precipitation 
from future tropical cyclones are likely to increase,90 
which, combined with sea-level rise, is expected to 
cause higher storm surge levels. If such events occur 
frequently, communities would face challenges in 
recovering between events, resulting in long-term 
deterioration of infrastructure, freshwater and agri-
cultural resources, and other impacts.246 
Adaptation:   Securing Water Resources
In the islands, “water is gold.” Effective adaptation to climate-related 
changes in the availability of freshwater is thus a high priority. While island 
communities cannot completely counter the threats to water supplies 
posed by global warming, effective adaptation approaches can help reduce 
the damage. 
When existing resources fall short, managers look to unconventional 
resources, such as desalinating seawater, importing water by ship, and 
using treated wastewater for non-drinking uses. Desalination costs are 
declining, though concerns remain about the impact on marine life, the 
disposal of concentrated brines that may contain chemical waste, and the large energy use (and associated 
carbon footprint) of the process.146 With limited natural resources, the key to successful water resource 
management in the islands will continue to be “conserve, recover, and reuse.”530
Pacific Island communities are also making use of the latest science. This effort started during the 1997 to 
1998 El Niño, when managers began using seasonal forecasts to prepare for droughts by increasing public 
awareness and encouraging water conservation. In addition, resource managers can improve infrastruc-
ture, such as by fixing water distribution systems to minimize leakage and by increasing freshwater  
storage capacity.530
A billboard on Pohnpei, in the Fed-
erated States of Micronesia, encour-
ages water conservation in prepara-
tion for the 1997 to 1998 El Niño. 
Extreme Sea-Level Days: Honolulu, Hawaii
Sea-level rise will result in permanent land loss and reductions in 
freshwater supplies, as well as threaten coastal ecosystems. “Extreme” 
sea-level days (with a daily average of more than 6 inches above the 
long-term average90) can result from the combined effects of gradual 
sea-level rise due to warming and other phenomena, including seasonal 
heating and high tides.
Firing and Merrifield536
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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Critical infrastruc-
ture, including 
homes, airports, and 
roads, tends to be 
located along the 
coast. Flooding re-
lated to sea-level rise 
and hurricanes and 
typhoons negatively 
affects port facili-
ties and harbors, and 
causes closures of 
roads, airports, and bridges.538 Long-term infra-
structure damage would affect social services such 
as disaster risk management, health care, education, 
management of freshwater resources, and economic 
activity in sectors such as tourism and agriculture. 
Climate changes affecting coastal and 
marine ecosystems will have major 
implications for tourism and fisheries.
Marine and coastal ecosystems of the islands are 
particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate 
change. Sea-level rise, increasing water tempera-
tures, rising storm intensity, coastal inundation  
and flooding from extreme events, beach erosion, 
ocean acidification, increased incidences of coral 
disease, and increased invasions by non-native 
species are among the threats that endanger the 
ecosystems that provide safety, sustenance, eco-
nomic viability, and cultural and traditional values 
to island communities.539
Tourism is a vital part of the economy for many 
islands. In 1999, the Caribbean had tourism-based 
gross earnings of $17 billion, providing 900,000 
jobs and making the Caribbean one of the most 
tourism dependent regions in the world.532 In the 
South Pacific, tourism can contribute as much as 
47 percent of gross domestic product.540 In Hawaii, 
tourism generated $12.4 billion for the state in 
2006, with over 7 million visitors.541 
Sea-level rise can erode beaches, and along with 
increasing water temperatures, can destroy or de-
grade natural resources such as mangroves and cor-
al reef ecosystems that attract tourists.246 Extreme 
weather events can affect transportation systems 
and interrupt communications. The availability of 
freshwater is critical to sustaining tourism, but is 
subject to the climate-related impacts described 
on the previous page. Public health concerns about 
diseases would also negatively affect tourism. 
Coral reefs sustain fisheries and tourism, have 
biodiversity value, scientific and educational value, 
and form natural protection against wave erosion.542 
For Hawaii alone, net benefits of reefs to the econo-
my are estimated at $360 million annually, and the 
overall asset value is conservatively estimated to be 
nearly $10 billion.542 In the Caribbean, coral reefs 
provide annual net benefits from fisheries, tourism, 
and shoreline protection services of between $3.1 
billion and $4.6 billion. The loss of income by 2015 
from degraded reefs is conservatively estimated at 
several hundred million dollars annually.532,543 
Coral reef ecosystems are particularly susceptible 
to the impacts of climate change, as even small 
increases in water temperature can cause coral 
bleaching,544 damaging and killing corals. Ocean 
acidification due to a rising carbon dioxide concen-
tration poses an additional threat (see Ecosystems 
sector and Coasts region). Coral reef ecosystems 
are also especially vulnerable to invasive species.545 
These impacts, combined with changes in the oc-
currence and intensity of El Niño events, rising sea 
level, and increasing storm damage,246 will have 
major negative effects on coral reef ecosystems.
Fisheries feed local people and island economies. 
Almost all communities within the Pacific Islands 
derive over 25 percent of their animal protein from 
fish, with some deriving up to 69 percent.546 For 
island fisheries sustained by healthy coral reef and 
marine ecosystems, climate change impacts exacer-
bate stresses such as overfishing,246 affecting both 
fisheries and tourism that depend on abundant and 
diverse reef fish. The loss of live corals results in 
local extinctions and a reduced number of reef  
fish species.547
Nearly 70 percent of the world’s annual tuna har-
vest, approximately 3.2 million tons, comes from 
the Pacific Ocean.548 Climate change is projected to 
cause a decline in tuna stocks and an eastward  
shift in their location, affecting the catch of  
certain countries.246
Coastal houses and an airport in the U.S.-
affiliated Federated States of Micronesia rely 
on mangroves’ protection from erosion and 
damage due to rising sea level, waves, storm 
surges, and wind.
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Approximately one-third of all Americans live in 
counties immediately bordering the nation’s ocean 
coasts.549,550 In addition to accommodating major cities, 
the coasts and the exclusive economic zone extend-
ing 200 miles offshore provide enjoyment, recreation, 
seafood, transportation of goods, and energy. Coastal 
and ocean activities contribute more than $1 trillion to 
the nation’s gross domestic product and the ecosystems 
hold rich biodiversity and provide invaluable servic-
es.551 However, intense human uses have taken a toll on 
coastal environments and their resources. Many fish 
stocks have been severely diminished by over-fishing, 
large “dead zones” depleted of oxygen have developed 
as a result of pollution by excess nitrogen runoff, toxic 
blooms of algae are increasingly frequent, and coral 
reefs are badly damaged or becoming overgrown with 
algae. About half of the nation’s coastal wetlands have 
been lost – and most of this loss has occurred during 
the past 50 years.
Global climate change imposes additional stresses 
on coastal environments. Rising sea level is already 
eroding shorelines, drowning wetlands, and threaten-
ing the built environment.43,224 The destructive po-
tential of Atlantic tropical storms and hurricanes has 
increased since 1970 in association with increasing 
Atlantic sea surface temperatures, and it is likely that 
hurricane rainfall and wind speeds will increase in 
response to global warming.112 Coastal water tempera-
tures have risen by about 2°F in several regions, and 
the geographic distributions of marine species have 
shifted.37,68,347 Precipitation increases on land have 
increased river runoff, polluting coastal waters with 
more nitrogen and phosphorous, sediments, and other 
contaminants. Furthermore, increasing acidification 
resulting from the uptake of carbon dioxide by ocean 
waters threatens corals, shellfish, and other living 
things that form their shells and skeletons from cal-
cium carbonate23 (see Ecosystems sector). All of these 
forces converge and interact at the coasts, making 
these areas particularly sensitive to the impacts of 
climate change.
Significant sea-level rise and storm surge 
will adversely affect coastal cities and 
ecosystems around the nation; low-lying 
and subsiding areas are most vulnerable.
The rise in sea level relative to the land surface in any 
given location is a function of both the amount of glob-
al average sea-level rise and the degree to which the 
land is rising or falling. During the past century in the 
United States, relative sea level changes ranged from 
falling several inches to rising as much as 2 feet.225 
High rates of relative sea-level rise, coupled with cut-
ting off the supply of sediments from the Mississippi 
River and other human alterations, have resulted in the 
loss of 1,900 square miles of Louisiana’s coastal wet-
lands during the past century, weakening their capacity 
Various forces of climate change at the coasts pose a complex array of management challenges and adaptation 
requirements. For example, relative sea level is expected to rise at least 2 feet in Chesapeake Bay (located 
between Maryland and Virginia) where the land is subsiding, threatening portions of cities, inhabited islands, 
most tidal wetlands, and other low-lying regions. Climate change also will affect the volume of the bay, its 
salinity distribution and circulation, as will changes in precipitation and freshwater runoff. These changes, in 
turn, will affect summertime oxygen depletion and efforts to reduce the agricultural nitrogen runoff that 
causes it. Meanwhile the warming of the bay’s waters will make survival there difficult for northern species 
such as eelgrass and soft clams, while allowing southern species and invaders riding in ships’ ballast water 
to move in and change the mix of species that are caught and must be managed. Additionally, more acidic 
waters resulting from rising carbon dioxide levels will make it difficult for oysters to build their shells and will 
complicate the recovery of this key species.553
Multiple Stresses Confront Coastal Regions
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to absorb the storm surge of hurricanes 
such as Katrina.552 Shoreline retreat is 
occurring along most of the nation’s 
exposed shores.
The amount of sea-level rise likely to 
be experienced during this century 
depends mainly on the expansion of 
the ocean volume due to warming and 
the response of glaciers and polar ice 
sheets. Complex processes control the discharges from polar ice sheets and 
some are already producing substantial additions of water to the ocean.554 
Because these processes are not well understood, it is difficult to predict 
their future contributions to sea-level rise.90,555 
As discussed in the Global Climate Change section, recent estimates of 
global sea-level rise substantially exceed the IPCC estimates, suggesting 
sea-level rise between 3 and 4 feet in this century. Even a 2-foot rise in 
relative sea level over a century would result in the loss of a large portion 
of the nation’s remaining coastal wetlands, as they are not able to build new 
soil at a fast enough rate.164 Accelerated sea-level rise would affect sea-
grasses, coral reefs, and other important habitats. It would also fragment 
barrier islands, and place into jeopardy existing homes, businesses, and 
infrastructure, including roads, ports, and water and sewage systems. Por-
tions of major cities, including Boston and New York, would be subject to 
inundation by ocean water 
during storm surges or even 
during regular high tides.234
More spring runoff and warmer coastal waters 
will increase the seasonal reduction in oxygen 
resulting from excess nitrogen from agriculture.
Coastal dead zones in places such as the northern Gulf of 
Mexico556 and the Chesapeake Bay557 are likely to increase 
in size and intensity as warming increases unless efforts 
to control runoff of agricultural fertilizers are redoubled. 
Greater spring runoff into East Coast estuaries and the Gulf 
of Mexico would flush more nitrogen into coastal waters 
stimulating harmful blooms of algae and the excess produc-
tion of microscopic plants that settle near the seafloor and 
deplete oxygen supplies as they decompose. In addition, all 
else being equal, greater runoff reduces salinity, which when 
coupled with warmer surface water increases the difference 
in density between surface and bottom waters, thus pre-
venting the replacement of oxygen in the deeper waters. As 
dissolved oxygen levels decline below a certain level, living 
things cannot survive. They leave the area if they can, and die 
if they cannot.
A “ghost swamp” in south Louisiana 
shows the effects of saltwater intrusion.
Dead Zones in the 
Chesapeake Bay
Climate change is likely to expand and intensify 
“dead zones,” areas where bottom water is de-
pleted of dissolved oxygen because of nitrogen 
pollution, threatening living things.
Wicks et al.558
Projected Sea-Level Rise
by 2100
Estimates of sea-level rise by the end 
of the century for three emissions 
scenarios.91 Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change 2007 projections 
(range shown as bars) exclude changes 
in ice sheet flow.90 Light blue circles 
represent more recent, central estimates 
derived using the observed relationship 
of sea-level rise to temperature.103 Areas 
where coastal land is sinking, for example 
by as much as 1.5 feet in this century 
along portions of the Gulf Coast, would 
experience that much additional sea-level 
rise relative to the land.128
Meehl et al.90; Rahmstorf103
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Coastal waters are very likely to continue to warm by 
as much 4 to 8°F in this century, both in summer and 
winter.234 This will result in a northward shift in the 
geographic distribution of marine life along the coasts; 
this is already being observed.70,347 The shift occurs 
because some species cannot tolerate the higher tem-
peratures and others are out-competed by species from 
farther south moving in.270 Warming also opens the door 
to invasion by species that humans are intentionally or 
unintentionally transporting around the world, for ex-
ample in the ballast water carried by ships. Species that 
were previously unable to establish populations because 
of cold winters are likely to find the warmer conditions 
more welcoming and gain a foothold,567 particularly 
as native species are under stress from climate change 
and other human activities. Non-native clams and small 
crustaceans have already had major effects on the San 
Francisco Bay ecosystem and the health of its fishery 
resources.559
Higher water temperatures and ocean 
acidification due to increasing atmospheric 
carbon dioxide will present major additional 
stresses to coral 
reefs, resulting 
in significant die-
offs and limited 
recovery.
In addition to carbon 
dioxide’s heat-trapping 
effect, the increase in 
its concentration in the 
atmosphere is gradually 
acidifying the ocean. 
About one-third of the 
carbon dioxide emitted 
by human activities has 
been absorbed by the 
ocean, resulting in a de-
crease in the ocean’s pH. 
Since the beginning of 
the industrial era, ocean 
pH has declined demon-
strably and is projected 
to decline much more by 
2100 if current emissions 
trends continue. Further 
declines in pH are very 
likely to continue to affect the ability of living things 
to create and maintain shells or skeletons of calcium 
carbonate. This is because at a lower pH less of the dis-
solved carbon is available as carbonate ions (see Global 
Climate Change).70,259 
Ocean acidification will affect living things including 
important plankton species in the open ocean, mollusks 
and other shellfish, and corals.22,23,70,259 The effects on 
reef-building corals are likely to be particularly severe 
during this century. Coral calcification rates are likely 
to decline by more than 30 percent under a doubling of 
atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations, with erosion 
outpacing reef formation at even lower concentrations.22 
In addition, the reduction in pH also affects photosyn-
thesis, growth, and reproduction. The upwelling of 
deeper ocean water, deficient in carbonate, and thus 
potentially detrimental to the food chains supporting 
juvenile salmon has recently been observed along the 
U.S. West Coast.259 
Acidification imposes yet another stress on reef-building 
corals, which are also subject to bleaching – the expul-
sion of the microscopic algae that live inside the corals 
Calcium Carbonate Saturation in Ocean Surface Waters
Corals require the right combination of tempera-
ture, light, and the presence of calcium carbon-
ate (which they use to build their skeletons). As 
atmospheric carbon dioxide levels rise, some of 
the excess carbon dioxide dissolves into ocean 
water, reducing its calcium carbonate saturation. 
As the maps indicate, calcium carbonate saturation 
has already been reduced considerably from its 
pre-industrial level, and model projections suggest 
much greater reductions in the future. The blue 
dots indicate current coral reefs. Note that under 
projections for the future, it is very unlikely that 
calcium carbonate saturation levels will be adequate 
to support coral reefs in any U.S. waters.219
NAST219
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and are essential to their survival – as a result of heat 
stress70 (see Ecosystems sector and Islands region). 
As a result of these and other stresses, the corals that 
form the reefs in the Florida Keys, Puerto Rico, Ha-
waii, and the Pacific Islands are projected to be lost if 
carbon dioxide concentrations continue to rise at their 
current rate.560 
Changing ocean currents will affect  
coastal ecosystems.
Because it affects the distribution of heat in the 
atmosphere and the oceans, climate change will af-
fect winds and currents that move along the nation’s 
coasts, such as the California Current that bathes the 
West Coast from British Columbia to Baja Califor-
nia.70 In this area, wind-driven upwelling of deeper 
ocean water along the coast is vital to moderation 
of temperatures and the high productivity of Pacific 
Coast ecosystems. Coastal currents are subject to 
periodic variations caused by the El Niño-Southern 
Oscillation and the Pacific Decadal Oscillation, which 
have substantial effects on the success of salmon and other fishery resources. Climate change is expected to 
affect such coastal currents, and possibly the larger scale natural oscillations as well, though these effects 
are not yet well understood. The recent emergence of oxygen-depletion events on the continental shelf off 
Oregon and Washington (a dead zone not directly caused by agricultural runoff and waste discharges such 
as those in the Gulf of Mexico or Chesapeake Bay) is one example.561 
Adaptation:  Coping with Sea-Level Rise
Adaptation to sea-level rise is already taking place in three main categories: (1) 
protecting the coastline by building hard structures such as levees and seawalls 
(although hard structures can, in some cases, actually increase risks and worsen 
beach erosion and wetland retreat), (2) accommodating rising water by elevating 
or redesigning structures, enhancing wetlands, or adding sand from elsewhere to beaches (the latter 
is not a permanent solution, and can encourage development in vulnerable locations), and (3) planned 
retreat from the coastline as sea level rises.269 
Several states have laws or regulations that require setbacks for construction based on the planned 
life of the development and observed erosion rates.371 North Carolina, Rhode Island, and South 
Carolina are using such a moving baseline to guide planning. Maine’s Coastal Sand Dune Rules 
prohibit buildings of a certain size that are unlikely to remain stable with a sea-level rise of 2 feet. The 
Massachusetts Coastal Hazards Commission is preparing a 20-year infrastructure and protection plan 
to improve hazards management and the Maryland Commission on Climate Change has recently made 
comprehensive recommendations to reduce the state’s vulnerability to sea-level rise and coastal storms 
by addressing building codes, public infrastructure, zoning, and emergency preparedness. Governments 
and private interests are beginning to take sea-level rise into account in planning levees and bridges,  
and in the siting and design of facilities such as sewage treatment plants (see Adaptation box in 
Northeast region).
Pacific Coast “Dead Zone”
2006 to 2007
Climate change affects coastal currents that moderate ocean 
temperatures and the productivity of ecosystems. As such, it is 
believed to be a factor in the low-oxygen “dead zone” that has 
appeared along the coast of Washington and Oregon in recent 
years.561 In the maps above, blue indicates low-oxygen areas and 
purple shows areas that are the most severely oxygen depleted.
PISCO; NOAA-NWFSC; OSU/COAS562
An Agenda for  
Climate Impacts Science
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Both mitigation and adaptation decisions are becoming 
increasingly necessary. Advancing our knowledge in the 
many aspects of science that affect the climate system 
has already contributed greatly to decision making on 
climate change issues. Further advances in climate 
science including better understanding and projections 
regarding rainfall, storm tracks, storm intensity, heat 
waves, and sea-level rise will improve decision  
making capabilities.
The focus below, however, is on advancing our knowl-
edge specifically on climate change impacts and those 
aspects of climate change responsible for these impacts 
in order to continue to guide decision making. 
Recommendation 1:  
Expand our understanding of climate 
change impacts.
There is a clear need to increase understanding of 
how ecosystems, social and economic systems, human 
health, and infrastructure will be affected by climate 
change in the context of other stresses. New understand-
ing will come from a mix of activities including sus-
tained and systematic observations, field and laboratory 
experiments, model development, and integrated impact 
assessments. These will incorporate shared learning 
among researchers, practitioners (such as engineers and 
water managers), and local stakeholders.
Ecosystems 
Ecosystem changes, in response to changes in climate 
and other environmental conditions, have already been 
documented. These include changes in the chemistry 
of the atmosphere and precipitation, vegetation pat-
terns, growing season length, plant productivity, animal 
species distributions, and the frequency and severity of 
pest outbreaks and fires. In the marine environment, 
changes include the health of corals and other living 
things due to temperature stress and ocean acidification. 
These observations not only document climate-change 
impacts, but also provide critical input to understanding 
how and why these changes occur, and how changes in 
ecosystems in turn affect climate. In this way, records 
of observed changes can improve projections of future 
impacts related to various climate change scenarios. 
In addition to observations, large-scale, whole-ecosys-
tem experiments are essential for improving projections 
of impacts. Ecosystem-level experiments that vary 
multiple factors, such as temperature, moisture, ground-
level ozone, and atmospheric carbon dioxide, would 
provide process-level understanding of the ways eco-
systems could respond to climate change in the context 
of other environmental stresses. Such experiments are 
particularly important for ecosystems with the greatest 
potential to experience massive change due to the cross-
ing of thresholds or tipping points.
Insights regarding ecosystem responses to climate 
change gained from both observations and experiments 
are the essential building blocks of ecosystem simula-
tion models. These models, when rigorously developed 
and tested, provide powerful tools for exploring the 
ecosystem consequences of alternative future climates. 
The incorporation of ecosystem models into an integrat-
ed assessment framework that includes socioeconomic, 
atmospheric and ocean chemistry, and atmosphere-
ocean general circulation models should be a major goal 
of impacts research. This knowledge can provide a base 
for research studies into ways to manage critical ecosys-
tems in an environment that is continually changing. 
Economic systems, human health, and the 
built environment
As natural systems experience variations due to a 
changing climate, social and economic systems will 
U.S. Global Change Research Program
154 155
Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States An Agenda for Climate Impacts Science
be affected. Food production, water resources, forests, 
parks, and other managed systems provide life support 
for society. Their sustainability will depend on how well 
they can adapt to a future climate that is different from 
historical experience. 
At the same time, climate change is exposing human 
health and the built environment to increasing risks. 
Among the likely impacts are an expansion of the 
ranges of insects and other animals that carry diseases 
and a greater incidence of health-threatening air pollu-
tion events compounded by unusually hot weather as-
sociated with climate change. In coastal areas, sea-level 
rise and storm surge threaten infrastructure including 
homes, roads, ports, and oil and gas drilling and distri-
bution facilities. In other parts of the country, floods, 
droughts, and other weather and climate extremes pose 
increasing threats. 
Careful observations along with climate and Earth 
system models run with a range of emissions scenarios 
can help society evaluate these risks and plan actions to 
minimize them. Work in this area would include assess-
ments of the performance of delivery systems, such as 
those for regional water and electricity supply, so that 
climate change impacts and costs can be evaluated in 
terms of changes in risk to system performance. It will 
be particularly important to understand when the effects 
on these systems are extremely large and/or rapid, 
similar to tipping points and thresholds in ecosystems.
In addition, the climate change experienced outside the 
United States will have implications for our nation. A 
better understanding of these international linkages, 
including those related to trade, security, and large-scale 
movements of people in response to climate change,  
is desirable. 
Recommendation 2: 
Refine ability to project climate change, 
including extreme events, at local scales.
One of the main messages to emerge from the past 
decade of synthesis and assessments is that while 
climate change is a global issue, it has a great deal of 
regional variability. There is an indisputable need to 
improve understanding of climate system effects at 
these smaller scales, because these are often the scales 
of decision making in society. Understanding impacts at 
local scales will also help to target finite resources for 
adaptation measures. Although much progress has been 
made in understanding important aspects of this vari-
ability, uncertainties remain. Further work is needed on 
how to quantify cumulative uncertainties across spatial 
scales and the uncertainties associated with complex, 
intertwined natural and social systems. 
Because region-specific climate changes will occur in 
the context of other environmental and social changes 
that are also region-specific, it is important to continue 
to refine our understanding of regional details, espe-
cially those related to precipitation and soil moisture. 
This would be aided by further testing of models against 
observations using established metrics designed to 
evaluate and improve the realism of regional  
model simulations. 
Continued development of improved, higher resolution 
global climate models, increased computational capac-
ity, extensive climate model experiments, and improved 
downscaling methods will increase the value of geo-
graphically specific climate projections for decision 
makers in government, business, and the  
general population. 
Extreme weather and climate events are a key com-
ponent of regional climate. Additional attention needs 
to be focused on improved observations (made on the 
relevant time and space scales to capture high-impact 
extreme events) and associated research and analysis of 
the potential for future changes in extremes. Impacts 
analyses indicate that extreme weather and climate 
events often play a major role in determining climate-
change consequences. 
Recommendation 3: 
Expand capacity to provide decision makers 
and the public with relevant information on 
climate change and its impacts.
The United States has tremendous potential to create 
more comprehensive measurement, archive, and data-
access systems and to convey needed information that 
could provide great benefit to society. There are several 
aspects to fulfilling this goal: defining what is most 
relevant, gathering the needed information, expanding 
the capacity to deliver information, and improving the 
tools for decision makers to use this information to the 
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best advantage. All of these aspects should involve an 
interactive and iterative process of continual learning 
between those who provide information and those who 
use it. Through such a process, monitoring systems, 
distribution networks, and tools for using information 
can all be refined to meet user needs. 
For example, tools used by researchers that could also 
be useful to decision makers include those that analyze 
and display the probability of occurrence of a range of 
outcomes to help in assessing risks.
Improved climate monitoring can be efficiently 
achieved by following the Climate Monitoring Prin-
ciples recommended by the National Academy of 
Sciences and the Climate Change Science Strategic Plan 
in addition to integrating current efforts of governments 
at all levels. Such a strategy complements a long-term 
commitment to the measurement of the set of essential 
climate variables identified by both the Climate Change 
Science Program and the Global Climate Observing 
System. Attention must be placed on the variety of time 
and space scales critical for decision making.
Improved impacts monitoring would include informa-
tion on the physical and economic effects of extreme 
events (such as floods and droughts), available, for 
example, from emergency preparedness and resource 
management authorities. It would also include regular 
archiving of information about impacts.
Improved access to data and information archives could 
substantially enhance society’s ability to respond to 
climate change. While many data related to climate 
impacts are already freely and readily available to a 
broad range of users, other data, such as damage costs, 
are not, and efforts should be made to make them 
available. Easily accessible information should include 
a set of agreed-upon baseline indicators and measures 
of environmental conditions that can be used to track 
the effects of changes in climate. Services that provide 
reliable, well-documented, and easily used climate 
information, and make this information available to 
support users, are important.
Recommendation 4: 
Improve understanding of thresholds likely 
to lead to abrupt changes in climate or 
ecosystems.
Paleoclimatic data show that climate can and has 
changed quite abruptly when certain thresholds are 
crossed. Similarly, there is evidence that ecological 
and human systems can undergo abrupt change when 
tipping points are reached. 
Within the climate system there are a number of key 
risks to society for which understanding is still quite 
limited. Additional research is needed in some key 
areas, for example, identifying thresholds that lead to 
rapid changes in ice sheet dynamics. Sea-level rise is 
a major concern and improved understanding of the 
sensitivity of the major ice sheets to sustained warming 
requires improved observing capability, analysis, and 
modeling of the ice sheets and their interactions with 
nearby oceans. Estimates of sea-level rise in previous 
assessments, such as the recent Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change 2007 report, did not fully quantify 
the magnitude and rate of future sea-level rise due to 
inadequate scientific understanding of potential insta-
bilities of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets. 
Tipping points in biological systems include the tem-
perature thresholds above which insects survive winter, 
and can complete two life cycles instead of one in a 
single growing season, contributing to infestations that 
kill large numbers of trees. The devastation caused by 
bark beetles in Canada, and increasingly in the U.S. 
West, provides an example of how crossing such a 
threshold can set off massive destruction in an ecosys-
tem with far-reaching consequences. 
Similarly, there is increasing concern about the 
acidification of the world’s oceans due to rising atmo-
spheric carbon dioxide levels. There are ocean acidity 
thresholds beyond which corals and other living things, 
including some that form the base of important marine 
food chains, will no longer be able to form the shells 
and other body structures they need to survive. Improv-
ing understanding of such thresholds is an important 
goal for future research.
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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Recommendation 5:
Improve understanding of the most 
effective ways to reduce the rate and 
magnitude of climate change, as well as 
unintended consequences of such activities.
This report underscores the importance of reducing the 
concentrations of heat-trapping gases in the atmosphere. 
Impacts of climate change during this century and 
beyond are projected to be far larger and more rapid in 
scenarios in which greenhouse gas concentrations con-
tinue to grow rapidly compared to scenarios in which 
concentrations grow more slowly. Additional research 
will help identify the desired mix of mitigation options 
necessary to control the rate and magnitude of  
climate change. 
 
In addition to their intended reduction of atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gases, mitigation options 
also have the potential for unintended consequences, 
which should also be examined in future research. For 
example, the production, transportation, and use of 
biofuels could lead to increases in water and fertilizer 
use as well as in some air pollutants. It could also create 
competition among land uses for food production, biofu-
els production, and natural ecosystems that provide 
many benefits to society. Improved understanding of 
such unintended consequences, and identification of 
those options that carry the largest negative impacts, 
can help decision makers make more informed choices 
regarding the possible trade-offs inherent in various 
mitigation strategies.
Recommendation 6:
Enhance understanding of how society can 
adapt to climate change.
There is currently limited knowledge about the ability 
of communities, regions, and sectors to adapt to future 
climate change. It is important to improve understand-
ing of how to enhance society’s capacity to adapt to a 
changing climate in the context of other environmental 
stresses. Interdisciplinary research on adaptation that 
takes into account the interconnectedness of the Earth 
system and the complex nature of the social, political, 
and economic environment in which adaptation deci-
sions must be made would be central to this effort.
The potential exists to provide insights into the possible 
effectiveness and limits of adaptation options that might 
be considered in the future. To realize this potential, 
new research would be helpful to document past re-
sponses to climate variability and other environmental 
changes, analyze the underlying reasons for them, and 
explain how individual and institutional decisions were 
made. However, human-induced climate change is 
projected to be larger and more rapid than any experi-
enced by modern society so there are limits to what can 
be learned from the past.
A major difficulty in the analysis of adaptation strate-
gies in this report has been the lack of information 
about the potential costs of adaptation measures, their 
effectiveness under various scenarios of climate change, 
the time horizons required for their implementation, 
and unintended consequences. These types of informa-
tion should be systematically gathered and shared with 
decision makers as they consider a range of adaptation 
options. It is also clear that there is a substantial gap 
between the available information about climate change 
and the development of new guidelines for infrastruc-
ture such as housing, transportation, water systems, 
commercial buildings, and energy systems. There are 
also social and institutional obstacles to appropriate 
action, even in the face of adequate knowledge. These 
obstacles need to be better understood so that they can 
be reduced or eliminated.
Finally, it is important to carry out regular assess-
ments of adaptation measures that address combined 
scenarios of future climate change, population growth, 
and economic development paths. This is an important 
opportunity for shared learning in which researchers, 
practitioners, and stakeholders collaborate using obser-
vations, models, and dialogue to explore adaptation as 
part of long-term, sustainable development planning. 
Concluding Thoughts
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Responding to changing conditions
Human-induced climate change is happening now, 
and impacts are already apparent. Greater impacts are 
projected, particularly if heat-trapping gas emissions 
continue unabated. Previous assessments have estab-
lished these facts, and this report confirms, solidifies, 
and extends these conclusions for the United States. It 
reports the latest understanding of how climate change 
is already affecting important sectors and regions. In 
particular, it reports that some climate change impacts 
appear to be increasing faster than previous assessments 
had suggested. This report represents a significant up-
date to previous work, as it draws from the U.S. Climate 
Change Science Program’s Synthesis and Assessment 
Products and other recent studies that examine how 
climate change and its effects are projected to continue 
to increase over this century and beyond. 
Climate choices
Choices about emissions now and in the coming years 
will have far-reaching consequences for climate change 
impacts. A consistent finding of this assessment is that 
the rate and magnitude of future climate change and 
resulting impacts depend critically on the level of global 
atmospheric heat-trapping gas concentrations as well as 
the types and concentrations of atmospheric particles 
(aerosols). Lower emissions of heat-trapping gases will 
delay the appearance of climate change impacts and 
lessen their magnitude. Unless the rate of emissions is 
substantially reduced, impacts are expected to become 
increasingly severe for more people and places. 
Similarly, there are choices to be made about adaptation 
strategies that can help to reduce or avoid some of the 
undesirable impacts of climate change. There is much 
to learn about the effectiveness of the various types of 
adaptation responses and how they will interact with 
each other and with mitigation actions. 
Responses to the climate change challenge will almost 
certainly evolve over time as society learns by doing. 
Determining and refining societal responses will be 
an iterative process involving scientists, policymakers, 
and public and private decision makers at all levels. 
Implementing these response strategies will require 
careful planning and continual feedback on the impacts 
of mitigation and adaptation policies for government, 
industry, and society.
The value of assessments
Science has revolutionized our ability to observe and 
model the Earth’s climate and living systems, to un-
derstand how they are changing, and to project future 
changes in ways that were not possible in prior genera-
tions. These advances have enabled the assessment of 
climate change, impacts, vulnerabilities, and response 
strategies. Assessments serve a very important function 
in providing the scientific underpinnings of informed 
policy. They can identify advances in the underlying 
science, provide critical analysis of issues, and highlight 
key findings and key unknowns that can guide decision 
making. Regular assessments also serve as progress 
reports to evaluate and improve policy making and other 
types of decision making related to climate change.
U.S. Global Change Research Program
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Impacts and adaptation research includes complex 
human dimensions, such as economics, manage-
ment, governance, behavior, and equity. Compre-
hensive assessments provide an opportunity to 
evaluate the social implications of climate change 
within the context of larger questions of how com-
munities and the nation as a whole create sustain-
able and environmentally sound development paths.
A vision for future U.S. assessments
Over the past decade, U.S. federal agencies have 
undertaken two coordinated, national-scale efforts 
to evaluate the impacts of global climate change 
on this country. Each effort produced a report to 
the nation – Climate Change Impacts on the United 
States, published in 2000, and this report, Global 
Climate Change Impacts in the United States, 
published in 2009. A unique feature of the first 
report was that in addition to reporting the current 
state of the science, it created a national discourse 
on climate change that involved hundreds of sci-
entists and thousands of stakeholders including 
farmers, ranchers, resource managers, city planners, 
business people, and local and regional government 
officials. A notable feature of the second report is 
the incorporation of information from the 21 topic-
specific Synthesis and Assessment Products, many 
motivated by stakeholder interactions. 
A vision for future climate change assessments 
includes both sustained, extensive stakeholder 
involvement, and targeted, scientifically rigorous 
reports that address concerns in a timely fashion. 
The value of stakeholder involvement includes 
helping scientists understand what information 
society wants and needs. In addition, the problem-
solving abilities of stakeholders will be essential to 
designing, initiating, and evaluating mitigation and 
adaptation strategies and their interactions. The best 
decisions about these strategies will come when 
there is widespread understanding of the complex 
issue of climate change – the science and its many 
implications for our nation.
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